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ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to assess the impact of the liberalisation of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) on the Thai economic development. The case study of Thailand is interesting 
because the country has embraced market-driven development policies, particularly FDI 
and export-led growth strategy, for nearly forty years but her economic performance is far 
from being excellent. The need for assessing these policies is critical because it is observed 
that Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have increasingly benefited from the 
government‟s investment incentive scheme more than domestic investment projects.  
This study offers a multi-disciplinary literature review showing that FDI not only generates 
an inflow of resources into the host economy but also creates an outflow of other types of 
resources. While FDI may bring additional capital and advanced technology that 
contributing to economic growth, the introduction of superior firms into the domestic 
markets in developing countries may also amplify the magnitude of market imperfections.  
These imperfections may be found to be more beneficial to TNCs than to domestic 
entrepreneurs. Thus, without sufficient and appropriate government interventions, 
domestic entrepreneurs may find difficulties in developing their ownership-specific 
advantages. This advantage at the aggregate level can be regarded as the productive 
capability of the nation that helps to increase the country‟s competitive advantages along 
its development path. Thus, liberalising FDI without strategic planning may cause an 
unfavourable impact on economic development. Under these circumstances, the 
dependency remains tenable to explain the phenomenon. 
The study‟s proposition is approached and validated by the use of political economy and 
empirical analyses. From political economy analysis, it shows that Thailand has a number 
of economic features suggesting it to be a capital-dependent state as argued by dependency 
theory. The empirical analysis is then carried out to assess the impact of inward FDI on the 
Thai GNI. The framework and methods used in empirical study are borrowed from the 
Growth Economics. The income regressions, using the quarterly time series data from 
Q1:1970 - Q4:2009, show that in the case of Thailand, inward FDI has been beneficial to 
the growth of the economy only in the short run but has a negative impact on the GNI in 
the long run. Moreover, the study found that the empirical evidence appears to support the 
claim of Thailand being a capital-dependent state. It found that inward FDI empirically 
explains an increase in income deficits and totals imports. These impacts render the 
balance of payments in a vulnerable position. The study then concludes that, given the 
nature of the Thai political economy, the liberalisation of FDI seems to make Thailand a 
capital dependent state, and that Thailand has not fully benefited from FDI.  
 
 
iii 
 
 
Research Supervisory Team 
 
Director of Studies 
Dr. Sima Motamen-Samadian, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., 
Economics and Quantitative Methods 
University of Westminster 
 
 
Second Supervisor 
Dr. Giorgio Di Pietro, B.Sc., Ph.D., 
Economics and Quantitative Methods 
University of Westminster 
 
 
Second Supervisor 
Dr. Latif Wahid, B.Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D., 
Economics and Quantitative Methods 
University of Westminster 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I am grateful to all the people who helped me in various stages of this PhD research. 
Without their help and support, I could never have reached a successful conclusion of this 
thesis.  
First and foremost, I am indebted to my Director of Studies, Dr. Sima Motamem-Samadian 
for her guidance, suggestions, and encouragement throughout the time of the research. I am 
also thankful to my second supervisors, Dr. Giorgio Di Pietro and Dr. Latif Wahid, for 
guidance, especially on the empirical side of the research. An equally important person, 
whose dedicated support was essential to the completion of this thesis, is Dr. Stewart 
Brodie. His guidance on research style and format made this thesis readable and 
presentable. I also would like to thank Professor David Shepherd and Dr. Elayne Coakes 
for their useful comments on my thesis. Nevertheless, I am the only person responsible for 
any remaining mistakes. 
There are a few more people who are not working in the university but, at some stages, had 
given guidance on my work. They are Associate Professor Lae Dilokvidharat, Professor 
Costas Lapavitsas, Professor Lawan Thanadsillapakul, Attakrit Leckcivilize, Nopphol 
Witvorapong, and Veerayooth Kanchoochat. My special gratitude also goes to the scholars 
whose names are mentioned in the bibliography. The intellectual footprints that they left 
helped me to understand the meaning of the phrase „standing on the shoulders of the 
giants‟.  
My thanks also go to friends and colleagues in Room M202, who were very supportive 
especially when I faced difficulties in both research and personal life. Finally, I can never 
thank enough my parents, Chaivat and Viladda, for giving me love and support in every 
aspect of my life. I would like also to thank my husband, Suksun, for his encouragement 
and care throughout my PhD journey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
ABSTRACT           ii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT        iv 
TABLE OF CONTENT         v 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS        x 
LIST OF TABLES         xii 
LIST OF FIGURES         xiii 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background        1 
1.2  Aims and Objectives of the Research      7 
1.2.1 Aims of the Study       8 
1.2.2 Objectives of the Study      8 
1.3    Research Design        10 
1.4 Research Methods        12 
1.5  Distinctive Contributions       15 
1.5.1 Analytical Contributions      15 
1.5.2  Empirical Evidence       16 
1.5.3 Practical Contributions       17 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis       17 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review I 
The Theory of the Firm and the Emergence  
of Transnational  Corporations (TNCs) 
 
2.1  Introduction         21 
2.2 The of the Growth of the Firm      22 
2.3  Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and their International Operations 25 
2.3.1  Nationality of the Firm      26 
2.3.2 Emergence of the TNCs and FDI     28 
2.3.2.1 Monopolistic Advantage and the Need to Control  30 
2.3.2.2 Product Life Cycle      35 
2.3.2.3 Internalisation and the Theory of Location   42 
2.3.2.4 The Eclectic Theory      44 
2.4 Definitions of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)    46 
2.5   Summary         49 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review II 
The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on  
Development and Political Economy of TNCs 
 
3.1  Introduction         51 
3.2  Economic Growth and Development      53 
3.2.1 Growth Economics       54 
3.2.1.1 Growth Models with FDI     56 
3.2.1.2 Empirical Evidence of FDI Spillovers   70 
3.2.2 The Role of the State and its Market Interventions   76 
3.2.3 FDI-related Development Policies     80 
3.2.3.1  Neo-liberalism and its Impact on FDI Policies  81 
vii 
 
3.3  Critical Perspectives on FDI and Economic Growth    85 
3.3.1  Dependency Theory and Political Economy of TNCs  87 
3.3.2 Capital Dependency Theory      91 
3.3.3 Dependency Theory and Neo-liberalism    102 
3.4  Summary         104 
 
Chapter 4: Conceptual Framework  
 
4.1  Introduction         106 
4.2  An Integrative Framework of FDI-Growth Concept    107 
4.2.1 First Scenario: the Investment Development Path   108 
4.2.2 Second Scenario: the Capital Dependent State     113 
4.3 Theoretical Model                    116 
4.3.1 Static Exogenous Growth Model with International Investment 118 
4.4 Summary         123 
 
Chapter 5: Thai Economic and Political Background 
 
5.1 Introduction         125 
5.2 FDI in Thailand        126 
5.2.1 Empirical Studies of FDI in Thailand     130 
5.2.2 FDI Policies in Thailand       132 
5.2.3 Patterns of FDI in Thailand and Total Factor Productivity  138 
5.2.4  Thailand in the Global Economy     142 
5.3  Brief Modern History of Thai Political and Economic Growth  154 
5.3.1 Political and Economic Development from the 1970s to Present 158 
5.4 Summary         170 
 
 
viii 
 
Chapter 6: Data, Empirical Analyses, and Discussions 
 
6.1  Introduction         172 
6.2  Econometric Methods        173 
6.2.1  Engle-Granger Two-step Procedure     175 
6.2.2  System Based Cointegration of Johansen    177 
6.2.3  Vector Error Correction Granger Causality     180 
6.3 Data, Variables, and Analysis of Time-series    181 
6.3.1 Data and Variables       182 
6.3.2 Analysis of Time-series      185 
6.4 Engle-Granger Two-step Procedure, Results, and Discussion  188 
6.5 Johansen Cointegration and VECM, Results, and Discussion  193 
6.6 Bi-variate and VEC Granger Causality     201 
6.7 Summary         205 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
7.1  Introduction          207 
7.2  Review of the Dissertation        207 
7.3  Policy Implications         217 
7.4  Limitations and Future Work       219 
 
Bibliography          221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Summary of Empirical Studies of Inward FDI on Growth   249 
Appendix B: Some Likely Benefits and Costs of Different Types of 
FDI to Host Countries       257 
Appendix C: Report of TFP Studies in Thailand     258 
Appendix D: Net Flow of FDI by Economic Sector      263 
Appendix E: Data Preparation        265 
Appendix F: The Estimation of Unrestricted Vector Autoregressions    270 
Appendix G: Thai Import and Export by Economic Sector    272 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS  
 
ADB   Asian Development Bank 
ADF   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
AIC   Akaike Information Criterion 
BIBF   Bangkok International Banking Facility 
BOI   Board of Investment (Thailand) 
BOP   Balance of Payment 
BOT    Bank of Thailand 
CPI   Consumer Price Index 
DWH   Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity Test 
ECM   Error Correction Model 
FBA   Foreign Business Act 
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA   Free Trade Areas 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GNI   Gross National Income 
HQ   Hannan and Quinn Criteria 
IDP   Investment Development Path 
IEA   Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IPA   Investment Promotion Act 
IV   Instrumental Variable 
M & A   Merger and Acquisition 
NESDB National Economic & Social Development Board 
(Thailand) 
NIEs   Newly Industrialised Economies 
NOI   Net Outward Investment 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
xi 
 
OLS   Ordinary Least Square 
PI   Portfolio Investment 
PLC   Product Life Cycle 
R & D   Research & Development 
SEQ   Structural Equation 
SIC   Schwarz Information Criterion 
TFP   Total Factor Productivity 
TNCs   Transnational Corporations 
UNCTAD  United Nation Conference on Trade and Development 
VAR   Vector Auto-regressions 
VECM    Vector Error Correction Model 
WB   World Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 5.1: Percentage Share of Net Inward FDI in Thailand Classified by 
Country 
126 
Table 5.2: Net Flow of Inward FDI by Economic Sector 129 
Table 5.3: Major Developments in the FDI Policy Regime 133 
Table 5.4: Distribution of Projects Being Granted Investment Incentives on the 
Basis of Ownership 
135 
Table 5.5: Structure of Foreign and Domestic Share of Registered Capital in 
Granted Project 
136 
Table 5.6: Percentage Share of Net Inflow of FDI in Thailand by Sector 139 
Table 5.7: Percentage Share of Gross National Product by Industrial Origin 140 
Table 6.1: ADF Unit Roots Examination on Variables 187 
Table 6.2: Cointegration Regressions 189 
Table 6.3: ADF Statistics of the Residuals from Cointegration Regressions 190 
Table 6.4: Engle and Granger Error Correction Model 192 
Table 6.5a: Test for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors Based on Trace 
Tests where k = 1 
195 
Table 6.5b: Test for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors Based on Maximum 
Eigenvalue Tests where k = 1 
195 
Table 6.6a: Test for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors Based on Trace 
Tests where k = 16 
196 
Table 6.6b: Test for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors Based on Maximum 
Eigenvalue Tests where k = 16 
196 
Table 6.7: Johansen Test for Cointegrating Vector of the Thai Growth 
Regression 
197 
Table 6.8: Estimation of the VECM 200 
Table 6.9: Bi-variate Granger Causality Tests 202 
Table 6.10: VEC Granger Causality Tests 203 
xiii 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1: Dynamics of Changes in Category of Income Per Capita Among 
Major Asian Countries During 1960 - 2009 
2 
Figure 3.1: Hypothethical BOP Depicting the Scenario Where Inward FDI 
Causes Leakages in Current account 
94 
Figure 4.1: Investment Development Path 109 
Figure 4.2: Development Path of a Capital Dependent State 114 
Figure 5.1: Ratio of FDI to GDP from 1980 - 2009 128 
Figure 5.2: Net Outward Investment and GNI Per Capita 144 
Figure 5.3: Ratio of GNI to GDP from 1970 - 2008 146 
Figure 5.4: Net Balance on Goods, Services, and Income from 1975 - 2008 149 
Figure 5.5: Net Current Account and Net Financial Account 150 
Figure 5.6: Cumulative Net Balance on Goods, Services, and Income 151 
Figure 5.7: Inward FDI, Export and Import of Goods, Import of Services and 
Income Payable 
151 
Figure 5.8: Inward FDI and Income Payable to the Rest of the World 152 
Figure 5.9: Terms of Trade in Constant Price US$ 153 
Figure 5.10: Percentage Growth Rate of GDP from 1970 - 2008 159 
Figure 5.11: Export of Goods and Services as Percentage of GDP 163 
Figure 5.12: Inflow of FDI and Portfolio Investment from 1975 - 2008 165 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
Prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Thailand had exhibited an outstanding growth 
performance. At that time, it was speculated that Thailand would soon become the fifth 
Asian Tiger to join the club of the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) which constitute 
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea. This speculation was sensible at that time, 
if one looked solely at the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the 
country‟s export performance. Thailand embarked on her modern economic development at 
the same time as her regional counterparts did particularly South Korea. The modern Thai 
economy had formally embraced an outward economic development regime since the 1970s 
when the country‟s annual Gross National Income (GNI) per capita stood at US$ 1901. At 
the same time, in South Korea, General Park Chung-hee ascended to his presidency and 
radically laid out the developmental path for South Korea‟s economic development (Il 
Sakong, 1993; Chang and Evans, 2000). South Korea‟s annual GNI per capita in 1970 was 
only US$ 277. 
 
                                                          
1
 Own calculations, World Development Indicator (2010)  
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Four decades later, however, South Korea has successfully transformed her relatively 
backward economy into an advanced one. Thailand has not even reached half-way to the 
experience enjoyed by South Korea. In 2009, while the current GNI per capita in South 
Korea was approximately US$ 17,000 that of Thailand stood modestly at US$ 3,700
2
. 
Obviously, the difference has been growing over time. Figure 1.1 depicts the dynamics of 
changes in categories of income per capita classified by the World Bank. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: DYNAMICS OF CHANGES IN CATEGORY OF INCOME PER CAPITA AMONG 
MAJOR ASIAN COUNTRIES DURING 1960-2009 
 
Source: Own calculations, World Development Indicators (2010) 
 
In a broader picture, in the beginning of 1960s, it is seen that all major East Asian countries 
were classified as low-income countries. Over the years, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
performed best in this league. Within 25-30 years, they repositioned themselves as rich 
countries, while Korea joined the club later in the very beginning of 21
st
 century. Malaysia, 
even lagging behind the NIEs, performed better than Thailand, while Indonesia and 
Philippines in contrast appear to have progressed fairly slowly. Within the same length of 
time, the last three countries could not break away from the low-middle income category.  
                                                          
2
 Own calculations, World Development Indicator (2010) 
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It is widely known that the major contributions to Asian economic success lie in their 
outward strategy to growth that influenced their plans towards international trade and 
investment, government intervention, high saving and investment rates, macroeconomic 
disciplines and good public policies. However, as economic performance varies among 
countries, the sources of divergence must be sought in fundamental differences in the 
development strategies adopted in Thailand and the NIEs. A general aspect may lie in the 
development model. It can be said that while Japan and the NIEs had a dirigiste model of 
development, Thailand has had a pragmatic, neo-liberal model of development which 
emphasises extensively the liberalisation of trade and inward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). A more specific aspect lies in the attitudes towards FDI. The chosen focus is selected 
on the basis of economic history of the countries. It is noted that Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea had been notably unfriendly towards inward FDI during the early stage of their 
economic development (Dunning, 1990; Il Sakong, 1993; Kim, 2000; Chang and Evans, 
2000; and Amsden and Chu, 2003). This is in the stark contrast to the Thai development 
model where inward FDI was thought to be the key stimulus to economic development and, 
therefore, the country implemented extensive policies and offered numerous incentives to 
attract more inward FDI. 
Furthermore, it is also observed that East Asian countries that underwent successful 
industrialisation appear to have successful and strong domestic firms. Some of them, later on, 
became Transnational Corporations (TNCs). The literature from international business and 
industrial organisation suggests that firms survive and grow stronger because they possess 
competitive advantages. It must be noted that large firms and TNCs from the successful East 
Asian nations have not only been protected from international competitors during their 
inceptions but also heavily subsidised by their states. In Thailand, confined by the neo-
liberal ideology, state‟s interventions and rigid industrial planning hardly ever took place.   
In fact, a firm‟s competitive advantages at the aggregate level reflect the nation‟s productive 
capability. According to Chang (2010), the nation‟s productive capability is an ability to 
command the sphere of productive forces. In other words, it is the ability to produce superior 
knowledge embodied in technologies and institutions. Chang (2010) goes further to criticise 
that the contemporary notion of „development‟, which largely derived from a neo-liberal, 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 4 
developmental framework, appears to overlook this essential aspect of the spirit of 
„development‟ which prevailed in the 1970s.  
Chang (2009, 2010) explains that contemporary development focuses mainly on poverty 
reduction, provision of basic needs such as education and health care, sustenance of existing 
productive structure, and individual betterment. These factors, individually, would not cause 
a complete development. They require a strategic organisation by the state so that the 
productive capability can be created. However, the contemporary developmental regime 
undermines the role of the state as well as the necessity of industrial planning and the 
protection of an infant industry. This, in turn, may impede the formation of productive 
capability, though all objectives of contemporary development have been achieved.  
The Thai Development and FDI 
Before the Asian financial crisis, Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996) published a report praising 
the success of Thailand‟s macro-economic management. More specifically, they expressed 
an approval of the effectiveness of the country‟s economic policies that relied, to a large 
extent, on market mechanism as a principal means of resource allocation. Cleary, Thailand‟s 
economic development model has largely been influenced by the neo-liberal ideology, 
promoted globally by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Hewison (2005, p.313) accurately states that Thailand has been a „star pupil‟ of the above 
mentioned international agencies for many years.  
From the Thai economic history, there were two periods when Thailand implemented liberal 
development policies. First, it was in the early 1970s, when Thailand shifted from an import-
substitution to an export-promotion strategy. This period is crucial because, in parallel with 
implementing export-led growth strategy, Thailand also revised her investment-related law 
and Foreign Business Act in such a way that facilitated more foreign operations particularly, 
in the export sectors. It must be noted that this strategy is different from that of, for example, 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, where their governments worked closely with domestic firms, 
rather than TNCs, in creating export and strategic industries. Confirmed by Phongpaichit and Baker 
(2003), Kohpaiboon (2009), Thai local firms and TNCs appear to specialise in different sectors. While 
large Thai conglomerates tended to be successful in domestically confined and low technological-
intensive sectors, such as, media, real estate, communication, and toys production, TNCs are more 
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competitive in high technological-intensive export sectors, such as, machinery, automobile 
parts, and the chemical industry.  
The second time that Thailand had to embrace the more extended neo-liberal policies was 
after being hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Despite the fact that this crisis was 
caused by the pre-mature liberalisation of the capital account, Thailand still did not reduce 
the extent of neo-liberal policies that were implemented. In contrast, she continued to adopt 
more neo-liberal policies, particularly in the area of FDI. This time, privatisation and more 
deregulations in the FDI-related area were carried out. These include, for example, the 
abolition of local content requirements, and permissions for 100% foreign ownership in the 
manufacturing sector.  
After the crisis, Thai academics started to question seriously the effectiveness of the neo-
liberal development regime (Hewison, 1999, 2001, 2005; Phongpaichit, 2005a, 2005b, 
2006a; Pongpaichit and Baker, 2003, and Winichakul, 2008). This is because the crisis had 
induced deep structural changes in the economy such as the transfer of ownership from 
domestic entrepreneurs to TNCs in several lucrative sectors, namely, banking and 
automobile and parts production. TNCs also became dominant in export sectors. The 
country became increasingly dependent on external factors. Most importantly, the crisis did 
highlight one structural deficiency of the Thai economy, namely the lack of productive 
capability, embodied in Thai domestic firms. As the national productive capability is 
responsible for the sustainable development, it is interesting to investigate whether or not the 
FDI-led growth policies and the neo-liberal development model can partly explain such 
deficiency. 
Possibly, the limited productive capability, normally embodied in domestic firms was lost 
due to the extreme implementation of FDI-led growth policies. For example, an introduction 
of TNCs could out-compete domestic firms or restrict the enhancement of domestic firms‟ 
capabilities. Besides, there was no effective competition law to restrict the aggressive 
activities of TNCs. This could be partly explained by the decision of the governments in the 
past in taking a limited role in directing the path of the country‟s economic development and 
leaving this task to a market mechanism which does not necessarily serve the national 
interest. Indeed, Doner and Hawes (1995) observed that Thailand had a weak state. Its past 
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governments were more likely to leave the fate of the country‟s economic development to 
the forces of the markets rather than a strategic organisation and coordination among 
domestic agents.  
In fairness, the liberalisation of FDI seems to be more beneficial than harmful to 
development as FDI is perceived as long-term capital that is less volatile compared to 
portfolio investment (PI). Besides, FDI has a good reputation of carrying additional capital 
and advanced technology to host countries. Thus, the presumption that FDI would generate a 
positive effect on the economic development of host developing countries has become 
contemporary conventional wisdom. However, it must be noted that, during the 1960s and 
the 1970s, the impact of FDI on economic development was seriously questioned and 
criticised, particularly by dependency theorists.  
FDI and development generated much controversy and debate in the late 1970s, both in 
policymaking and academic circles, particularly among social scientists whose interest lay in 
development (Biersteker, 1978). Dependency theorists argued that FDI might also distort the 
institutional structure of the host economy so much so that a full capitalist development may 
never be achieved. Distortions may be found in the forms of outflows of resources, 
displacing domestic entrepreneurs, and inequality. The empirical studies, assessing the 
impact of FDI on growth, give inconclusive results. In fact, it can be said that the impact of 
FDI on economic development is not unique and universal. Moreover, in the cases where the 
likely benefits of inward FDI are observed, they are conditional on several conditions such 
as, a significant absorptive capacity and a liberal trade regime. Clearly, the benefits of FDI 
are not automatic. The nature of the impact is largely specific to the context. Thus, 
Biersteker (1978) and Dunning (1995) suggested that a thorough insight into the impact of 
FDI in host countries can be gained with an analysis of the institutional configuration 
embedded in the host country.  
The loss of vitality of the academic debate on FDI and development topic may be explained 
by several reasons. Firstly, neo-classical economics and its descendants have gained the 
hegemonic power over the matters of explaining and examining economic problems. This 
line of theories suggests that FDI are a bundle of technology and additional capital which 
would be beneficial for development in developing countries. However, these mainstream 
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theories do not fully take into account the motivations of TNCs and the role of the state in 
the host countries.  
Secondly, specialisation influences the curriculum in universities. The uni-disciplinary style 
in academia appears to play its part. While the proponents of the positive impact of FDI 
draw their argument from the static framework, where only quantifiable economic forces are 
incorporated, those who argue for the negative impact of FDI mostly involve qualitatively 
socio-political factors and the use of a dynamic framework in their analysis. As a result, the 
former falls into the economic arena and the latter goes to political and social studies. Each 
of them publishes their own journals, have their own discussion circles and differing ways of 
looking at the world. Unless research into the impact of FDI and economic growth takes a 
multi-disciplinary approach, the results may not be fully fruitful.  
Thirdly, it is also due to the dominance of neo-liberal ideology, whose main proponents are 
the key international agencies that look after the policy-making processes in most of the 
developing world. This ideology advocates a free market economy in which government 
interventions and restrictions on the mobility of resources should be kept minimal. The neo-
liberal exponents also argue for FDI-related positive spillovers which stem from the liberal 
framework. At the same time, the strength of the opponents has been weakened by the 
collapse of the planned economies in the USSR and difficulties that most import-substitution 
regimes faced. As the intellectual root of those who are critical of FDI and its impact on 
development lie mainly in Marxist analysis, their credibility has been criticised by 
mainstream economics. As mainstream economics prioritises knowledge gained trough a 
scientific approach, they accused the critics of FDI as being politically motivated. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
 
The economic situations that Thailand is now experiencing can be described as follows. 
Firstly, as mentioned earlier, even though all East Asian nations adopted an export 
promotion strategy, the management of FDI during the early stage of development in Japan 
and the NIEs was different from that of Thailand. It was then observed that, while exports 
from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea were largely produced by their domestic firms, 
transnational corporations (TNCs) account for the majority share of Thai exports 
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(Kohpaiboon, 2003; Tambunlertchai, 2009; and Thanadsillapakul, 2010). Secondly, the 
country is experiencing the situation where domestic capital started to give way to foreign 
investment in several major industries such as banking and the automobile industry, 
particularly after the crisis (Phongpaichit, 2006). Thirdly, as a result of an attempt to 
promote more inward FDI, it appears that instrumental policies that were created to increase 
technological spillovers between TNCs and domestic firms, such as, local content 
requirements and limited foreign ownership have been gradually lifted since the financial 
crisis in 1997. Lastly, fiscal privileges for promoted investment projects have increasingly 
been given to TNCs more than to domestic firms. 
Inward FDI is still largely perceived as a key stimulus for growth and that an inducement of 
FDI is high on the country‟s agenda. Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned Thai 
economic features, it is necessary to examine the impact of FDI on the economic 
development of Thailand and justify its liberalisation. More specifically, this research seeks 
to identify how inflow of FDI empirically impacts economic growth when the government 
limits its intervention and largely liberalises the rules on transfer of resources by TNCs. In 
so doing, this study also expects to shed some light on how FDI affects the formation of 
domestic productive capability, which, in turn, is responsible for upgrading the competitive 
advantages of a nation along its developmental path. Without such ability, economic growth 
may not translate into a complete and independent development. Development, without 
productive capabilities, could become a dependent development, similar to what dependency 
theorists have been arguing for a long time.  
1.2.1 Aims of the Study  
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of the liberalisation of FDI on the economic 
development of Thailand, using political economy and empirical approaches. The aim of the 
study is actually the research question which can be re-formulated as follows: 
 “How has the liberalisation of FDI affected the economic development of 
Thailand?” 
On the political economy aspect, this study approaches the research question using the 
conceptual frameworks developed from two major disciplines, namely, international 
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business and political economy. With regard to the empirical approach, it borrows analytical 
tools from growth economics to examine the impact of inward FDI on the Thai economic 
development, measured by GNI.  In order to achieve this aim, the following objectives have 
been set. 
1.2.2 Objectives of the Study 
1) To address the research question with a multi-disciplinary framework. The study will 
first identify major disciplines that focus on FDI and economic development and 
produce a comprehensive literature review accordingly. 
 
2) To identify the contradictions in the theoretical level and contradictions between 
theories and practices. 
 
3) To identify the appropriate conceptual frameworks to assess the impact of FDI on 
economic growth. These conceptual frameworks should take into account the 
dynamic nature of economic development, the country‟s productive capability, and 
the distinction of the contributions of domestic capital vis-à-vis that of international 
capital to the developmental process   
 
4) To analyse the institutional configurations of the Thai economy and its FDI-related 
policies by looking at various economic aspects indicated by the related theories. In 
addition, the study seeks to examine how political forces could partly explain the 
choices of the adopted policies.    
 
5) To assess empirically the impact of inward FDI on the Thai economic development 
with an appropriate econometric procedure.  
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 1.3 Research Design  
This research, firstly, starts from identifying elements of the research question, namely, FDI 
conducted by the TNCs, and development administered by the state. A theoretical 
understanding of these elements is gained through the review of literature.  Indeed, the 
research question is multi-disciplinary. This is because the theoretical explanation of TNCs 
can be found in international business and industrial organisation disciplines. The role of the 
state and development are discussed in political economy literature. The impact of FDI and 
economic growth is largely discussed and analysed both in growth economics and political 
economy. The multi-disciplinary literature review is conducted to serve two purposes. One 
is to reveal conceptual or theoretical similarities and contradictions in relation to the impact 
of FDI on development. The other is to shed light on what type of data and economic 
features this study needs to collect and analyse in order to comprehend fully the impact of 
FDI on economic development. Most importantly, the review of literature from several 
related disciplines would reveal conceptual similarities and differences towards FDI. 
It will be seen that there are two contending arguments regarding the impact of FDI on 
economic development. The prevailing current thought advocates that FDI is beneficial to 
development.  The critics of FDI argue that it is detrimental. The literature review shows 
that each argument appears to have different assumptions on the institutional context. 
Differences in these institutional contexts may be a key to an understanding of the impact of 
FDI on economic development. Indeed, Dunning (1981, 1999, and 2005), the prominent 
scholar of the international business discipline repeatedly emphasised that the study of FDI 
and development is specific to context and history.    
Secondly, integrative analytical frameworks, where both positive and negative impacts of 
FDI are explained, will be constructed. According to mainstream perspectives, FDI are 
sources of additional capital and advance technology. Based on growth theories, these 
factors contribute to economic growth. The presumption that FDI would lead to growth is 
then derived. The critics of FDI, mostly confined to dependency theory, argue that FDI is 
likely to be detrimental to economic development, particularly in the long term. This is 
because FDI is perceived as an entry of superior foreign firms into the domestic market 
where indigenous firms are relatively weaker. Due to a competitive incompatibility, the 
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domestic firms are likely to be driven out. Also, because of their foreign nationality, FDI 
tends to instigate the outflow of resources. Growth can still take place under the negative 
scenario. Nevertheless, the nature of growth that FDI induces is dependent and does not 
allow for complete industrialisation. 
To assess which scenario, positive or negative impact, is taking place requires both 
institutional and empirical analysis. For institutional and historical analysis, this study 
adopts and modifies a conceptual framework from the international business discipline. It is 
the Investment Development Path, developed by Dunning (1981). For empirical analysis, 
this study develops an exogenous growth model that would explain the change of the 
nation‟s income in relation to an international investment. This model will be used as a 
theoretical platform for the empirical analysis. 
Thirdly, the nature of the research question governs the scope of the study in terms of time 
and geography. Clearly, it points out this research is a particular case study of Thailand. As 
the country had adopted the FDI and export-led growth strategy since the beginning of the 
1970s, this historical fact suggests that, ideally, the historical and empirical studies should 
draw data from the 1970s onwards. Taking into account that the study is interested in 
development in relation to inward FDI at the macro-economic level, naturally, it follows that 
the relevant empirical test should take the form of a time-series analysis using macro-
economic data.  
Fourthly, the modern history of the Thai political economy will be chronologically analysed. 
In this step, the study relies heavily on the analysis of documents and historical data of 
related economic indicators which were initially suggested by the literature review in the 
second step. Institutional configurations in Thailand will be studied. Indeed, the study 
attempts to analyse the Thai political and economic backgrounds in relation to FDI with the 
use of the conceptual framework developed in the previous stage. The information gained at 
this stage can help to determine which path of economic development Thailand is likely to 
experience. Then, this will help to define a hypothesis on the effect of FDI on economic 
development in Thailand. The arguments, at this stage, are mainly derived by deduction and 
may contain a degree of subjectivity. For this reason, the following step, the empirical 
analysis, is necessarily important because it will provide relatively more objective evidence.   
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Fifthly, this step focuses on testing the hypothesis on FDI empirically. However, since 
theories and stylised facts indicate that FDI affects the economic development of a host 
country either positively or negatively, one needs to examine other observable phenomena 
that are likely to occur specifically within each scenario. For example, in a capital-dependent 
state, not only the impact of FDI in the long run is negative, the country‟s gain from trade 
openness is ambiguous or likely to be negative due to the deterioration of the terms of trade. 
Therefore, the empirical model, developed in this stage, has to incorporate other variables 
that are discussed at the theoretical level. Indeed, in this stage, it is expected that the 
empirical results would support the hypothesis that the study has established from the 
analysis of the Thai political economy.  
Lastly, the study should be able to assert with a high degree of confidence whether, or not, 
Thailand has benefited from inward FDI, particularly under the actual liberal regime. Based 
on the conceptual frameworks that it has initially developed, the study should be able to give 
some prediction, ceteris paribus, as to what type of developments, either a complete 
capitalist development or a dependent development, Thailand will achieve. 
1.4 Research Methods 
Descriptive Methods 
The study of the Thai political economy history will be using the „analytic narrative method‟. 
It is worth noting that Thai economic and political history will be analysed through the 
theoretical perspectives guided by the literature review. These theories do mostly assume the 
concept of rationality. This method is normally used in in-depth case studies (Bates, et al., 
2000, p.696). 
History is documented through the reflection and interpretation of historians. Historical 
documents used in the study are written both by Thai and foreign economic historians. They 
are collected from journal articles, books and periodicals. The languages used are Thai and 
English. In so doing, it is hoped to provide balanced perspectives towards Thai politics and 
economics through the eyes of both the insiders and outsiders. In parallel, political and 
economic history will be studied alongside the historical data of relevant economic 
indicators in order to maintain consistency between the story and observations. The entire 
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research relies only on secondary data. It should be noted that statistics analysed in this 
political economy analysis will only be descriptive in nature. Inferential statistics will be 
discussed in the empirical analyses chapter.   
Empirical Methods 
The objective of empirical analyses, in this study, is to identify the empirical impact of 
inward FDI on the Thai economic development as well as revealing the causal relationship 
between them. Theoretical framework and estimation methods are taken from growth 
economics. Detailed discussion on justifications of the methods used can be found in 
Chapter 6. In this section, sources of data, econometric methodology, and selected 
estimation techniques are briefly highlighted. As mentioned earlier, this study deals with 
macro-economic time series analyses. By definition, it works with secondary data that can 
be drawn from international and national institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the 
Bank of Thailand and the National Economic and Social Development Board in Thailand.  
The empirical analyses depart from transforming the theoretical exogenous model, 
developed in Chapter 4, into an empirical model. However, the empirical model derived 
directly from the theoretical model, taking the Cobb-Douglas form, may suffer from the 
problem of selection bias, to be precise, the problem of omitted variables. Therefore, as 
much as possible, the study will add more theoretical variables suggested by the literature in 
growth economics and dependency theory. As a result, now, the empirical model must be 
large, possibly over-parameterised, and the concept of parsimony may no longer hold. So, to 
derive a final restricted model, the study will use the General to Specific approach, 
developed by Hendry and Richard (1982), to simplify the model. The General to Specific 
approach is effective identification strategy. It must be noted that the General to Specific 
approach will be used for the first time to derive the growth regression assessing the impact 
of FDI in Thailand. Then, the validity of the final model will be assessed by relevant 
diagnostic tests.   
The choice of estimation techniques and functional form of model are governed by the 
objectives of the study, theories, and the empirical properties of data. As the study is 
working with time series data, prior to empirical tests, empirical properties of each time 
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series data need to be analysed, particularly on the aspect of stationarity. Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression for time series analysis is a natural point of departure. Nevertheless, 
it is acknowledge that the OLS regression is biased when there is a problem of endogeneity. 
This is particularly important when the growth regression contains investments and trade 
openness among its independent variables. To assess whether or not an endogeneity exists in 
the model, two tests, namely, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and the Hausman specification 
test, will be conducted. It will be seen in Chapter 6 that the endogeneity appears not to be an 
issue in the model. Therefore, an Instrumental Variable (IV) regression is not necessary.    
This does not mean that one can be satisfied with the OLS. At theoretical level, FDI and 
growth are examined in a dynamic fashion. That is, theories do distinguish the impact of 
FDI on economic development between the short-run and the long-run effects. Hence, it is 
necessary to empirically assess the impact of FDI accordingly. To do this, the study resorts 
to the two-step error correction model (ECM), developed by Engle and Granger (1987). At 
this stage, the short-term and long-term impacts of FDI on the Thai economic development 
should be revealed. However, regression analysis represents only correlations between 
independent variables and a dependent variable as well as the magnitude of estimated 
parameters. It does not say anything about directions of causation (Fine, 2006). To gain a 
deeper insight, it is necessary to identify the directions of causal relationships between FDI 
and economic development. 
This study then conducts the Vector Autoregressive Granger Causality test in which four 
key variables are included in the system, namely, FDI, GNI, trade openness and domestic 
investment. This is because these four variables are central to the analysis of FDI and 
development.  With the use of all these estimation techniques, the empirical impacts of FDI 
on economic development in Thailand and their causal relationship should be fully assessed.    
1.5 Distinctive Contributions  
 
This study makes three original contributions to knowledge, namely, analytical contributions, 
practical contributions and empirical evidence.  
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1.5.1 Analytical Contributions 
1) Multi-disciplinary approach to FDI and economic development 
One of the contributions of this thesis to knowledge is its multi-disciplinary analytical 
approach in explaining the impact and the role of FDI in economic growth of a country. By 
drawing on different disciplines, the thesis highlights the shortcomings of FDI theories in 
different disciplines and the need to have a more thorough understanding of the role of all 
parties involved in any assessment. 
2) Integrative conceptual framework 
This study has used a conceptual framework, Investment Development Path (IDP), 
developed by Dunning (1981), to capture both a successful developmental path and a 
dependent development, in relation to an international investment. It will be seen that the 
IDP, when modestly modified, can represent a capital-dependent state, a developmental case 
argued by dependency theorists. This research argues further that this conceptual framework 
is dynamic and can be used for a historical analysis of the political economy of a particular 
country. To make full use of this framework, the ratio of GNI to GDP, the terms of trade and 
the balance of payments have been taken into account. This can be taken as being modestly 
original since the literature review suggests that no other in the past has analysed the case of 
Thailand in relation to FDI by applying these frameworks. 
3) Neo-classical growth models with multiple types of investments 
Unlike contemporary endogenous FDI-growth models, this study develops a simple 
exogenous FDI-growth model in which capital has been classified into several types, namely, 
domestic, inward FDI, and outward FDI. This model, though leaving the role of policies and 
technological productivity to be determined outside the model, is very friendly for empirical 
analysis. The originalities of this model are located in the following aspects. Firstly, there is 
the specific addition of the extra forms of capital related to inward and outward FDI in the 
Cobb-Douglas production function. The addition of these two variables makes the model 
relevant to the concept of the IDP. Secondly, it no longer assumes a constant return and 
allows for both increasing and decreasing returns, depending on the output elasticities of 
international investment. In fact, this model is developed to offer the empirical platform 
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assessing the impact of FDI on the process of wealth accumulation which is absent in the 
IDP framework. 
 
1.5.2 Empirical Evidence 
 
As far as this study is concerned, there are only two past empirical studies that analysed the 
impact of FDI on the Thai economic growth at the aggregate level. Both Kohpaiboon (2003) 
and Ang (2009) assessed the impact of inward FDI on GDP, using annual time-series data 
from 1970-1999 and from 1990-2004, respectively.  
There are three aspects of originality embodied in the empirical evidence, proposed by this 
study. Firstly, it presents more up-to-date empirical evidence of the impact of inward FDI on 
the Thai economic development, measured by GNI. Secondly, as the Thai economic 
development has been relying, to a large extent, on inward FDI, the more proper 
measurement of its economic growth should be GNI rather than GDP. This is because the 
latter does not take into account the net income transfer, incurred by an international 
investment. Thirdly, the previous two studies might suffer from a small-sample bias. This 
study, however, benefits from the longer span of time-series data at a higher frequency, on a 
quarterly basis, which is only recently available from the World Bank and the IMF. Thus, 
the times-series analyses in this study are analysed with the data from 120 observations, 
covering Q1:1970 – Q4:2009.   
 
1.5.3 Practical Contributions 
 
The multi-disciplinary approach to the research problem reveals that there are contradictions 
between theories and practices in relation to the regulation of FDI and economic 
development. An obvious example is that the literature both at theoretical and empirical 
levels, emphasises that the positive impact of FDI is conditional and that TNCs, the product 
of market imperfections, are unlikely to allow for technological leakages. This suggests that, 
in order to extricate the positive spillovers from FDI, the state in the host countries needs to 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 17 
regulate foreign operations and ensure that all policy instruments that are necessary to 
induce spillovers are being implemented. However, the neo-liberal development model 
appears to underplay the role of the state and encourage the deregulation of FDI.  
This is exactly the case of Thailand. Thus, the empirical evidence shows that when practices 
are carried out without embracing an insight that can be gained through theoretical studies, 
the impact of FDI is likely to be unsatisfactory. Details of policy implication will be further 
elaborated in the concluding chapter. 
1.6   Structure of the Thesis 
The organisation of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 lays the foundations of this research 
and then Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide Literature Reviews. In Chapter 2, this study 
reviews the literature relating to the nature of the firm. It first examines the model that 
explains the underlying reasons for TNCs, their motivations and capabilities an institutions 
vis-à-vis the market. Thus, Chapter 2 approaches FDI at a micro-level by trying to 
understand reasons behind the institution that produces it. At the end of this chapter, FDI 
will be defined and the method of its measurement will be critically discussed. In so doing, 
the study aims to present some missing aspects of FDI, particularly, their rent-seeking 
behaviour which is generally underplayed in a growth-analysis context. 
Chapter 3 focuses on a review of literature on the FDI-related growth models and tries to 
show how the presumption of the positive impact of FDI on economic growth is derived. 
Here, the key channels through which the positive spillovers from FDI take place will be 
identified. The discussion will then move on to assess the empirical works that find the 
positive spillover from FDI with the empirical tools taken from growth economics. The 
literature review reveals that most empirical studies find that the impact of FDI on economic 
development to be ambiguous and specific to the context. In cases where positive spillovers 
were reported, the outcome was found to be conditional on other factors such as the 
absorptive capacity of the host country. In other words, these results were revealing the 
important role that the institutional configurations may play in assessment of the impact of 
FDI on the economy. It is important to note that the market is largely shaped by policies and 
regulations.  
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Then, the role of the state will be introduced as it is the institution that has an absolute 
legitimacy of setting policies and regulations. The review of the literature will present the 
roles that the state can take to promote the prosperity of its economy. The discussion will 
shift to the contemporary policy environment. Indeed, the study will discuss the neo-liberal 
ideas on the FDI-related development policies and how they might have impeded the state in 
performing its role as a growth promoter, particularly, in the area of industrial policy. The 
study will highlight that when the state interventions in the market are minimised and 
domestic firms are weaker than TNCs, the impact of FDI on economic development may be 
similar to what has been explained by the dependency theorists so avidly in the 1970s. This 
is because TNCs can exercise their superior power to a great extent. Thus, the review of 
literature will introduce dependency theories. More specifically, it will employ the capital-
dependency theory to explain the other macro-economic problems that host economies 
might experience when exposed to excessive inflow of FDI. 
Chapter 4 uses the concept of the Investment Development Path (IDP) to analyse the role of 
FDI in economic growth in a dynamic fashion. The IDP is a concept that is developed within 
the international business discipline and which, later on, the author has extended to the field 
of political economy, see Dunning and Narula (1996). This framework can be used to assess 
what type of development a country tends to follow, that is, a complete capitalist 
development or a dependent development, based on the Net Outward Investment. This 
indicator represents the productive ability that is embodied in domestic firms in relation to 
that of TNCs. The IDP also suggests the ideal timing of when inward FDI and outward FDI 
should be promoted along the path of development. Most importantly, the IDP sheds some 
light on the dynamic nature of FDI-related policies.  
Clearly, the IDP incorporates the role of the state, the market environment in the host 
country, and the productive capability of the domestic firms compared to that of TNCs. As 
mentioned earlier, the IDP framework, when modestly modified, can also represent a capital 
dependent state.  Indeed, analysing a country‟s developmental path in relation to FDI as well 
as examining its balance of payments, its ratio of GNI to GDP, and its history of political 
economy should shed some light upon the type of development on which the country is 
embarking. However, according to neo-classical economics, this may not be sufficient, 
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unless some statistical evidence has been produced to support the argument. For this reason, 
this study resorts to growth economics and adapts the neo-classical growth model to serve 
empirical purposes as the IDP framework does not offer an analytical tool as to how the 
impact of FDI can be empirically assessed.   
Chapter 5 is a chronological study of the Thai political economy from 1970s until the 
present time. It provides qualitative analysis of FDI in Thailand and presents a 
comprehensive background of the structure of the economy. Most importantly, FDI-related 
policies will be discussed and the configurations of the Thai market, where TNCs operate, 
will be examined. This chapter will also encompass the review of the empirical studies, 
using micro-level data, in order to gain an insight into the impact of foreign operations at the 
industrial level. It will also examine the intensity of FDI by sector in relation to Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth by sector in Thailand and consider if the sector that exhibited the 
highest TFP was the one where FDI was mostly clustered.  
Chapter 5 will also examine Thailand‟s economic position in the global economy. In so 
doing, the study goes through the analysis of the indicators such as Net Outward Investment 
which could reflect the productive capability of the country. Furthermore, it will report the 
pattern of changes in several other macro-economic indicators, namely, the terms of trade, 
balance of payments, and the ratio of GNI to GDP, that have been influenced by inward FDI. 
The last section of this chapter gives a brief account of growth record of Thailand since the 
1970s. It is expected that these analyses should demonstrate the development path that 
Thailand is likely to be following and clarify the hypothesis that should be used to assess the 
impact of FDI on the economy. Indeed, the analysis in this chapter is made in support of the 
empirical analyses that are conducted in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 presents empirical analyses. This chapter statistically assesses the validity of the 
arguments discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter, firstly, discusses the econometric 
methodology. More specifically, it explains how the empirical model is derived and 
specifies the choice of estimation techniques. Next, it explains how the data are collected 
and their description. The empirical tests are carried out by running regressions, using the 
Ordinary Least Squares and the Error Correction Model. In addition, the Vector Auto-
regressions Granger Causality test are conducted to assess the direction of causality between 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 20 
inward FDI and GNI, whilst taking into account the influence of domestic investment and 
international trade. The results provide empirical evidence on the type of impact inward FDI 
has on the Thai economic development and identifies the direction of causality. 
Conclusions are presented in Chapter 7, where the findings of both descriptive and empirical 
are revisited and their consistency will be discussed. Lastly, this study will address its 
limitations and suggest recommendations for future work.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Part 1: The Theory of the Firm and the Emergence of the Transnational 
Corporation and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The literature review in this chapter provides a review of the evolution of the theory of 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), even though the research question focuses on the 
impact of FDI on the economic development in host developing countries. It is necessary to 
understand the motives and nature of a TNC because it is the maker of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). It is worth noting that this study will not take a critical position towards 
the literature reviewed in this chapter because it is not the main area in which the research 
question is situated. Thus, the style of the literature review in this chapter will be 
informative and concise. The main objective of this chapter is to point out that TNCs exist 
because of market imperfections and that TNCs make FDI to pursue, if not to secure, their 
position in an imperfect competition. In addition to this, this chapter will also show that a 
firm, as a form of economic institution, has a great capacity to realise economic efficiency 
which, in turn, translates into a power in accumulating capital. This fundamental aspect of a 
firm is very important but rarely reflected in the definition of FDI when its impact is 
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assessed in the context of development. However, this theoretical shortfall at macro-level 
analysis will be fully addressed in the following chapter. 
The plan of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theory of the 
growth of the firms. This section will identify what drives the firm‟s growth and how its 
organisational structure and its productive capability evolve when the firm grows. These 
characteristics imply the power of the firm over the market and hence the deviation of the 
assumptions of perfect competition. Next, in section 2.3, the study will discuss several 
concepts made to explain the emergence of TNCs and FDI. Once the nature and motives of 
TNCs have been adequately discussed, then in section 2.4, this study will show how FDI 
which is the TNC‟s action to commit in a long-term international investment is perceived in 
macro-economic literature. A summary is found in section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Theory of the Growth of the Firm 
The full understanding of the motivations of TNCs could not be gained without an insight 
into the firm‟s growth process as a result of its quest for ever larger profit. It is also notable 
that a firm‟s growth process will unusually bring about its by-product, which is an increase 
in size. Penrose (1995, p.9)
3
 
 
and Hymer (1970, p.441) mentioned that the size of firms 
affects, and is affected by, changes in their organisational structure, which in turn is induced 
by the strategy for further growth. The more advanced these elements become, the more 
powerful the firm become in relation to the market. Thus, an increasing size of the firm and 
a pursuit for profit could render firms, particularly TNCs, anti-competitive in their very 
nature.  
This section draws heavily from the contributions made by Penrose (1995). Pitelis (2000, 
2007), Rugman and Verbeke (2001), and Volpe and Biferali (2008) agree that Penrose was 
the main pioneer who tried to disclose the inside of a firm. Penrose (1995) questioned the 
factors that naturally induce and impede the growth of a firm. In answering this question, 
she first defines what a firm is. Influenced by Coase (1937), she posits that a firm is a basic 
                                                          
3
The theory of the growth of firm was first published in 1956. This study uses the third edition which was 
published in 1995. 
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unit for the organisation of production which constitutes a bundle of human and non-human 
resources, tactically manoeuvred by the administrative and authoritative coordination of a 
group of individuals. The firm can be regarded as a specialised collection of productive 
resources which is idiosyncratic. It can also be seen as a (productive) problem solving 
institution (Demsets, 1988, p.141). According to Penrose (1995), each firm reacts to the 
market opportunities differently, depending on the availability of resources and more 
importantly, on its managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities. Hymer (1976, p.50) shares 
the same insight. He observes that businessmen may receive signals from the market but 
then act differently even though their goals are identical.  
As to what are the drivers of the growth of the firm, Penrose (1995) pointed to the 
management‟s ability to mobilise and manoeuvre the firms‟ own resources in order to 
capitalise on the opportunities arising in the market. More specifically, in Penrosean 
perspectives, the key determinant of firms‟ growth is the managerial ability  
i. to receive the signals from the market; 
ii. to manipulate the firm‟s available resources to capitalise such opportunities; and 
iii. to set off the rate of growth of the firm or, at least, to secure the firm‟s position in the 
market  
The last point can be achieved by keeping generating an intra-firm knowledge, or 
developing impregnable bases, which are the unrivalled, income-generating assets. To add 
more detail, the generation of intra-firm knowledge is the way by which a firm uses its own 
resources, resulting from the interaction of human resources and the interaction between 
human and non-human resources. It takes the form of specialisation that refers to the 
division of labour. This results in a better organisation, which in turn, leads to the proficient 
deployment of unused and excess resources. The specialisation brings more efficiency and 
the deployment of unused resources brings additional profits at zero marginal cost. In this 
growth process, the initiative to grow is propelled initially by the management‟s vision and 
later on by the management ability to create and maintain the firm‟s competitive advantages 
that are difficult to be imitated, or rendered obsolete, by the rivals.  
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Despite the fact that the internal interactions between human resources and non-human 
resources are identified as the key drivers for growth, Penrose (1995) does not overlook the 
role of external factors such as demand for products, customers‟ preferences, technological 
discoveries in other institutions, legislation and the role of the state. She suggests that when 
external factors are to be included into the analysis of the growth of the firm, one needs to 
depart from the firm‟s internal nature. This is because changes in external factors are 
channelled into the firm through the experience of its personnel and the knowledge that is 
embodied in the firm‟s machinery. These external factors, carried by the firm‟s human and 
non-human assets, are then put into the process of interactions and generate growth when it 
is possible. Some forms of external factors such as regulations and threats by competitors, 
are responsible for shaping the directions of the growth of the firm. When taking external 
forces into account, it can be said that the growth of firms are precisely induced by the 
interaction between internal and external conditions. It is also true for the same reason that 
firms are also constrained by the interaction of internal and external factors. To summarise, 
the growth of a firm has to be approached by focusing, firstly, on the firm‟s internal 
resources and how they are manoeuvred and, secondly, by the study of its external 
environment or the market in which it operates, and lastly, by the interaction between these 
two forces. None of these can be neglected.   
As firms grow, regardless of how they are measured, in the long term, they will tend to gain 
more competitive advantages over their smaller competitors. Hymer (1970, p.441) shared 
the same view and pointed out that, since the beginning of the industrial revolution, there 
has been a steady increase in the size of manufacturing firms particularly in the US. He 
stresses that an increase in size essentially contributes to the reinforcement of the firm‟s 
strength and ability. As to how the size and the ability are related, it can be said that as firms 
grow they inevitably need to develop their administrative framework appropriate to the 
increasing size and scope of their activities. This natural evolution brings an ever greater 
efficiency into a firms‟ productive and organisational operation.   
Thus, it may be seen that the productive capacity that could be restored in a firm is 
essentially significant, so much so that, a firm can be said as a true engine of capital 
accumulation in the capitalist system that characterises the contemporary global economy 
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(Hart, 1989, p.1757). Besides, it should be noted that the efficiency gained at the firm level 
makes them large. This comes with the loss of competitive forces in the market since an 
increase in a firm‟s size would normally increase the degree of market concentration. These 
two points will prove crucial when this study analyses the impact of TNCs‟ operation in 
developing economies in the next chapter.  
2.3 Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and their International Operations 
The materials presented above portray a concept of the firm, its role in relation to the market 
and its source of growth. This section will review the literature explaining the rationale 
behind the firm‟s choice to expand across borders in pursuit of further growth. It is vital to 
note that a firm‟s decision to internalise or to pursue growth across national markets does 
not alter its essence as a firm. However, as its activities are now involving an international 
exchange and causing the flows of resources across nations, the effect of the operations of 
TNCs on the global economy is far more significant and complicated than that of large, 
national firms. This has instigated some key theorists in the field such as Stephen H. Hymer, 
Raymond Vernon and John H. Dunning to comment on the issue of the political economy 
aspect of TNCs, particularly their investment, FDI. However, before this study introduces 
the discussion on such topics and how these relate to the development in the developing 
countries, it is useful to give a theoretical overview on the emergence to the TNCs. This will 
shed light on the rationale for FDI.   
Generally speaking, TNCs are simply large firms whose economic activities cover more 
than a single economy. Hymer (1970, p.441) defines a TNC as the substitute for the market 
as a method of organising international exchanges. Pitelis (2000, p.72) defines TNCs as 
firms that control productive assets in other countries, in addition to its country of origin. 
The act of acquiring or creating such productive assets abroad is called Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). Buckley and Casson (2009, p.1564) define a TNC as a firm that owns and 
controls productive activities in two or more different countries and a firm that internalises 
market imperfections across national boundaries. In fact, even though TNC can be regarded 
as an international producer, Dunning (1990, p.16) suggested that TNCs can also be viewed 
as an international transactor if one looks at it as „an institution that coordinates the use of 
immediate products produced in one country with subsequent added value activities in 
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another country‟.  All explanations appear to be influenced by Coase (1937)‟s concept of 
internalisation in that they all see TNCs internalise international transactions. In the absence 
of TNCs, international flow of resources would have been taken place be two independent 
firms situated in different countries. In other words, the international exchanges would 
simply be an international trade. 
Hymer, (1976, p.27), Penrose (1995, p.xv), Rugman (1981, 1999, p.55) share the view that 
TNCs can be studied within the framework of the general theory of the firm. Hymer (1976, 
p.28) suggests that international operations of TNCs can be studied by using the same 
methodology as the one used in studying national operations of firms. He argues, however, 
that what needs to be noted is that while the operations are carried out internationally, the 
firms or the owners of such operations remain national.  Pitelis (2000) also notices that the 
theory of TNCs has been largely built upon the theory of the firm and since the 1990s 
onwards the theory of TNCs has been given great attention by scholars, because of their 
dramatic increase in scope and activities.  
2.3.1 Nationality of the Firm 
It is important to emphasis the reference to the concept of national boundary or the nation-
state in an analysis of TNCs and in the study of the impact of their activities in a foreign 
market. As mentioned earlier, the economic activities, controlled by a firm across nations, 
do not only have a geographical dimension. The flow of resources, generated by the 
production and controlled by a management team, also has a political implication and 
possibly creates tensions among countries. The political implications attached to the TNCs 
have been underplayed over the last few decades. This is largely because, as Professor 
Kenen suggests in his forward for Ozawa (1979), as firms expand globally, their 
management and also scholars tend to overlook the significance of national sovereignty. 
Hence, in most case, they attempt to explain and assess international trade and investment in 
cosmopolitan terms. This means that they tend to analyse cost and benefit of FDI mainly on 
the global scale. Vernon (1967) once emphasised that even though TNC may appear to be 
ambiguous about its identity, this ambiguity may only change the quality of the tensions 
among countries but not reduce it. 
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Leaving the notion of nationality of the firm aside could be dangerous and misleading when 
analysing TNCs and their international operations. In fact, as some authors, such as, Pitelis 
(2000) and Ietto-Gillies (2007), point out most of the theoretical explanations of TNCs do 
not adequately incorporate the concept of the nation-state into the analysis. Paradoxically, in 
the first two seminal works on TNCs and FDI by Dunning (1958) and Hymer (1976), the 
concept of nation-state occupied a significant role. While the concept is implicit in the work 
of Dunning (1958) when he focuses on the impact of the US-inbound FDI on British 
manufacturing industry, it is explicitly incorporated in the work of Hymer (1976) who refers 
to the concept of the nation state in his theoretical explanation of TNCs, observed mainly 
from the behaviour of American firms. The firm, he posits, even though it extends its 
productive activities internationally, remains, to a great extent, a national firm. This point 
should be noted because it is likely that the behaviours of a national firm, operating globally, 
may not be only determined by an economic force, but also by a political influence as the 
decisions taken by the firm are directed by the management and the shareholders who have a 
particular nationality and bear some sort of loyalty to their nation.  
Buckley (2006) summarises Hymer‟s (1976) view of the firm‟s nationality as follows. 
Firstly, as a firm operates in a given economic system, it therefore has a legal nationality 
which in turn shapes the behaviours of that firm through legal constraints and incentives 
provided by government. This point is self-evident and manifested through an array of 
domestic industrial policies, FDI inducement packages, and bilateral and multilateral 
attempts among nations to produce Free Trade and Investment Agreement. Secondly, as in 
most cases, the majority of shareholders appear to be homogenous in social background and 
nationality. Also, the TNC is obliged to pay dividends in a certain currency depending on 
where its stocks are traded. This second point introduces the problem of where the profits 
are to be consumed and where the wealth is to be stored. Thirdly, as previously mentioned, 
the decisions of the TNCs‟ managers might have been influenced by their nationality. 
Hymer‟s concern on the nationality of the firm and its impact on the firm‟s behaviour have 
been extended in his later works (Hymer, 1979). He notes that the higher the managerial 
hierarchy, the more homogenous the nationality of the managers become. Therefore, the 
managers‟ nationality may affect their commitment and behaviour as well as their decisions. 
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This raises the sensitive issue of how the redistribution of the profits made from 
international production will take place. It is true that TNCs generate greater efficiency at 
global level but one should not overlook the distribution of such efficiency across nations, 
especially when the efficiency is translated into income. On the last point, this may suggest 
the nationalist sentiments of the firms‟ executives, which could ultimately lead to the 
adoption of a certain strategic policy regarding the redistribution of income. All of these 
would cause a problem for resource transfer which will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.   
2.3.2 Emergence of the TNCs and FDI  
In the years prior to the World War II, the discipline of international economics focused 
mainly on explaining international trade and international capital movement. It paid 
relatively little attention to foreign direct investment (FDI). Since the post war period, 
particularly after the 1960s, the composition of international business has dramatically 
changed due to several factors such as the advancement of transport and information 
technology and the superior competitiveness of American firms in knowledge intensive 
industries over their counterparts from the rest of the world. It was mostly after the World 
War II when the trend of global production fully emerged. A surge of FDI and a rise in 
number of TNCs were observed. This phenomenon is so significant that the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, in their unanimously adopted resolution 1721, requested the 
Secretary-General to appoint a group of eminent persons to study the role of TNCs in the 
global economy, their impact on the process of development and that on the international 
relations (UNCTAD, 2008). Since then, the United Nation Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) also puts special emphasis on monitoring the impact of FDI on 
global development. The elements of international business have changed in their 
composition; international investment has gradually taken the place of international trade. 
Dunning (1994) notes that in the past international exchange was driven by trade, today the 
international trade itself has been largely driven by FDI. From the 1960s onwards, FDI has 
been an integral part of the Golden Age of the global economic growth. FDI grew at twice 
the rate of GDP, and 40 percent faster than international trade over the past thirty years 
(Dicken, 2003). In academia, this phenomenon has been reflected in the rise of the theory of 
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international operations which was initially built on the framework of industrial organisation 
and international trade theory since the 1960s.  
FDI is the manifestation of the firm‟s decision to expand across borders through 
international internalisation. FDI is a complex economic activity which can be analysed by 
various theoretical frameworks. For example, based on the theory of the firm and the theory 
of the growth of the firm, FDI can be regarded as an international growth strategy that a firm 
adopts in order to capitalise its competitive advantages beyond the national market, or to 
enhance its competitiveness in the international market. Under this particular framework, the 
firm and its efficiency are usually the units of analysis. If FDI is examined under the light of 
the theory of international economics, one could explain FDI in terms of the cross-border 
mobility of capital and, to a larger extent, the factors of production that include human 
capital and technology. Under a macro-economic framework, the national welfare or 
economic growth and the aggregate economy are the units of analysis. Furthermore, FDI in 
social studies can be examined under the theme of globalisation and its impact on cultural 
and social institutions. This line of study is abundant in the political economy discipline and 
other social science disciplines, such as media studies. As the scope and the nature of the 
research of this study are focused mainly on the economic impact of FDI and its political 
implication on development, a review of the following literature will be made exclusively 
around the core issue. 
FDI was first depicted by the scholars as the flow of private capital across borders. Hosseini 
(2005) and Buckley and Casson (2009) say that the initial attempt to explain capital flow is 
carried out on the basis of modifications of classical trade theory. For example, Mundell 
(1957) and the neoclassical arbitrage theory of portfolio investment, proposed by Iverson 
(1936). Mundell (1957) takes the initiative to relax the assumption of factor immobility in 
the standard Hecksher-Ohlin model of international trade. He builds the model in which not 
only commodity movements, but also some degree of productive factor mobility, are 
allowed. He posits that the restriction on trade would result in encouraging the factor 
mobility across borders. The quid pro quo, foreign, direct investment, which a decade later 
has been studied by Bhagwati et al. (1987), Bhagwati, Dinopoulos and Wong (1992) and 
Blonigen and Figlio (1998), falls perfectly into this category. Although Mundell (1957) did 
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not explicitly explain foreign investment, with his intention to allow for factor mobility 
specifically capital, he implicitly offered an interpretation applicable for FDI. Mundell‟s 
model, however, could not capture all the complexity of foreign direct investment as he did 
not explain why one needs to invest aboard where the cost of not knowing the foreign 
environment well enough is high.  
The portfolio investment theory, in which there is no distinction between physical and 
financial capitals, points out that investors look to invest where their capital generate the 
highest returns according to the interest rate. Thus, if the interest rate abroad is higher than 
that which is available at home, and if the capital mobility is allowed, it is predicted that 
investors would pour their capital abroad until the interest rate between the home countries 
and elsewhere converts to a similar rate. It appears that the portfolio investment theory, 
though taking into account the risk premium, fails to explain the motive of investors taking 
risks in managing productive activities in unknown foreign markets. Should they wish, they 
could have simply purchased and sold bonds and equity in the international capital markets.  
2.3.2.1 Monopolistic Advantage and the Need to Control 
The seminal work on the theoretical explanation of FDI is believed to be that of Hymer 
(1976). He sharply depicts the inadequacy of portfolio theory in explaining FDI and makes a 
fundamental distinction between two major types of private capital flows; FDI and portfolio 
investment (PI). Buckley (2006, p.141) summarises the following stylised facts pointed out 
by Hymer (1976) in support of his propositions. 
1) There was little, or no, correlation between high interest rates and inflows of FDI. 
2) There was an intra-industry FDI which refers to the event where countries A and 
B both conduct cross direct investment in the same industry within each other‟s 
country.   
3) Most of the FDI was carried out by firms in a small number of countries notably 
by the United States. This suggests that the motivation of FDI should be other 
than the differential in the interest rates. 
4) Based on the empirical observations made by Dunning (1958), Hymer (1976) 
notices that FDI mostly took place in highly concentrated industries.  
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From these empirical observations, Hymer (1976, p.1) claims that, firstly and implicitly, 
what differentiates FDI from PI is the control over the invested assets. He asserts that PI 
focuses mainly on financial capital and not physical capital. He advances that PI grants the 
ownership over the financial capital unlike FDI which allows the investors the power to 
control the use of the productive assets embodied in the invested firms. It can also be said 
that this control allows investors to act not only as a global producer but as a global 
transactor who holds the command over the global chain of added value activities. 
Secondly, Hymer (1970, 1979) no longer regarded an economic agent who produces FDI as 
a simple investor but as an authoritatively organised unit, taking the form of a large firm. By 
this, he urged the readers to think how powerful this economic institution can be as it is 
endowed with, not only knowledge, technology and advantages that come with large size but 
also the organisational ability which would eventually be used to serve its ultimate objective, 
that is to maximise profits. In Hymer‟s perspective, control is the heart of FDI. To 
understand FDI is to understand the motivations of a firm to control its foreign means of 
production. Indeed, according to Hymer, a TNC‟s international operations are controlled by 
a national firm.  
As indicated by Hymer (1976. p.23) there are two main circumstances under which the 
investors seek to control. One is to ensure the safety of international investment where there 
is an inherent conflict of interest between investors from different countries, and also 
between the investing firm and the host country. The more distrust arises, the more control 
that is needed. The distrust can also be regarded as the transaction cost as suggested in 
Buckley and Casson, (1976) and Williamson (1979). In this event, particularly where the 
level of distrust is high, an act of internalisation of the international market, FDI, becomes 
the substitute for PI. By implication, given an equal rate of return on investment and similar 
level of risk and uncertainty, investors would be indifferent between FDI and PI. The other 
refers to the situation in which the investors seek control over foreign firms because of the 
desire to remove competition between foreign enterprise and potential, domestic and 
international rivals that have not yet entered into the market at the time. Because of this, 
Hymer (1970) stressed that TNCs have an anti-competitive nature. Furthermore, the control 
in this event would ensure the optimisation of return on certain skills and abilities that are 
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uniquely endowed in the investing firms. This unique set of skill and abilities can be equated 
to the Penrosian impregnable base, discussed earlier. It is notable that it is the control 
stemmed from a desire to reduce competition that gives rise to a number of large TNCs. 
Thus, this study will elaborate the FDI generated from the second type of circumstance in 
more detail. 
Hymer (1976, p.25) calls the second type of FDI an international operation. There are two 
conditions which give rise to this type of FDI. One condition is the existence of market 
imperfections such as horizontal or vertical monopoly or oligopoly. In this event, firms 
could only maximise their profits either by collusion with existing firms, or by the 
elimination of its competitors. By adopting either choice, a firm tends to enjoy a larger 
proportion of profit than it would be involved in an oligopolistic competition. Another 
condition is that the firm should have a superior competitive advantage over its competitors 
in a particular product. He calls this a monopolistic advantage, which could be a result of an 
access to the superior assets, particularly technology, a large size, and a pool of cheap 
capital.  This point has been appreciated by the scholars such as Porter (1980) and Dunning 
(1981). Porter (1980) terms Hymer‟s monopolistic advantage as the competitive advantage 
and Dunning (1981) refers to it as the ownership-specific advantage. Indeed, a firm would 
engage in FDI when it perceives that its ownership-specific advantages, be they, technology, 
managerial and organisational capability, or entrepreneurship, are greater than those owned 
by their competitors or potential competitors.  
Also, Hymer (1976) sees that there is a cost involved in making FDI. He establishes the 
assumption that has been widely accepted by the theorists in the international business study. 
It says that, ceteris paribus, enterprises operating in a country tend to be national firms. In 
other words, all other things being equal, a foreign firm is at a disadvantage compared to 
their domestic counterparts. This could be due to the discrimination arising from the 
government, the consumers and the suppliers in the host countries. Among these, 
discrimination from the host government could be the most severe threat as in the extreme 
case this could mean the expropriation of the foreign assets. Practically, the discrimination 
from the government is normally removed by the use of international agreements, such as a 
bilateral free trade agreement and a bilateral treaty of amity. The discrimination from 
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consumers and suppliers can be addressed by the firm‟s public relation strategy. Other 
difficulties could arise from inefficient communication, the lack of local knowledge, 
particularly in the area of legislations, culture and politics. These would impede a firm from 
establishing a proper network and efficient business strategies. The cost of acquiring this 
information could be very high but Hymer (1976, p.34) notes that this cost is fixed. Once it 
is paid out to acquire local information and to merge with locals, such cost will not recur. 
This could possibly encourage firms to grow further in foreign lands as this type of cost 
structure would give them an increasing return on investment.   
By implication, it is seen that when these two conditions interact, they could determine the 
mode of institutional entry to a foreign market. For example, assuming that the firm has a 
competitive advantage over its competitors in foreign market, the degree of market 
imperfection would determine the mode of entry. While the high degree of market 
imperfection would induce a firm to internalise such imperfections, that is, to conduct FDI, 
the low degree of market imperfection would allow a firm to go for an arm‟s length method 
such as licensing, or selling out its superior skill. As pointed out by Hymer (1976), based on 
the experience of American TNCs, in some circumstances, firms are not motivated but 
rather pushed to conduct FDI. Otherwise, it would risk facing the oligopolistic competition 
in its home market if its foreign competitors decided to make the first move. Furthermore, 
given that there is no threat from foreign competitors, Hymer (1976) notices that American 
firms could find themselves facing more fierce competition at home than abroad, because in 
the United States, there are a large number of competent entrepreneurs who possess equal 
access to general factors of production such as skilled personnel and capital. However, in a 
foreign country where competent entrepreneurs, skilled labour and capital are scarce, the 
American firms, even bearing the disadvantage of being foreign, could find themselves in 
the powerful market position and make a handsome profit thanks to their superior bundle of 
human and non-human resources, as well as  better managerial and technological skills. 
Apart from these two conditions motivating firms to get involved in FDI, there is also an 
additional, minor motivation. That is diversification. Hymer (1976) sees this as a minor 
reason because diversification does not necessarily suggest a control over an asset. He 
explains that profit in one industry could inversely correlate with the profit in another. He 
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gives an example of an aluminium plant and electricity plant which, within the context that 
is being discussed, is justifiable. However, this would rather be seen as a case of vertical 
integration. In fact, if the two products are direct substitutes for one another, this would 
convey a much clearer picture such as the example of petroleum and natural gas. In his later 
writing, Hymer (1979, p.60) advances this point. He claims that Engel‟s Law of 
consumption and the concept of life-cycle could also be used to explain the reason to 
diversify in order to maintain a firm‟s growth rate. Engel‟s Law of consumption states that 
people do not generally consume proportionately more of the same things as they get richer, 
but rather reallocate their consumption away from old goods towards new goods. This 
would create the non-proportional growth of demand implying that each product tends to go 
through a life-cycle. This latter concept means that when the product is newly introduced 
into the market the sale grows rapidly, provided that it is successful. This rate of growth 
tends to stabilise and halt eventually when the market is saturated. Thus, any firm that ties to 
a single product would cease to grow and become extinct if it does not diversify. In addition 
to this, introducing a product that is matured in the home country but is new to the host 
country could extend the life cycle of such product for a firm. This, in turn, would also result 
in an increasing return. 
Penrose (1995) shares a similar, but not identical view. She sees that diversification is 
indeed a natural outcome of the growth process. Pitelis (2000) mentioned that what remains 
unclear in Hymer (1979 and Penrose (1995) is why such diversification needs to be done 
across borders. Furthermore, as pointed out by Buckley (2006) FDI is a poor way of 
diversification. It would rather be a case for an international integration. Pitelis (2000), 
suggests that if one wants to use diversification as a reason for FDI, it might need to be used 
in conjuncture with the concept of the aggregate demand deficiency and the business cycle-
related considerations as the possible explanations.  
To sum up on Hymer‟s theoretical explanation of FDI, he assumes in the first place that 
national cooperation does hold superior competitive advantages over its competitors and in 
most cases, any firm that enjoys such a position is a large corporation equipped with 
sophisticated organisational abilities that would allow large scale management. This 
corporation then sees an opportunity to capitalise its superior skills in a foreign market 
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where there are imperfections which give rise to opportunities to make profit. By 
internalising foreign markets transaction, that is, to exploit its advanced technological 
capability abroad, the firm grows larger and is strengthened by its newly acquired market 
position which, in most cases, refers to an oligopolistic or monopolistic position. Through 
this process, the efficiency gains are significantly accumulated at firm-level. In the bigger 
picture, any nation that has this type of firm can accelerate its rate of large-scale capital 
accumulation.  
2.3.2.2 Product Life Cycle 
Motivated by the lack of unified analytical tools for international trade and investment, 
Vernon (1966) proposed the Product Life Cycle (PLC) theory in which he explains the 
rationale for an outward FDI from the United States. His concept, when generalised, can be 
used to explain the pattern of international trade and investment based on the technological 
gap between the advanced economies (the North) and the developing countries (the South). 
The PLC theory is a successful concept despite some minor challenges. For example, 
Dunning (1990) notes that Vernon (1966) has not incorporated enough of the organisational 
structure of the firm in the PLC analysis. Remarkably, the PLC concept shares similar 
arguments with the Japanese „flying geese‟ economic model, initially proposed by 
Akamatsu (1962) and later developed in Kojima (1975, 1977, and 2000). The main 
difference between these two models may be that while the PLC appears to be a purely 
economic concept, the flying geese implies the political message in which Japan is placed as 
the centre of the region.  
Vernon (1966, pp.190-191) distinguishes the PLC from the international trade theory in that 
his theory takes into account the timing of the innovation, the effects of scale economies, the 
roles of uncertainties, and the theory of location rather than a simple comparative cost 
analysis governed by the differential of resource endowments in different nations. Indeed, 
Vernon (1966) was the first scholar to introduce the theory of location into the analysis of 
TNCs. That is, he stressed the interplay between a country‟s specific factor and the 
monopolistic or ownership-specific advantage that a firm accumulates. He did not, however, 
emphasise national boundaries in his theory (Gross and Behrman, 1992, p.114) as Hymer 
Chapter 2: Literature Review   
 36 
(1976) did. Despite this, the PLC is still considered as a synthesis and generalised 
framework due to its explanatory power in many disciplines.  
Before proceeding further, it is essential to state the key assumptions on which the general 
predictions of the PLC are made. Firstly, it is assumed that knowledge is not a universally 
free product. This assumption is different from those of elementary neo-classical theory 
which assumes knowledge is a public good. Secondly, at firm-level, it is assumed that 
knowledge is an inseparable part of the decision-making process and that the relative ease of 
access to knowledge, in order to make innovation, tends to facilitate the success of the firm. 
Clearly, Vernon suggests that the drive for innovation is the key to the success of the firm. 
This, in turn, grants the firm some types of monopolistic position in the market. Even though 
Vernon (1966) does not quote or cite the seminal book by Penrose (1995), his insight into 
the process of the growth of the firm can be said to be in line with her thinking. Thirdly, it is 
assumed that wages are low in the less developed countries and high in the more developed 
countries. Lastly, he assumes that the choice of location for production is based on least-cost 
considerations.  
Stating from his observation that new products constantly appear in the market and that their 
features at the initial stage are different from those at an established stage, Vernon claims 
that a product has a life cycle which can be classified into an introduction, a maturity, a 
standardisation, and a decline. In his article, the introduction takes place where the product 
is freshly introduced into the market. A new product is likely to be conceived in the market 
where an entrepreneur is operating. This entrepreneur (or manager) depicts an unfilled need 
in the market. Then, as long as the possibilities of some kind of monopolistic returns are 
justified, an investment takes place. Hence, it can be said that to some extent, the feature of 
the new product is influenced by the home country. For example, Vernon says that a product 
developed in the US tends to be labour-minimising product due to the high income per 
capita and relatively higher labour cost. He suggests that products from Germany tend to be 
made of plastic because of the country‟s traditional concern with the lack of resources. Later 
on, Vernon (1979) notices that the products developed in Japan are space-saving. According 
to Vernon (1966), the first production facilities of a product should be close to the targeted 
consumers for two reasons. One is the efficiency of communication in the case where the 
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firm needs a prompt feed back from its first users. And, since the innovation takes place 
where the consumers are, the close proximity between the product development team and 
the targeted consumer helps reduce the cost of product development. 
The maturity phrase refers to the period when the demand for the product increases and then 
starts to level off. It is also suggested that the features of the product and the production 
technology at this stage are well developed. Given such stage of specialisation, it does not 
mean that there is no possibility for further differentiation. However, the differentiation is 
considered as an incremental change in the state of the technology. It is also at this stage 
when a producer of the product enjoys a rise not only in domestic demand but also foreign 
demand. This is met by means of export from the producing country. During this stage, 
Vernon notes that there are two reasons encouraging a producer to consider establishing 
production facilities abroad. Firstly, as the product becomes mature, it is likely that the 
nature of the competition will be based more on price. In addition, as the production 
technology is standardised, it can be transferred with a significant degree of ease to another 
location where the factor costs are minimised. Secondly, it may be possible that the demand 
for a product in foreign market increases to the point where export may no longer be the 
financially most suitable means to serve the foreign market. Moreover, in this event, the 
producer could well reap the benefit of the economies of scale. In cases where a firm decides 
to conduct FDI, that is establishing a foreign production in the form of wholly owned 
subsidiary, the nature of oligopolistic competition at home market would trigger its 
competitors to follow suit, fearing the loss of  their global market share or missing the 
advantage of cost minimisation. According to the original PLC model, FDI mostly goes to 
countries whose income per capita is relatively similar to that of the home market. 
The standardised stage could well refer to the stage when a product can be produced cheaply 
and considered as a commodity. This stage, according to Vernon, is when the less developed 
countries may offer competitive advantage as a location for production. As the name 
suggests, the production of a product in this stage is fully standardised and the low wage 
cost plays an important part in minimising the final cost. Moreover, not all products 
produced in the less developed countries are deemed to be exported back to the home 
countries as some could serve the domestic markets. This is because, with the help of the 
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marketing strategies, the less developed countries tend to follow the consumption pattern of 
their advanced counterparts due to the demonstration effect. All of these reasons make the 
establishment of production facilities in the less developed countries lucrative. It is also 
important to note that standardisation lifts up the production possibilities. Hence, the 
capacity of the plants in host developing countries run by TNCs could well serve the global 
market, including both home and host countries. In this event, firms enjoy the economies of 
scale. Therefore, even though the home country is first served by the local production and 
exports its product abroad, its domestic demand could eventually be met with an import 
instead. In his seminal article, Vernon also reminds us that not all types of production would 
fall into the hypothetical path of the PLC theory for instance, the assembly of aeroplanes, 
and research-oriented production. 
It is true that Vernon has proposed his PLC theory based on the observations of the 
American firms. Today, the main sources of outward FDI are countries mainly in the Triad; 
the US, Europe and Japan, and some from the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). 
However, an insight derived from the PLC theory on the behaviours of the TNCs, 
nevertheless, remains tenable and analytically useful (Rugman, 1999, p.56). In later works, 
Vernon (1979) and Cantwell (1995) posit that the power of the hypotheses suggested by the 
PLC theory has changed due to the evolution of an international environment.  Vernon 
(1979) articulates the hypotheses that purport to explain international trade and investment 
explicitly. The first hypothesis, influenced by Hymer‟s (1976) idea, postulates that firms set 
up their foreign production facilities because they believe they possess some real or 
imagined monopolistic advantage that gives them superior competitiveness compared to 
their rivals. This monopolistic advantage, he argues, lies in the lead in innovation. The 
second hypothesis is that innovations are almost always developed in the home market, 
which is an advanced nation. This leads to the third hypothesis which points out that the 
international dispersion of activity is led by technology leaders. Then, it follows by the 
fourth hypothesis stating that the productive activity is firstly dissipated to the country 
whose market environment is found to be similar to the home market and later on to the 
more geographically diverse regions such as developing countries.  
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The first hypothesis is well accepted among the prominent scholars in the field of 
international business. Even though each has a different point of view on the importance of 
the monopolistic power as the driver for conducting FDI, all accept that it is traditionally a 
necessary condition. Cantwell (1995) has empirically tested the second and the third 
hypotheses and found that the evidence rejects the former and that the latter is only 
historically valid. The fourth hypothesis, as suggested by Vernon (1979), is ambiguous when 
testing with empirical observations as it depends on the nature of the product in which TNCs 
specialise and the organisational structure of TNCs. Seminal articles by Vernon (1966, 1979) 
did provide an insight into the dynamics of international trade and investment driven by the 
actions of TNCs. Vernon (1979) also offer some details about several hypothetical types of 
TNCs. 
Vernon (1979) classifies the TNCs into three ideal types based on the nature of the products 
and the organisational structure of the firm. The first ideal type is the TNC with a high 
innovating capacity and the ability to capture the global opportunities. This type of TNCs is 
called the global scanner. Vernon explains that low or virtually zero cost of communication 
across the globe would give rise to this type of TNC. In this case, risk and uncertainty are 
very much reduced as information is more accessible, thus, the global scanner tends to react 
equally to the opportunities arising from all the markets where they have their bases as long 
as the prospect of a return is justified by cost analysis and the advantage of economies of 
scale is achievable. It is noted that the first production facilities no longer needs to be 
established in the market where the innovation is conceived since, the product can be 
produced, for the first time, in a set of the locations where the cost of production is 
minimised.  
Once the innovation is developed and produced, thanks to the TNC‟s network, it can serve 
any market in which it is aware that a demand exists. The global scanner is in a very 
powerful and advantageous position compared to the firm whose operation is limited to the 
national market, especially the national firms established down the ladder of the world 
income pecking order. The disadvantage could occur to the firms whose ability is inferior to 
the global scanners and have to compete in the same market with them. Since the profit 
made by firms will be used to improve the firms‟ competitiveness, it follows that when 
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facing the competition with this type of TNCs, the inferior national firms in the relatively 
low income countries tend to enter a vicious cycle.  
Vernon (1979, p.262) postulates that the PLC theory explains to a limited extent the 
behaviour of the first ideal type of TNCs.  In the late 1980s, when the revolution of 
information technology had just taken off, Vernon sees that the global scanners do not exist. 
However, at present where information technology has been fully established, 
communication across the world can be virtually cost free and thus most of the current 
powerful TNCs could well share some aspects of the global scanner. In effect, Buckley and 
Casson (2009, p.1573) note that in the 1980s, some TNCs have successfully expanded 
globally. This means that they not only serve several overseas markets but also penetrate 
into all markets where foreign investments are permitted by their governments.  
The second ideal type refers to the TNCs which develop and produce a line of standardised 
products, thinking that the demand for their products is homogenous in nature, for example, 
oil, pharmaceutical, computers and automobiles. In reality, firms may strategically choose to 
organise their production in this way due to the cheaper cost of production and/or the 
inefficiency of communication from a far distance, given that the cost of communication is 
high. There are two distinctive benefits from standardising a firm‟s products. One is that 
there is no cost involving in the adaptation to particular preferences of consumers in 
different markets. Another is that it allows for economies of scale to be achieved more easily.  
Despite these advantages, the innovation made by the second ideal type of TNCs is 
somehow at more risk compared to the one made by the first type. This could be due to 
negligence in some specific local preference. However, it is in relation to this type of TNCs 
that Vernon finds his PLC theory to be most relevant. That is, an initiative to innovate is 
expected to take place in the home market or at the headquarters such that the face-to-face 
consultation among engineers, scientists, managers and a group of explorative consumers 
can be easily carried out. In this respect, it is additionally reasonable to expect that this type 
of TNCs would behave according to the behaviour predicted by the PLC theory.  
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Once the innovation is standardised, its production can move to a set of locations where the 
cost of production is minimised. It is noted, however, that the organisational structure in this 
type of TNCs needs not only cope with the scattered production processes but also serve the 
centralised decision making process. Vernon reminds us that there is no reason not to expect 
the global scanners to adopt the strategy implemented by the second ideal type. 
The third type of TNCs refers to the firms whose headquarters have no interest in the nature 
of the demand in the foreign market at all. Thus, an innovation would take place solely in 
the home market. To another extreme, it is also possible that an innovation for the home 
market needs to be decided only by the subsidiaries themselves. Vernon explains that in the 
first case, firms may face difficulties in designing the organisational structure that efficiently 
gives the feedback from the subsidiaries. In the second case, firms might find the cost of 
centralised policies in production to be greater than the expected benefits. The hypothesised 
behaviour of firms in the PLC theory may remain relevant given the pattern of production of 
the third type of TNCs. Nevertheless, the phase when the home market serves foreign 
demand by means of export could be shortened and the monopolistic advantage of the firm 
could be weakened, by an increase in the number of international rivals. 
By implication, it can be deduced that TNCs may not need to follow an identical production 
strategy but that their common goals are pretty much the same. These goals would include 
the pursuit of powerful market position, the search for the least-cost production, the 
economies of scale and the longest possible life for their products. Most importantly, Vernon 
(1966, 1979) suggested that TNCs are responsible in transferring technology across 
countries. The particular emphasis is given to the direction from the advanced to the 
developing countries. Thus, the PLC offers the theoretical pattern of global technological 
transfer which is studied and further developed heavily in the endogenous growth theories 
particularly the models that explain the North-South international technology spillovers. 
Among this line of study, the pioneers are Krugman (1979), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1995), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Glass and Saggi 
(2002). However, it is important to point out here that the channel in which technology is 
transmitted to the developing countries is not limited to only FDI but also licensing, 
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subcontracting and other sorts of arm‟s length arrangements (Antras, 2005, p.1054) and the 
efficiency of each mode is different depending on the socio-institutional structure.  
2.3.2.3 Internalisation and the Theory of Location 
While Hymer (1976) used the concept of control, market imperfections and monopolistic 
advantage and Vernon (1966) used the idea of product life cycle and the theory of location 
to explain the emergence of TNCs and their FDI, Buckley and Casson, (1976, 1991, 1998 
and 2009), Hennart (1982, 1991 and 1999), Rugman (1981, 1985, and 1996) adopted the 
concept based on Coase‟s (1937) idea of internalisation to explain the existence of TNCs 
and the rationale for FDI.  
Among the above authors, Buckley and Casson (1976) are the prominent pioneers. They use 
this concept of internalisation in conjecture with the theory of location and the endogenous 
growth of the firm that is based on innovations. The former refers to the orthodox theory of 
location which has also been assumed in the PLC theory. More specifically, the theory of 
location assumes (i) constant returns to scale, (ii) free and standardised technology and (iii) 
firms being price takers in the market.  
The latter has already been discussed in section 2.2 and has been found in Vernon‟s PLC. 
This concept asserts that the firm‟s profitability and the dynamics of its growth are the 
results of the continuous process of innovations stemming from R&D. The second concept 
could be viewed as being in line with the endogenous growth strategies advocated by 
Penrose (1995). It also shares the spirit of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Based on 
these two principles, the internalisation framework can explain the location and growth 
strategies, the division of a given market between domestic producers and local subsidiaries 
of TNC, the export from the subsidiaries to a parent firm, and also the import from the 
parent firm. Moreover, it is closely related to the concept of a capitalist knowledge-based 
economy that characterises the global economic system from the post war period.  
In their classic book, Buckley and Casson (1976) distinguish between two types of 
internalisation in the context of international business. One involves the intermediate 
products flowing in the multi-stages of production that are an upward and a downward 
integration. This is alternatively called a globally vertical integration which contributed to an 
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increase in a globally economic interdependence. Vernon (1967) anticipated this trend long 
before and asserted that this type of internalisation would make different nations more 
interlocked by supply lines which implement a common strategy of production, market, and 
control. The other is the internalisation of knowledge generating from the firm‟s research 
and development. The latter can be thought of as Hymer‟s explanation that firms choose to 
internalise to maximise the potential profits. Henisz (2003) explains the rationale of these 
two types of internalisation as follows. In the former case, an internalisation is deployed as a 
way to coordinate and plan down-stream markets. In the latter case, internalisation takes 
place to address the missing market, a type of market failure, or to cope with the 
oligopolistic nature of the high-technological market.  
Both types of internalisation have a significant explanatory power over the expansion of the 
international boundary of the firms. Hymer (1976) and Vernon (1966), suggest that the 
monopolistic or the firm-specific advantage is a prerequisite of FDI while Buckley and 
Casson (1976) suggests that the internalisation of the firms‟ managerial and technological 
capabilities in foreign market could grant firms with a substantial economic rent, that is the 
monopolistic return, ex post, as a result of the combination of locational and the firm-
specific advantages (Rugman, 1981, Henisz, 2003). For example, firms that are successful in 
their R&D investment can choose to capitalise on their patented innovation that offers them 
monopolistic returns and go for international internalisation. This can be either in the form 
of a vertical integration, to reduce production costs, or a horizontal expansion to foreign 
markets via FDI. By so doing, firms expand and may gain a favourable position in the 
market, both at national and international level. This, in turn, reinforces the firm‟s specific 
advantages.  
It is important to note that internalisation in this context implies the expansion of managerial 
control over the foreign assets, as opposed to selling the knowledge, or the right to produce, 
to an independent foreign firm. The internalisation is adopted in order to minimise some 
potential opportunistic behaviours such as imitating, improving the technology, out-
competing the initial seller, and reselling the knowledge to a third party. In brief, even an 
international internalisation may imply to some extent, the transfer of resources such as, 
financial capital, managerial and organisational capabilities and technology from parent 
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firms to their subsidiaries. The objective of an internalisation, in this context, is to retain the 
unrivalled income generating asset within the firm or the firm‟s network. 
Insofar as it can be seen, the arguments, made by Hymer (1976), Vernon (1966, 1979) 
Buckley and Casson (1976, 1981, 1985, 2009), suggest that there are impurities in the 
market and the differential in firm-specific advantage that encourage firms to internalise and 
conduct FDI. It is argued that the monopolistic advantage and the internalisation are closely 
related subjects. Therefore, it can be seen that the framework developed by Buckley and 
Casson, can be used as a complementary concept to those of Hymer (1976) and Vernon 
(1966), since they not only share many overlapping ideas but their different concepts 
appears to be complementary. 
2.3.2.4 The Eclectic Theory 
An eclectic theory is an integrative framework, used to study the international production 
and the behaviour of TNCs. It has been formally proposed by Dunning (1977) and iterated 
many times. See Dunning (1981, 1988, 1995, 2000 and 2001). Dunning is a prominent 
scholar in international business studies. He is as distinctive as Hymer and Vernon. Most of 
his works go beyond the mainstream economic tradition to cover the political and historical 
aspects of TNCs. Dunning has constructed a framework, called an OLI paradigm that 
explicitly explains the working of TNCs at micro-economic level and shows how it could 
affect and be affected by the development of the economy at the macro-economic level. His 
work on this aspect will be reviewed in Chapter 4.  
An OLI paradigm explains the positions and operations of TNCs on the basis of three 
interdependent variables namely, ownership-specific advantage (O), locational attractions 
(L), and internalisation (I). In some literature, an OLI paradigm is known as the eclectic 
theory (Dunning, 2000). Pitelis (2000) explains that the OLI paradigm is basically made of 
three main concepts that earlier scholars adopted to explain the raison d’être of TNCs and 
FDI. These would include the monopolistic advantage by Hymer (1976), the concept of 
internalisation by Buckley and Casson (1976) and the theory of locations by Vernon (1966) 
and Buckley and Casson, (1976). However, Rugman, (1999) and Dunning (2000) noted that 
the idea of the ownership and the location advantages had already been conceived earlier in 
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Dunning (1958). At the time, his focus was on the impact of American investment on British 
industries. Hence, these concepts were not spelled out explicitly. There is an evolution of 
Dunning‟s thought about his eclectic theory. This study will explain this theory based 
heavily on his more recent works (Dunning, 2000 and 2001), on the OLI paradigm.  
There are three set of forces embraced in the OLI paradigm. Firstly, the net ownership 
advantage, also known as monopolistic, firm-specific, competitive advantage. This force 
may arise from various factors, such as, the firm‟s human and non-human resources, the 
managerial capability to depict an opportunity and react to it accordingly, the way the firms 
use their resources, the size, the privileged access to special assets such as low cost capital, 
exclusive natural resources, and highly able human capital. The above force is mobile and 
empowers firms that possess them to have current and potential advantages over their 
competitors. Secondly, the locational advantage refers to the immobile resources which are 
geographically specific to a country, such as, labour cost, nature of demand, tariff barriers, 
the presence of competitors, and non-tradable products. This force determines the extent to 
which firms choose to locate their multi-stage production stages outside their national 
boundaries. Also, from Vernon (1966 and 1979), it is seen that the locational specific 
advantage may help shape the firm‟s specific advantage as well. Lastly, the internalisation 
refers to the extent to which firms attempt to maximise their potential profits by internalising 
the market transactions and exploiting the firm-specific advantage. Internalisation helps 
significantly to explain the mode of entry of a firm to a foreign market, that is, FDI over 
other modes of entry. 
Dunning (2001) affirms that the significance of each of these advantages and their 
configuration depends on the context of countries in questions, the political features, regions, 
industries and the market structure. The paradigm itself is more useful for analyzing the 
determinations of FDI than for predicting the behaviour of TNCs. Being criticised as having 
too many variables in a theory, Dunning (2001, p.176) defends by stating that no single 
theory nor concept can give a satisfactory explanation of TNCs and FDI. This is not only 
because FDI has multi-aspects and can be approached by various frameworks, but also 
because FDI involves so many parties, such as, the firm, the state, labour, consumer and 
suppliers. Each is driven by different motivations and expectations. Thus, he urges that to 
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appreciate fully this framework, the context in which the OLI forces are operating must be 
clearly specified. He concludes that these three concepts are complimentary and 
interdependent. Even though they cannot give a full explanation of FDI, they can, at least, 
deliver a satisfactory one.   
While Vernon uses his PLC theory and observation of American firms, Dunning provides 
the ideal types of FDI from his eclectic paradigm and the observation of the pattern of FDI 
in the past. According to Dunning (2000), there are four main types of FDI. Firstly, it is a 
market seeking FDI. This type of international operation is designed to satisfy a particular 
market in which firms perceive to have a competitive advantage over their rivals. Clearly, 
this type of FDI is demand-oriented. Secondly, it is the resource-seeking FDI. It can be said 
that this type of FDI is the most traditional one and can be traced back to the Mercantile era. 
It is designed to gain access to natural resources for instance, cheap unskilled labour, 
minerals, forestry and agricultural products. It is worth mentioning that the first and second 
types of FDI are the traditional ones. The third type of FDI refers to a rationalised or 
efficiency-seeking FDI. This type of FDI is designed to promote a more efficient use of an 
international division of labour or a specialisation of the deployment of an existing portfolio 
of foreign and domestic productive assets. This type of FDI is related to the first and second 
kinds and sequential to them. It is also the case supporting the concept of internalisation. 
The fourth type of FDI is one of strategic-asset seeking. This type of FDI is designed to 
protect or increase the existing firm‟s ownership-specific advantage by, for example, to 
acquire complementary assets which would improve the firm‟s market position. In effect, a 
direct investment project can have more than one kind of these categories. As Dunning 
keeps mentioning, one needs to look at the context of the case in question. 
2.4 Definitions of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
The previous section has discussed the evolution of the literature explaining TNCs and the 
rationale for FDI. It is important to note that, when FDI is analysed in the context of 
economic growth, the nature of the TNCs as well as their rationale tends to be understated. 
More specifically, macroeconomists tend to see FDI as a bundle of plain factors of 
production rather than the action of an economic institution which is driven by a group of 
individuals. The next chapter will show that underplaying these aspects could produce a 
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misleading result when assessing the impact of FDI on the economic growth in host 
developing countries.   
This section will provide the definition of FDI from both the accounting perspectives and 
macroeconomic perspectives. It is noted that while the former reflect FDI more in line with 
the microeconomic analysis, the latter does not. It will also point out a few key aspects of 
FDI that are explicit under microeconomic analysis but tend to be understated under 
macroeconomic analysis.   
According to the concept of direct investment defined in the user manual for the 5
th
 edition 
of Balance of Payments, published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), FDI is a type 
of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy 
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy. It also notes that a 
direct investment relationship, not only generates the first capital outlay, it also generates the 
subsequent transactions between the investing and invested firms. A direct investment 
enterprise must have its ordinary shares or voting power held by foreign investors, be they 
an individual or an investing corporate, at more than ten percent. Indeed, these voting shares 
reflect the control element advocated by Hymer (1976). With regards to the concept of 
control, Hymer (1976) asserts that it is not easy to define, particularly when one wants to 
distinguish between „some‟ control and „no‟ control. 
For this reason, it is worth clarifying the quantitative definition of control which draws a line 
between FDI and PI. Normally, to identify whether or not an investor, or a firm, has an 
interest to control over the foreign firm, empirical researchers resort to the legal aspect of an 
investment. They look at the percentage of equity of a corporation held by foreign investors. 
It will tell roughly how much management in one firm could influence and control the 
decision of another. The criteria can be varied but this study adopts the one advised by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The threshold where PI and FDI are distinguished is 10 
percent. Thus, foreign controlled enterprises can take the form of subsidiaries, branches 
(100% foreign equity or majority foreign owned firm), joint-ventures (foreign equity 50% 
and domestic equity 50%), and partly foreign owned firm (foreign equity of less than 50% 
but greater than 10%).  
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The focus now turns to the purest sense from macroeconomic perspectives. FDI is viewed as 
a flow of long term capital. It involves two countries. The home country refers to the 
country where the investors of FDI reside. Outward FDI refers to the outflow of capital from 
the home country. The host country refers to the destination of the FDI. Inward FDI refers to 
the incoming flow of capital in the host country. In a broader sense, FDI does not only 
represent the flow of capital, attached to these capitals, there are marketing strategies, 
technology, and managerial knowledge (Borensztein, et al., 1998; De Mello, 1999; Ramirez, 
2000; Saggi, 2002 and Kohpaiboon, 2006). 
It must, however, be noted that FDI is not necessarily equal to the demand for financial 
capital to finance the foreign project because a foreign investment can always be financed 
from the saving pool of the host country. Zhan (2006) observes that a significant portion of 
FDI does not always involve cross-border capital flow. This is because, according to 
UNCTAD (2006b), FDI statistics are complied from three main components, namely, equity 
capital, reinvested earnings, and intra company loans. The first component constitutes voting 
shares of an investing firm in invested companies as described earlier. However, it is noted 
that equity can also be provided in the form of machinery and other investments in kind. The 
second component refers to an investment using a firm‟s domestic profit, generated from 
past investment. This component does not involve fresh, new, foreign capital at all. The last 
component points to the financial transactions between a parent company and its affiliates. 
Again, it is also possible that an intra-company funding can be raised domestically. Taking 
all theses points into account, FDI statistics does not fully represent additional capital to the 
home countries. Rather, they reflect foreign operations in their economies.  
On the aspect of technological transfer, the review of the theory of TNCs points out that, 
ceteris paribus, TNCs tends to limit the technological spillovers and it is also one of the 
main reasons why a foreign firm decide to enter to a national market with FDI and not 
licensing or export as a mode of entry. In fairness, Technological spillovers would then be 
more appropriated to be viewed as a residual or an intended outcome from the decision of a 
foreign firm to internalise an international market transaction. Hence, to assume straight 
away that FDI is accompanied by knowledge and technological spillovers may be too naïve 
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and could cause the misleading analysis when FDI is analysed in the macroeconomic 
context.    
2.5 Summary 
The literature review in this chapter adopts a microeconomic approach to comprehend the 
nature of TNCs and present the rationale for their FDI. This is done by reviewing the theory 
of TNCs. The literature shows that firms exist in the first place because of market 
imperfections. As long as firms are more efficient than the market in carrying out a given 
transaction, they will continue to internalise. As long as the firms internalise, they not only 
secure their survival but are also able to grow. The theory points out that technological, 
managerial and organisational skills embodied in both human and non-human assets of firms, 
are sources of the capabilities of firms to conduct further internalisation. When firms decide 
to internalise transactions across national borders, the firms become TNCs. 
The capability to achieve further growth is known as ownership-specific advantages. In 
many cases, firms internalise in order to exploit and protect their ownership-specific 
advantages. It is also possible that the act of internalisation could reinforce the firms‟ 
ownership advantages by increasing the firms‟ market shares and preventing the firm‟s 
competitors from expanding or even halting an entry by their potential competitors. All of 
these would provide the firms with increasing returns. This could be translated into a large 
scale of capital accumulation. Equally important, it is seen that ownership-specific 
advantages, internalisation and their interplay, affect and are affected by the market 
environments, known as locational specific advantages. Once the internalisation takes place 
beyond national market, these three factors can be used to comprehend fully the emergence 
of TNCs and the rationale for their FDI. 
In summary, the literature shows that TNCs are large firms that are strongly efficient. Indeed, 
they have to be more efficient than the market in their area of specialisation otherwise they 
would have not existed in the first place. From this, it can be said that TNCs, as well as their 
operations, need to be studied and approached in an oligopolistic framework where market 
failure prevails. Also, under these circumstances, the Adam Smith‟s invisible hand may face 
some kind of constraint to deliver the collective welfare of the market economy as, at least, 
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several assumptions of perfect competition do no longer hold, for instance, monopoly or 
oligopoly, and imperfect information. This suggests the role of the state in interfering in the 
market to ensure that TNCs will not abuse their superior power. By the same token, the great 
efficiency, stored in a firm, and derived by an efficient organisation and control, is important 
to the economy as an economic institution, shows how important role it takes as a wealth 
generating institution.  
The last section shows that when foreign operations of TNCs are perceived as FDI, the 
rationale of TNCs and their rent-seeking motivation have been underplayed. Their financial 
capital and advance technology tends to be over-emphasised.  This may have a significant 
implication on the analysis of the impact of FDI on economic development. In the following 
chapter, this study will review the literature that considers FDI with a macroeconomic 
approach. It is a conventional discipline adopted to analyse the impact of FDI on economic 
growth in the developing countries. It will be seen that the nature and rationale of TNCs 
presented in this chapter are the missing pieces in the analysis of an impact of FDI on 
economic growth at the macroeconomic level. Taking these missing pieces into account 
could help to explain partly the discrepancy between the theoretical predictions of the 
positive impact of FDI on growth in host developing countries and the empirical 
observations. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents how Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), in theory, affects economic 
growth and development in host countries, particularly the developing ones. FDI will be 
approached from macro-economic perspectives. The study initially presents the literature 
review from the growth economics discipline, whose theories and methods are now 
commonly used in the analysis of impact of FDI. At the theoretical level, growth economics 
tends to suggest that FDI is beneficial to host countries. However, the evidence in support of 
this claim is inconclusive and conditional. The evidence suggests that the impact varies in 
relation to the specificity of the host market and provides some key conditions where the 
positive spillovers prevail. As the market is a socially and politically constructed entity, the 
study then considers the role of the state and discusses how its intervention in the market 
could make a difference to economic development.      
The discussion then moves to FDI-related policies and their evolution over the past fifty 
years. Focus is made on the recent FDI policies that most developing countries are advised 
to implement and that are influenced by the neo-liberal ideology. The study then shows that 
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neo-liberal FDI-related polices have re-directed the role of the host state in intervening in 
the market in such a way that might impede the host country from benefiting from inward 
FDI. It should also be noted that, in many cases, the adoption of such policies is driven by 
politics both at national and international level. Due to the political involvement in 
development and the institutional environment that the neo-liberal development policies, 
particularly in relation to an inward FDI, tend to create in developing countries, the study 
suggests that perhaps, a complementary, theoretical approach towards FDI may be found in 
the dependency theory.  
This is because dependency theory explicitly embraces political aspects of development in 
relation to FDI, and takes into account the monopolistic power of TNCs into their analyses. 
Moreover, it is observed that the state in the host countries tends to be passive and that 
domestic entrepreneurs appear to be weak in the context that dependency theory portrays. 
As a result, dependency theory tends to suggest a negative impact of FDI in host countries. 
The objective of the literature review in this chapter, however, does not lie in taking the 
position of any argument but to highlight the institutional context, economic aspects, and 
assumptions that are specific to each argument. It will then point out that the neo-liberal 
policies tend to create the institutional configurations which are similar to what the 
dependency theory depicts. Hence, the positive impact of FDI on economic development 
under neo-liberal policy environment remains much in doubt if not negative as asserted by 
the theory. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the conventional perspective 
towards FDI and economic growth. This section gives a review of theoretical works and 
portrays the channel through which FDI conveys benefits to the host country‟s economic 
growth. The study will then give a review of the empirical evidence and its implications on 
the role of the state and policies. Section 3.3 introduces the critical perspective towards FDI, 
dependency theory.  More specifically, the study will focus on capital dependency theory 
which is an extraction of dependency theory. Capital dependency theory focuses mainly on 
the role of FDI and economic development in the host countries. In this section, the study 
will outline counter-arguments of the benefits of FDI which were discussed in the previous 
section. A summary for the chapter is found in section 3.4           
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3.2 Economic Growth and Development  
Economic growth and development literature will be used as the context for the analysis of 
FDI. Economic growth and development can be thought of as a single subject or two related 
subjects, depending on the theoretical point of view. More specifically, growth economics 
represents the mainstream view on how growth is produced. The other schools of economics 
such as institutional and Marxist economics do draw lines between the two. This study will 
discuss briefly the conceptual difference between growth and development in order to justify 
the position taken in this thesis.   
Mainstream economics, confined to its analytical techniques, captures growth with static and 
tractable analysis. Thus, economic growth is measured mainly by quantitative variables such 
as firm‟s output or sales at the micro-level and Gross National Income (GNI) or Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) at the macro-level. In contrast, institutional and Marxist economics 
see economic development as a flux, a continuous process, and an evolution. Moreover, the 
definition of economic development appears to cover greater aspects than a simple growth 
of inputs. It also includes humanistic dimensions such as an access to education and 
healthcare, the degree of social mobility and equality. In addition to this, recently, Chang 
(2010) encourages to bring back the production side of development which refers to the 
ability to command the sphere of productive forces. Indeed, this productive capability can be 
regarded as a sum of national firms‟ specific advantages. It is also the focused characteristic 
of growth which perpetually pushes economic development to the ever higher stage. It will 
be argued further that an increased of this capability can largely be reflected by an increased 
in GNI.  
In this study, the distinction between growth and development, even though being insightful, 
is not given a central emphasis. This is because, firstly, it is always observed that a country 
with a low level of GNI or GDP has never been regarded as developed country and that 
these indexes per capita have never misrepresented the country‟s level of development 
(Krugman, 1995, pp.719-720). Secondly, the creation of social institutions and other 
qualitative aspects of development require financial resources or wealth. Without the 
sustainable growth rate of national wealth, measurable by the GNI or GDP, a government 
could face financial constraints in carrying out these developmental projects. Thirdly, this 
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study adopts its empirical framework from the neo-classical growth economics. Therefore, 
to reserve the compatibility with the methods being used, the measurement of growth and 
development needs to be quantitative in nature. Lastly, even though the measurement of 
development and growth in this study is reduced to only a single index, the GNI, the 
qualitative aspects of development, particularly the production side of development, will not 
be ignored as they will be discussed in the descriptive analysis.  
3.2.1 Growth Economics 
This section presents the theoretical explanation of how growth is produced from the 
mainstream perspective. Once the theoretical growth mechanism is adequately depicted, the 
study will introduce FDI into the context in order to show how FDI can potentially be 
beneficial to growth and development. Growth economics is a branch of economics where 
the investigation into the source of economic prosperity is the key interest. It can be dated 
back to the time of classical economics in which Adam Smith (1776), David Ricardo (1817), 
Thomas Multhus (1789) and John Stuart Mill (1967) were key pioneers. Classical growth 
economics has weathered both theoretical and practical challenges through time and left the 
great legacy found in every branch of contemporary economic studies. Contemporary 
enquiries into the growth process mostly have their theoretical root from, for example, 
Ramsey (1928), Young (1928), Schumpeter (1934), Denison (1956) and Solow (1957). 
These neo-classical economists provided the modern building blocks for endogenous growth 
theories that currently prevail in growth economics.  
The evolution of growth theories from the neo-classical theory to the endogenous growth 
theory can be briefly explained as follows. Inherited from the classical theory, the neo-
classical growth theory includes the concepts of competitive behaviour, general equilibrium, 
the role of diminishing returns and its relationship to the accumulation of physical and 
human capital, the relationship between the income per capita and the growth rate of a 
population, and a slight degree of positive elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p.16). These aspects are common in the neo-classical 
form of production function. The productive inputs, usually incorporated into these models, 
are technology, capital and labour, with technology being treated as a constant and capital 
and labour as variables.   
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The neo-classical production function shows that economic growth is the result of an 
increase in factors of production such as capital and labour, and/or an increase in the level of 
technological advancement. However, growth caused by an increase in factors of production 
is usually seen as less desirable than the growth generated from technological advancement. 
This is because growth will cease in the long run if an increase in capital and labour reaches 
a certain threshold due to the assumption of diminishing return of rival inputs. Technology, 
on the other hand, has a non-rival nature and can be used simultaneously in more than one 
area without interfering with another. It is also assumed to be repetitively used with no 
additional cost. By its specification in the model, an increase in the level of technology 
would shift the entire production upward. Therefore, it is the only variable in the neo-
classical model that is responsible for raising the long-term growth rate.  
Hypothetically, based on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital, the neo-classical 
production function makes two general predictions.  First, the lower the starting level of per 
capita GDP, relative to the long-run growth rate, the faster the country would grow. This 
implies the convergence of the growth rate across nations. This convergence is conditional 
on the saving rate, the growth rate of population, and the heterogeneity of production 
functions across-countries (Barro and Sala-i-martin, 2004, p.17). This prediction is largely 
confirmed by a number of empirical studies, for example, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 
1992 and 2004). The convergence is also conditional on the homogeneity of economies. In 
other words, it tends to take place among the countries with a similar level of development. 
Very rich and very poor countries can hardly be converged.  
The second prediction is that per capita output will cease growing in the absence of 
technological progress. That is because an increase in capital accumulation alone would 
soon be subject to the law of diminishing returns. This proposition has been established in 
order to reconcile with the fact that a number of traditional rich countries, for example, the 
U.S. and the Western European countries still enjoy a continuous growth rate of income per 
capita. Even though the neo-classical model could explain meticulously the mechanism of a 
short-term or transitional change of growth, the main problem of the model, however, is that 
it cannot explain anything about the long-term growth rate, which is determined by 
technology.  
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This deficiency was eventually addressed in the latest vintage of growth theory; the 
endogenous growth theories in which emphasis is heavily placed on the role of technological 
change in economic growth. Endogenous growth models attempt to discard the assumption 
of diminishing returns of rival inputs, perfect competition, and the constant return of the 
function. Beside, the endogenous growth theories seek to define explicitly the mechanism of 
technological change, such that, in the endogenous growth theories, perpetual growth is 
formally formulated. They also introduce additional variables to explain technological 
change. For example, Romer (1986, 1990) and Audretsch, Keilbach and Lehman (2006) 
included the role of entrepreneurial decisions, Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) and 
Funke and Strulik (2000) proposed human capital, Barro (1990) and Xie, Zou, and Davoodi 
(1999) incorporated government policies in their models.  
It should be noted that some concepts attached to the newly introduced variables are not 
necessarily new concepts but the way they are expressed in a mathematical formulation, is 
original. Another innovation of endogenous growth models originates from the attempt to 
insert the micro-mechanism. An example of this is the collective decisions of an individual 
or institution to maximise profit is incorporated into a macro-mechanism by aggregating the 
production function. This attempt provides a clearer and more instructive picture of how an 
individual decision and the distribution of knowledge and technology contribute to the 
economic growth process. As pointed out by Durlauf (2001), growth economics is an open-
ended study, and growth theorists may introduce any variable that they believe contributes 
to growth. As a result, the width and the depth of growth economics are significant. This 
review, however, will focus mainly on the models that concern growth that is induced by 
FDI. 
3.2.1.1 Growth Models with FDI 
FDI brings not only additional capital to host countries, but also superior managerial and 
technological knowledge. Scholars in growth economics have paid great attention to these 
aspects of FDI, especially on its potential to transfer technology across nations. De Mello 
(1999) explains that FDI affects growth in recipient economies through two channels. One is 
by increasing the capital stock, and the other is by increasing the rate of technological 
change. The evolution of this thought gives rise to a sensible hypothesis, stating that FDI 
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eventually contributes to economic growth. This is particularly the case in developing 
countries where financial capital and technology are scarce.  
It can be said that due to the importance of technology over capital, the potential of 
transferring technology across borders by TNCs has been given a central role and theorised 
in growth studies. See for example, MacDougall (1960), Findlay (1978), Das (1987), 
Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1990), Wang and Blomstrom (1992), Huizinga (1995), 
Rodriguez Clare (1996), De Gregorio and Lee (1998), Glass and Saggi (2002), and 
Kohpaiboon (2005). Scholars in international business discipline also agree with the above 
point. For instance, Dunning (1994), Lall and Narula (2004), and Buckley and Casson (2009) 
suggest that FDI would not only enhance the competitiveness of the host countries but also 
facilitate their process of industrialisation. This would ultimately contribute to their long-
term growth. However, it must be noted that scholars from the international business 
discipline all maintain that the benefit of FDI on development is extremely specific to 
context and policies being implemented in the host countries and that FDI could affect the 
nature of competition in the host country in such a way that the positive outcome of FDI on 
economic development may not necessarily be guaranteed. This suggests that the study of 
the impact of FDI on growth requires a historical and institutional analysis and a study of 
government policies.  
The rest of this section focused mainly on the study of the role of FDI on economic growth. 
It highlights several classic growth models where FDI is present. As FDI-related growth 
models are numerous, this literature review will classify them into four groups. The first 
three categories deal with the channels through which the technological spillover from FDI 
is likely to take place. The fourth group refers to the models in which the focus is on the 
conditions enhancing the occurrence of the spillovers. The empirical evidence supporting 
these models will be discussed afterwards. Prior to the discussion of these models, this study 
will briefly give the definition of the spillover from FDI and outline two fundamental 
assumptions, found in most FDI-related growth models.  
Technological spillover is an economic externality. It is an unintended product which, once 
having taken place, is not transmitted through the price mechanism. In the context of FDI, 
spillover suggests the positive externality which allows local firms to benefit from the 
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superior knowledge of the TNCs with a relatively lower, or even zero cost. Saggi (2002, p. 
208) gives a clear concept of spillover. He distinguishes two types of spillover; pecuniary 
externality and pure externality. The former concerns the impact of FDI on the market 
structure and the latter concerns the impact of FDI on the adoption of the technology. In a 
strict sense, only the latter counts as externality because the pecuniary externality can be 
reflected through the price mechanism.  
It should be noted that externality can take both positive and negative forms. Most of FDI-
related growth studies, both theoretical and empirical, focus mainly on the pure and positive 
externality which, „if it exists‟, appears to be favourable to economic growth. The pecuniary 
impact of FDI, nonetheless, appears to be neglected even though it affects directly the 
aggregate welfare by altering the nature of market competition in the host countries. For 
example, from the previous chapter, it is seen that TNCs are mostly large and highly 
efficient firms. Thus, for host countries, if FDI induces more competition in the domestic 
market and, if domestic firms could withstand that competition, the aggregate welfare would 
then increase. On the other hand, it is normally observed that firms in developing countries, 
particularly those at the early stage of capitalist development, are relatively small and 
unlikely to be efficient. Under these circumstances, FDI could crowd out domestic firms and 
reduce competition by their superior efficiency and size. In this event, FDI would undermine 
the aggregate welfare as well as the development of domestic firms, known to be an engine 
of capital accumulation, where productive capabilities are mostly embodied.  
There are two fundamental assumptions that are normally found in most FDI-related growth 
models. One refers to the contagion effects and the other to the technological gap. These 
assumptions were initially identified in Findlay (1978). The first assumption, influenced by 
Arrow (1962), Lancaster (1966) and Nelson and Phelps (1966), asserts that technical 
innovations are most effectively disseminated when there are personal contacts between the 
providers and the receivers of the knowledge. This is known as the contagion effect. It refers 
to the idea that once the local firms enter into contact with the TNCs, whose competitiveness 
is superior, they will not only improve their efficiency through imitation but they will also 
get inspired to perform even better. The second assumption, influenced by Veblen (1915) 
and Gerschenkron (1965), refers to the notion that the greater the relative disparity in 
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technological capability between the host and the home nation, the faster the rate at which 
the relatively backward nation can catch up. This notion is also known as the advantage of 
backwardness. It should be noted, however, that for this assumption to hold, the 
technological disparity must not be too wide. Otherwise, technological convergence would 
not happen.  
These two assumptions give rise to a number of theoretical works, attempting to identify the 
channel through which the spillover takes place. Saggi (2002) suggests that the channels 
through which FDI spillover takes place can be categorised into three categories, namely, 
the demonstration effects, labour turnover, and vertical linkages. 
Demonstration Effects 
The first category of the FDI-related growth models focuses on the studies that explain the 
mechanism of FDI spillover through demonstration effects.  The demonstration effects refer 
to the notion that local firms consider adopting the superior technology only when it is 
introduced in the local market. This is because it is assumed that adoption of technology that 
is readily available at home is always cheaper for local firms.  
Among the above line of models, Findlay (1978) is considered the pioneer. Building his 
work mainly from Mansfield (1961) and Nelson (1968), he presented the model in which 
TNCs own and transfer technology to local firms in relatively backward countries. The 
innovation in Findlay‟s model lies in the distinction between foreign capital and domestic 
capital, each with its own separate rate of return and with no necessity of factor price 
equalisation. In this model, host countries are not capable of producing technology.  
Some implications can be drawn from Findlay‟s model. Firstly, the increase in domestic 
efficiency will decrease the inflow of FDI and that the rate of technological change in 
developing countries would eventually cease. Clearly, this is not supported by the historical 
evidence as it is observed that most of FDI still takes place among developed countries 
(WIR, 2008b). Secondly, if the innovation takes place continuously and rapidly in the 
advanced nations, this tends to make developing countries more dependent on foreign 
capital for further growth.  Lastly, an increase in education of the labour force may help to 
reduce the dependency on foreign capital. Findlay‟s model, however, does not explain the 
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force that determines the transfer of technology to the backward region (Fan, 2002, p.5). 
This force is explicitly examined in the international business literature and already 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
Das (1987) proposes the oligopoly model in which local firms may learn or imitate the 
technology from the subsidiaries of TNCs by conducting a reverse engineering. In other 
words, learning and imitating increases domestic firms‟ efficiency with virtually zero 
development cost. Thus, in her model, the rate of increase in a domestic firm‟s efficiency is 
an increasing function of foreign activities. It follows that the larger the scale of the TNCs‟ 
productions, the greater opportunities for the domestic firms. Das (1978) is aware of TNCs‟ 
incentive to protect their technology but despite this, she shows that, along the optimal path, 
TNCs still benefit from transferring technology to their subsidies in a foreign land. Clearly, 
Das‟s model represents the win-win scenario for TNCs and the developing host countries. 
The shortfall of this model, however, is that it does not acknowledge the cost of assimilating 
technology and that it does not take into account the incentives and the restriction of local 
firms in acquiring new technology.  
Wang and Blomstrom (1992) develop a related duopoly model in which TNCs transfer 
technology endogenously by means of interactions between local firms and TNCs‟ 
subsidiaries. Their assumptions are explicitly taken from Findlay (1978) in that they assume 
positive relationship between the technological gap and the rate of spillover.  Wang and 
Blomstrom‟s model is distinctive from Das (1987) in that they recognise the cost of 
transferring and assimilating technology. Hence, the rate of technological change in the host 
country induced by FDI spillovers depends on the strategic action between TNCs and local 
firms in their investment in transferring and acquiring technology. Compared to the first two 
models, this model is more powerful in that it takes into account the actions of the firms in 
determining the aggregate economic performance. The key implication that can be drawn 
from Wang and Blomstrom‟s model is that the technology transfer from FDI is positively 
related to the local firms‟ investment in learning. Also, it can be deduced, from this model, 
that strategic actions involve some degree of planning both at firm and national levels.   
Huizinga (1995) incorporates political aspects into FDI-led growth model. He proposes a 
model in which TNCs are willing to transfer technology only when the host countries are 
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politically stable. In his model, even though the cost of transferring and acquiring 
technology is nil, if TNCs are facing the hostile government or the risk of expropriation, 
they will choose to transfer low quality technology. Wang and Blomstrom (1992) and 
Huizinga (1995) agree that, in the light of operational risk, such as, political instability, and 
low potential of economic growth, TNCs would be reluctant to transfer technology 
irrespective of the cost of technological transfer.  
The above reviewed models suggest that demonstration effects may be mostly observed at 
the industrial level. Accordingly, these models can be empirically assessed by looking at the 
industrial variation in R&D expenditure made by local firms in an effort to acquire 
technology induced by FDI. What should be noted is that empirical studies of this kind 
should allow for the impact of FDI on the structure of the market, that is, the nature of 
competition, if they seek unbiased results (Saggi, 2002, p.211).    
Labour Turnover 
The second category of FDI-related growth models refers to the theoretical models 
explaining the mechanism of FDI spillover through the physical movement of workers 
between TNCs and local firms. On this aspect, so far, there are only a few theoretical models. 
For example, Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde (2001) developed a model in which technological 
spillovers through FDI occur due to worker‟s mobility. Their model has a comparatively 
static nature and shows that TNCs can transfer superior technology to their foreign 
subsidiaries by training local workers. The spillover occurs when these trained workers are 
later hired by local firms. Even in the absence of labour turnover, their model still suggests 
that the host country could benefit from the wage premium paid by the TNCs.  
Glass and Saggi (2002) see it differently. They construct the oligopoly model in which 
TNCs have a superior technology to local firms, allowing them to compete successfully in 
the local market. Thus, TNCs tends to limit technological diffusion by offering higher wages 
to their workers relative to local firms. In this event, the premium, enjoyed by the TNCs‟ 
local workers, may surpass or fall behind the aggregate welfare from which an economy 
would benefit if the labour turnover would take place. It is noted that, however, such 
premium does not necessary reflect the social value of the knowledge embodied in the 
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workers. Thus, in their model, the premium wages offered by TNCs would make the 
benefits from FDI ambiguous. More specifically, the welfare effect in host countries remains 
conditional. For example, TNCs‟ wage premium could distortedly raise labour cost of the 
few middle class while leaving wages of the majority unskilled labour unchanged. In this 
case, aggregate wage premium may fall behind the aggregate welfare, distortions would then 
arise.  The technological diffusion, if ever it had taken place, may not be optimal for the 
local economy. Thus, the government of the host country may be interested in intervening 
and regulating FDI, for example, by increasing minimum wages, improving the quality of 
unskilled labour in the long run, and subsidising local firms so they can offer the same wage 
rate as TNCs, this would increase the labour turnover at least in the short run.  
Franco and Filson (2006) advance the concept that the workers in TNCs may later become 
entrepreneurs after a certain level of knowledge has been acquired. They develop a model in 
which the mechanism of imitation is specified and there is a high rate of improvement of 
production technologies. In these circumstances, employees may learn their employer‟s 
technological know-how and use it to start their own firm. This creates the spin-outs of new 
firms that can normally be observed in the automobile parts, construction, and electronics 
industries (Franco and Filson, 2006, p.841).  
It should be noted that studies of spillover through labour turnovers need to take into 
account the local competition policy and industrial differences (Saggi, 2002). Citing 
Hoekman and Djankov, (1997), Saggi (2002) noted that labour turnover is affected by the 
local competition policy. As in some countries, such as, Bulgaria, individuals are not 
permitted to join the management of competing firms for the first three years after leaving a 
company. In this event, the labour turnover and FDI-related spillovers may be legally 
restricted.  
Apart from competition law, trade secrecy law and intellectual property rights also have the 
same effects in protecting TNCs from losing their important information or their 
technological knowledge. Industrial variations are also essential because a high labour 
turnover rate is only associated with the industries where there is a fast pace of technological 
change. As it is observed that this type of industry is located mostly in the developed nations, 
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it is unlikely that the host developing countries will receive FDI, whose nature involves a 
high rate of labour turnover. 
So far, it can be implied that FDI, through demonstration effects and labour turnover, may 
increase the choices of technology available to local firms. However, an increase in the 
number of choices may not necessarily imply an increase in the rate of technological 
adoption and ultimately an increase in the rate of technological change. This is because 
technological change depends in part on the nature of competition, the strategic behaviour of 
domestic firms, and the size of the technological gap. In addition, as noted in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, TNCs‟ decision to internalise, and hence conduct FDI, is made partly in 
order to protect their technology, which is their income generating asset, from their 
competitors. Thus, the fundamental challenge to the hypothesis that FDI leads to growth 
does not lie in the question of technology contributing to growth but in the question of 
whether, or not, FDI will generate technological spillover. Nonetheless, there appears to be a 
consensus on the circumstances where TNCs are most likely to transfer the technological 
know-how to local firms. This refers to the vertical linkages spillovers. 
Vertical Linkages  
The third category of FDI-related growth models focuses on FDI spillovers through vertical 
linkages. This channel of spillover has been studied in both international business and 
growth studies. It is observed that when firms expand their productive operations to foreign 
markets, in most cases, they will generate backward and forward linkages with local agents. 
Through these linkages, contacts take place and, thus, the spillover is believed to occur. Lall 
(1980) was the first to propose the concept of backward linkage that takes place from the 
creation of a supplier network. Lall (1980) explains that as TNCs want to ensure the quality 
of inputs, they will need to provide the local suppliers with technical assistance and training. 
In so doing, the local firms would benefit from the knowledge provided by TNCs. In this 
event, the government of the host countries can secure the backward linkage FDI spillover 
by imposing a local content requirement on TNCs. These practices would also make a 
TNC‟s subsidiary less dependent on only one or two suppliers. Blalock and Gertler (2008, 
p.404) argue that, even when TNCs seek to minimise technology leakage, they have an 
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incentive to improve the productivities of their suppliers through training, quality control 
and inventory management.  
The forward linkage points to the supply of high quality outputs, the creation of the 
distribution network and the development of a client base. In this case, the domestic end-
producers and end-consumers could benefit from superior products produced by TNCs. 
Citing Crespo and Fontoura (2006), Javorcik (2004), however, notes that the upgrade of 
production may be attached to an increase in price. If the domestic firms cannot afford an 
increase in cost, they may instead suffer a negative effect from FDI.  
Growth models capturing vertical linkages are quite numerous. This study will review only a 
few notable papers. Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1991) developed a simple, general, 
equilibrium model with external, increasing returns due to specialisation. Their model shows 
that foreign capital increases the degree of specialisation in a service industry. Consequently, 
this drives the cost of services down and when services are used as inputs in manufacturing 
firms, they eventually increase the productive efficiency of the manufacturing sectors. When 
both service and manufacturing are enjoying an increase in efficiency, it is likely that the 
aggregate welfare would also be increased.  
Rodriguez Clare (1996) develops a formal model in which there exist backward and forward 
linkages. He shows that whether the spillover from the vertical linkages takes place or not is 
conditional on the nature of the product that TNCs produce, the cost of communication and 
the technological gap between the host and the home countries. Specifically, the product that 
is being produced must require intensive use of locally produced intermediate goods. Next, 
the cost of communication between headquarters and subsidiaries must be high. Then, the 
home and the host countries should be producing a relatively similar set of intermediate 
goods, suggesting a relatively small technological gap. There are at least two implications 
from this model. Firstly, it suggests the implementation of local content requirements in host 
countries. Secondly, the government of the host country must implement additional policies 
to ensure that the technological gap is to be reduced and that there must be a good domestic 
technological system. Otherwise, FDI could render the host developing countries into the 
enclave economy which refers to the situation where the benefits from FDI are confined to 
only a few, foreign, capital-intensive sectors. Even though technological spillover exists 
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within these sectors, it does not diffuse to the rest of an economy. In this event, FDI would 
create an inequality which would hinder further development.  
Markusen and Venables (1999) construct a model in which they address two issues. One is 
the pecuniary externality generated by FDI, that is, its impact on competition. The other is a 
backward linkage spillover in the intermediate-goods market which could benefit domestic 
final-goods producers. This model represents the case where FDI could act as a catalyst for 
growth in developing countries. For example, there are circumstances where the entry of a 
TNC would create new industries and push up the production possibility frontiers. Hence, 
the welfare of the host country is improved. It should be noted that on this aspect, Amsden 
(2007) argued that from historical evidence, it is observed that FDI normally takes place in 
the sectors where domestic entrepreneurs are pioneers. In other circumstances, with regard 
to the pecuniary externality, Markusen and Venables (1999) are also optimistic. They argue 
that local firms could be so strengthened by vertical spillover that the TNCs could be driven 
out of the market at later stage.  
Pack and Saggi (2001) also develop the model that addresses both the vertical spillover and 
the pecuniary externality. This model is, in fact, not developed in the context of FDI but it is 
highly relevant. They show that technological diffusion in a downstream market can 
increase the level of competition among suppliers and eventually drive down prices. Not 
only producers of downstream products in developing countries would benefit from an 
increase in productivity, but also the buyers in industrial countries would benefit as prices 
fall. This model suggests that, theoretically, as long as the barriers to entry in the 
downstream markets are regulated, the industrial profit will rise. Under these circumstances, 
they argue that both developing and developed countries gain from the international 
technological transfer. Blalock and Gertler (2008) adapt Pack and Saggi‟s (2001) work into 
the context of FDI and empirically confirm that it is relevant.  
Conditions for the Presence of Spillover  
While the above mentioned models focus on the channels through which spillovers take 
place, there is also another line of FDI-led growth models that highlight the conditions that 
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facilitate the occurrence of FDI-generated spillover for instance, Wang (1990) Borensztein, 
De Gregorio and Lee (1998), Hermes and Lensink, (2003), and Kohpaiboon (2005). 
Wang (1990) develops a growth model in which an international capital movement brings 
about the technological transfer. This model is similar to Findlay (1978) and assumes that 
the technological diffusion in developing countries is an increasing function of foreign 
production activities. Thus, the more the developing country relaxes its capital control, the 
higher is the long-term growth rate of the country. In particular, he points out that when 
international capital mobility is implemented in parallel with an increase in the level of 
human capital, or with an increase in the rate of domestic technological diffusion in recipient 
countries, it will reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor countries.  
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) developed a model highlighting the interaction 
between FDI and human capital as a key determinant of economic growth. Influenced by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), their model specifies that an economy‟s technological 
progress is the result of capital deepening and takes place in the form of an increase in the 
varieties of capital goods. Technological progress occurs only when local firms adopt 
foreign technology. In this context, FDI would act as the main channel for technological 
transfer. The adaptation of foreign technology, however, incurs a fixed cost that is inversely 
related to the ratio of foreign firms to the total firms in the market. Therefore, the more 
foreign firms are present in the market the lower will be the cost of producing the new type 
of products for local firms. The implications derived from this model, even though being 
sensible and rational, but from the history of late industrialised countries, such as, South 
Korea, it is also observed that the establishment of South Korean Heavy-Chemical industries 
did not rely on the presence of foreign firms at the early stage of its development (Il Sakong, 
1993; Kim 2000). Most importantly, foreign technology does not necessarily come under the 
single form of foreign investment. It must be emphasised that the rate of technological 
change in Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1998)‟s model is not only a function of FDI 
but also the level of human capital in host countries. This points out that the positive 
spillover from FDI is conditional and dependent on policy environment in the host country.  
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Hermes and Lensink (2003) designed their model along the same line as Borensztein, De 
Gregorio and Lee (1998). But, instead of focusing on the level of human capital as the 
condition for the presence of the FDI-generated spillover, they highlighted the importance of 
the development of the financial system in host countries. They suggest that an increase in 
FDI leads to an increase in the growth rate of output, but the final, positive effect of FDI 
depends on the extent of development of the financial sector.  
Kohpaiboon (2005) depicts another condition governing the occurrence of FDI-generated 
spillover. His model owes much to Wang and Blomstrom (1992), with a special emphasis 
drawn from the concept developed by Bhagwati (1968, 1985, and 1994). In this, he 
constructs a model where the spillover from FDI is conditional on the nature of the trade 
regime which is believed to affect the cost effectiveness in the learning activities of the local 
firms. Specifically, his model shows that the cost of acquiring foreign technology from FDI 
is higher in a restrictive trade regime than in a more relaxed environment. This is because 
most industries with high trade restrictions are mostly highly capital- and technology- 
intensive. In this case, the local firms may find it difficult to reproduce and imitate the 
TNCs‟ subsidiaries due to their limited capabilities and resources. Moreover, in some 
circumstances, the local firms may not have an incentive to improve the status quo of their 
production as they may be satisfied with the current economic rents, protected by the 
government. This line of argument appears to be perfect in arguing against infant industry 
protection. However, this model overlooks the competitive force and the control aspect of 
FDI. It also cannot explain the experience of Japanese and South Korean development 
which relied heavily on the protection of their strategic industries at the early stage of 
economic development.    
Recently, there is increasing evidence pointing to the correlations between FDI and 
inequality, for example, Basu and Guariglia (2007). Their model represents a dynamic dual 
economy with two sectors. The traditional sector employs the diminishing return technology 
while the modern sector benefits from the flow of new technology from FDI. There are two 
types of altruistic agents in this economy; the poor with a low level of human capital and the 
rich with a high level of human capital. In their model, FDI benefits only the rich, who have 
sufficient human capital. Unless the poor gain sufficient level of human capital, they cannot 
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benefit from FDI. The only way for the poor to break away from this rule is to increase their 
productivity in the traditional sector, in order to fund their accumulation of human capital. 
Once the level of human capital embodied in the poor is large enough, they can then benefit 
from FDI and the income gap would then be reduced. In contrast, this model shows that in 
the case where the poor are unable to acquire enough human capital, FDI will only increase 
the extent of income inequality in the country.  
There are also other conditions that contribute to the presence of spillover, such as, the 
technological gap between the home and the host countries, alternatively known as an 
absorptive capacity, the characteristics of domestic firms and the types of FDI, see Xu 
(2000), Narula and Marin (2003), Alfaro (2003) and Takii, (2005). However, as these papers 
do not explicitly formalise the models and their nature are mainly confined to the empirical 
level, this study will discuss their findings in the following section, where the empirical 
evidence on spillover from FDI and growth is discussed.  
It can be seen that most of the theoretical FDI-related growth models that have been 
presented so far, focus mainly on the potential of technological transfer brought about by an 
entry of TNCs. The most appropriate measurement of spillover would be the productivity of 
the local firms. However, as mentioned earlier, an increase in productivity in some local 
firms may not necessarily mean an increase in the overall national wealth, despite their close 
relationship. This is because an increase in efficiency may cluster mainly in a few economic 
sectors and does not diffuse to the entire economy effectively. This is partly due to 
imperfections inherited in the market that prevent efficient resource allocations and partly 
due to other policies such as inefficient income redistribution and poor domestic innovation 
systems.   
Apart from studies, such as, Rodriguez Clare (1996), Pack and Saggi (2001), Saggi (2002), 
and Glass and Saggi (2002), there are very few studies that discuss the role of pecuniary 
externality in the FDI-led growth analysis literature. These scholars take into account the 
nature of TNCs. The above studies refer to the pursuit of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
returns by TNCs that are made possible by their superior size and technological and 
managerial capability. It is vitally important to note that the incentive of achieving 
monopolistic or oligopolistic returns tend to outstrip that of transferring technology to local 
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firms. Furthermore, the spillover, if examined in the context of the theory of transaction cost 
and internalisation, is simply a residual outcome of internalisation by the TNCs. Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect TNCs to minimise the residuals from their internalisation of 
international transactions cost, that is, to limit the spillover of technology.  
Another important point to be noted is that, given that TNCs have an incentive to transfer 
technology to local suppliers, such technology should somehow be inferior to that possessed 
by the TNCs. Otherwise, these suppliers could, at later stage, become TNCs‟ competitors. 
As an example, consider an automobile industry in which there exists a technological 
hierarchy such as technology used in producing automobile parts and that used in 
assembling a whole car. In cases where there are low barriers to entry at the lower tier and 
few buyers in the upstream market, it can be expected that TNCs would be better off if they 
allow for technology diffusion in lower tiers of an industry. This would create many local 
suppliers and increase the price competition in the downstream market. Eventually, the 
profits of the suppliers will be driven down while the buyers which are likely to be TNCs 
can enjoy the monopsony power. In addition, TNCs could enjoy oligopolistic returns in the 
final product markets. This is the case of the Thai automobile industry in which the majority 
of local firms participate only in lower tiers of the industry whereas the industry‟s higher tier 
productions is dominated by TNCs (Ministry of Industry, Thailand, 2006).    
Many models have correctly pointed out that the positive impact of FDI on growth is not 
automatic but conditional on several conditions which are mainly shaped by domestic 
policies. Therefore a fuller analysis of the impact of FDI on growth may need to take into 
account policies that are implemented in many developing countries, as well as the nature 
and the role of the host countries‟ government. In brief, the theoretical works, despite being 
rational and vigorous tend to play down the possibility of multiple equilibria. This means 
that, while the impact of FDI on growth might be either positive or negative, most of the 
FDI-led growth models emphasise mainly the positive scenario. As a result, it will be seen 
that the empirical studies in this subject produce an unclear pattern, and it is difficult to draw 
a conclusion from them.  
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3.2.1.2 Empirical Evidence of FDI Spillovers  
Most of the empirical investigations into the impact of FDI on growth borrow analytical 
tools from growth empirics. There are two empirical methods used mostly in growth 
empirics. One is growth regression which is commonly used in empirical studies to analyse 
the impact of FDI on growth. The other method is growth accounting that mostly used in the 
calculations for Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Due to the dominance of regression 
analysis which involves many regression techniques and that growth regression will be 
adopted in the empirical study of this thesis, the review of empirical literature will focus 
both on the results and the estimation techniques used in deriving the empirical evidence. 
The summary of the estimation techniques adopted in the reviewed empirical studies can be 
found in Appendix A.  
Generally, the empirical evidence of FDI spillovers on growth can be classified into two 
broad categories. The first category refers to case studies which focus mainly on a single 
country. This category can also be sub-divided into the studies at micro-level, seeking to 
identify the spillovers at the firm or industrial level and the studies at macro-level, seeking 
to identify the direct positive impact of FDI on the economic growth. The second category 
refers to the cross-country analysis. In this category, due to the limitations of data and the 
complications of analyses, most of the work focuses mainly at the macro-level. 
Empirical Evidences from Case Studies 
The following quote, made by Rodrik (1999, p.37), reflects perfectly the situation of the 
theoretical works and the empirical evidences on the issue of FDI and economic growth.  
  “Today’s policy literature is filled with extravagant claims  
about positive spillovers from FDI but the evidence is sobering”  
The empirical evidence of the FDI spillover focusing mainly on a single country can also be 
categorised into groups of micro- and macro- analyses. The empirical works at firm and 
industrial level will be the first to be introduced. It is noted that this line of empirical 
evidence, drawn heavily from the panel regressions, is the earliest generation of empirical 
study on FDI and growth. This type of empirical analysis is useful in providing the evidence 
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of spillover in different country. Firm-level analyses offer a better confidence in terms of 
accuracy and reliability as they are based on analyses of large number of observations. The 
limitation of panel estimations, however, is that unless such analysis takes into account the 
heterogeneity of industries‟ and firms‟ production functions, the results may not be robust 
(Herzer, Klasen and Nowak-Lehman, 2008). Other problems that are not limited to panel 
studies, as pointed out by Carkovic and Levine (2002), are omitted variables and 
endogeneity. Their presence may produce bias in parameter estimates. Fortunately, over the 
last decade, these problems have been much alleviated and addressed thanks to the 
development of statistical tools such as the use of Instrumental Variable which are capable 
of addressing these drawbacks. Aitken and Harrison (1999) pointed to another problem, that 
is, a reverse causality between FDI and efficiency. They argued that it might be possible that 
FDI may not lead to an increase in efficiency, but itself is attracted to the most efficient 
sectors in the economy. Correlation does not imply causation. 
Despite these limitations in empirical studies, one has to admit that perfect econometric or 
statistical study could hardly exist. Applied economists are commonly facing many 
difficulties such as the limitations of data and the complexities of statistical analysis. Solow 
(1985) and Pagan (1990) suggest economists be pragmatic, that is, they make the most of the 
available information and analytical tools at a given time.   
Micro-level panel case studies on FDI spillover produce an inconclusive result. Caves 
(1974), Globerman (1979), Blomstrom (1986), Jarvocik (2004), Haskel, Pereira and 
Slaughter (2007), and Keller and Yeaple (2009) found that FDI helps to increase the 
productivity of domestic firms. It should be noted that, with the exception of Blomstrom 
(1986) and Jarvocik (2004) who used Mexican and Lithuanian data respectively, all the 
empirical evidence draws its conclusions from data gathered from developed countries such 
as Canada, Australia, the U.K., and the U.S.  
In contrast to most of the studies that used data drawn from developing countries, their 
empirical results show either a negative impact of FDI or a midget positive correlation 
between FDI and growth. For example, Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison 
(1999), Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Konings (2001), Kohpaiboon (2006), and Ran, Voon 
and Li (2007) found that FDI alone has a negative impact on the productivity of domestic 
Chapter 3: Literature Review   
 72 
firms. More specifically, Aitken and Harrison (1999) used Venezuelan, plant-level data from 
1976 to 1989. They found that the net impact of FDI on local firms‟ productivity in 
Venezuela is weakly positive and questionable. They suggested that a joint venture is the 
best mode of entry that promotes technological spillovers in the host country.  
Kohpaiboon (2006) used plant-level data from the Thai industrial consensus in 1996. He 
reported that FDI alone has a negative impact. However, the interaction variable between 
FDI and trade openness suggests that FDI under the open trade regime appears to increase 
productivity in Thai local firms. Therefore, he asserted that Bhagwati hypothesis is accepted 
in the case of Thailand. This is in contrast to Mah (2010). He uses Korean annual time-series 
data from 1970-2006 and find no evidence supporting Bhagwati hypothesis in the case of 
Korea. 
Alternative to micro-level empirical studies, a holistic investigation into the direct impact of 
FDI on growth could be carried out by looking at the macro-level. The empirical studies of 
FDI and growth at macro-level are also distinctive from those at micro-level studies in that 
some of them seek to uncover the direction of causality. In other words, they try to identify 
whether FDI leads to economic growth or economic growth attracts FDI. Nearly all of them 
follow the norms of growth empirics, using GDP as the measurement of economic growth. 
Case studies at macro-level normally adopt time-series analysis to assess the impact of FDI 
on economic growth. It should be noted that case studies using time-series analysis remain 
limited in number due to the short span of the availability of time-series data which gives a 
small number of observations. However, recently, as time-series data have become more 
available, several studies have adopted this type of analysis to examine the impact of FDI on 
growth on an individual country basis.  
Similar to panel studies, case studies using time-series analysis do not provide a clear picture 
on the positive impact of FDI. In some cases, the contradiction can be found even within a 
single country. For example, in the case of Thailand when directions of causation are 
examined, Zhang (2001) used annual time-series data from 1957 to 1997. He found no 
evidence of a long-run relationship between FDI and growth of GDP. However, Chowdhury 
and Mavrotas (2005) used annual time-series data from 1969 to 2000. They found that there 
is a bi-directional causality between FDI and growth in Thailand. In fact, it can be 
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preliminary argued that econometric results can be attributed to the differences in the model 
specification and the set of data.  
There are two empirical studies that assessed the impact of FDI on the Thai economic 
growth at the aggregate level using growth regression. There are Kohpaiboon (2003) and 
Ang (2009). Kohpaiboon (2003) tests the impact of FDI on the Thai economic growth while 
taking into account the role of the trade regime. He found that FDI alone has a negative 
impact on the Thai GDP. However, the multiplicative variable between FDI and the index of 
trade liberalisation give a significant and positive coefficient, indicating that Thailand could 
benefit from FDI if the country adopted the liberalised trade regime. Ang (2009) tests the 
impact of FDI on the Thai economic growth while taking into account the role of the 
development of financial market. Based on annual time series-data from 1970 to 2004, he 
found that the long-run relationship between FDI and growth of the Thai GDP exists but 
negative in nature. However, the multiplicative variable between FDI and the index of 
financial market development gives a significant positive coefficient, meaning that Thailand 
would benefit from FDI through the development of financial market.   
Empirical Evidence from Cross-Country Studies 
The second category of empirical studies corresponds to those that used the cross-country 
data. From the theoretical point of view, the cross-country analysis is useful in increasing 
the power of generalisation. Cross-country studies generate similar result as far as the 
impact of FDI on growth is concerned. Most of them find a positive correlation between FDI 
and growth. It is crucially important, however, to note that these studies suggest that the 
presence of positive impact from FDI is specific to each country and conditional on several 
domestic policies. The positive impact from FDI is not automatic. Even though there is 
abundant empirical evidence of spillovers from cross-country analysis, none of them 
supports a hasty presumption of the positive impact FDI have on economic growth in host 
countries.  
A number of researchers conducted cross-country panel regressions and found a positive 
relationship between FDI and economic growth. See for example, Balasubramanyam, Salisu, 
and Sapsford (1996), Borensztien, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), De Mello (1999), Alfaro 
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(2003), Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), Alfaro, et al. (2004), Li and Liu (2004), Busse 
and Groizard (2008) and Basu and Guariglia (2007). More specifically, Balasubramanyam, 
Salisu, and Sapsford (1996) employed panel data during 1970-1985 from 46 developing 
countries. These countries are divided into two groups, based on their trade regimes, namely, 
export promotion and import substitution. They found that the positive impact of FDI tends 
to be conditional on the liberalised trade regime, a significant level of human capital 
endowment, an economic freedom, the types of industries, and the technological gap. Based 
on data from 69 developing countries during 1970-1989, Borensztien, De Gregorio, and Lee 
(1998) found that the positive impact of FDI tends to be an increasing function of the level 
of human capital in the host countries. In their empirical model, human capital is 
approximated by the number of years of schooling.  
Alfaro, et al. (2004), studied differently. They tested the model developed by Hermes and 
Lensink (2003) focusing on the effect of FDI in relation to the level of development of the 
financial market. Based on cross-countries data that incorporates both developed and 
developing countries from 1980 to 1995, they found that the effect of FDI alone tended to be 
ambiguous but FDI appears to be beneficial only when the host country has a well-
developed financial market. Next, Basu and Guariglia (2007) investigated the role of FDI in 
relation to an income inequality. They showed that even though FDI seems to be correlated 
with growth, it tends to increase income inequality in the recipient countries. 
Although some cross-country panel studies produce supporting results on the positive 
impact of FDI, some suggest differently. See for example, Xu (2000), Xu and Wang (2000), 
Carkovic and Levine (2002), and Yang (2008) who showed that their empirical evidence 
does not support the FDI-led growth hypothesis.  More specifically, Xu (2000) found that 
the U.S. TNCs contributed to productivity growth only in advanced and not in developing 
countries. Xu and Wang (2000) used data from 21 OECD countries during 1970-1990. They 
examined the impact of international trade and FDI on TFP and found that technological 
spillover and outward FDI are positively correlated with TFP growth. However, they found 
no evidence of spillover from inward FDI. Based on panel data from 72 countries during 
1960-1995, Carkovic and Levine (2002) also found no evidence of technological diffusion 
from an inward FDI.  
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Zhang (2001) uses cross-country data differently in that he analyses them with time-series 
analyses for each country.  He found that FDI-led growth hypothesis is strongly specific to a 
country and that six out of eleven countries from East Asia and Latin America showed no 
long-term relationship between FDI and growth. Yang (2008) investigated the relationship 
between inward FDI and economic growth using a panel data of 110 countries over the 
period 1973 to 2002. He found that the impact of FDI on growth varies across countries and 
with time. Strikingly, his evidence suggested that the „economic miracle‟ in most of East 
Asian nations cannot be explained by FDI. This is in line with Ozawa (1979), Dunning 
(1990), Il Sakong (1993), Kim (2000), Chang and Evans (2000) who examined the cases of 
Japan and South Korea and found that neither of these countries implemented a friendly 
policy towards an inward FDI at the early stage of their development and that FDI has never 
been their main source of economic prosperity.  
It is clearly seen that there are repetitive themes arising from reviewing empirical studies in 
all categories. Firstly, evidence supporting the FDI-led growth hypothesis is always 
conditional on  
i) the technological gap between the host and the home countries  
ii) trade policies  
iii) countries‟ specificities for example, an institutional infrastructure, domestic 
politics and social value. 
iv) the propensity to use of local contents 
v) the mode of entry of TNCs in the host country for example, joint venture is 
preferred to wholly owned subsidiaries. 
vi) the nature of industry.  
Secondly, from the abovementioned point, it follows that the positive impact of 
technological diffusion on growth is not automatic. Thus, this implies that the state would 
need to intervene by making and implementing the correct policies that facilitate the 
realisation of FDI-generated spillovers. Thirdly, none of the measurements of spillovers 
used in empirical studies can reflect the full picture of what type of development or growth 
that inward FDI brings to country. Lastly, as most empirical investigations focus mainly on 
a few positive aspects of FDI such as its role in transferring technology, and increasing 
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efficiency, other adverse impacts attached to FDI have been underplayed,  for example, rent-
seeking behaviour, and problems of resources transfer ex post. Some applied economists, 
such as, Crespo and Fontoura (2007) and Contessi and Weinberger (2009), when faced with 
negative or inconclusive results of empirical studies, try to explain them by blaming the 
unreliability of data or the wrong empirical approaches rather than the inadequacy of the 
mainstream theoretical frameworks and the incomplete way of looking at the subject matter.  
3.2.2 The Role of the State and Market Interventions  
So far, the theoretical explanation of the process of economic growth in relations to FDI is 
made mainly by the basis of economic forces. However, in reality, economic forces, if not 
always, have largely been shaped by political influences. One of the most evident 
manifestations of political forces is policy. Obviously, the institution which has an absolute 
power over making and implementing policy is the state. Thus, a more complete analysis of 
economic growth in relation to FDI could not be done without taking into account the role of 
the state and its policies. This proposition is also confirmed by the empirical evidence, 
reviewed in the previous section, which implies that market intervention is necessary in 
order to help realise the positive impact from FDI. It is fair to argue that the government of 
host countries have the responsibility of implementing the „right‟ policies in order to make 
an inward FDI beneficial for all citizens. This section will discuss the role of the state as the 
promoter of economic growth and state interventions since this could shed some light into 
the different economic performance across nations particularly in the area of FDI and 
development policies.  
Biersteker (1978, p.220; 1990, p.480) defined the state as an entity consisting of the 
institutions of governance – including but not limited to the bureaucracy, the police, the 
military, the judiciary, and the legislative assemblies.  These institutions, he wrote, 
according to Miliband (1969, pp.49-54) and Giddens (1985, p.17), act as both the state‟s 
instruments and the constituents of the system of order. The latter aspect shows that the state 
is actually an organisation. Several developmental theories such as dependency and world 
system suggest that the state should not be examined as a sole and independent entity. This 
is because each nation state is connected to the global system where there is a hierarchy 
determined by political and economic power. The concept of the world as a system has long 
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been established in social science since the 1970s, for example, see Wallerstein (1974, 1976). 
This notion is absolutely compatible with the analysis of international investment in the 
globalisation era. Scholars in International Business field such as Dunning (2007) and 
Buckley and Casson (2009, p. 1573) also suggest that FDI should be examined on the 
background of the world as a system.  
All nations that take part in the global system do not share an equal political power leads to 
the inevitable possibility that domestic activities could be influenced by external forces. 
Nonetheless, for simplicity, at the moment, the external forces are not considered in order to 
focus on the state as an autonomous institution. The autonomous state is believed to act 
effectively as a moderator for the different interest groups and classes in an economy in 
order to maintain political stability and to create the institutional infrastructure that enables 
the country to develop sustainably. The state also has the absolute legitimacy to tax its 
citizen and to use the military force. Thus, the Hegelian philosophy which sees the state as 
the main agent of historical change (Tosh, 1991, p.74) is true, for the most part. It also 
implies that the state is largely responsible, for better or ill, for the nation. The economy is 
usually managed by the state through its institutional apparatus and the interference of the 
activities carried out by the economic entities embedded in the nation state.   
Reinert (1999, p.279) considers three main roles for the state in the promotion of economic 
growth. Firstly, as the provider of institutions, the state is responsible for setting the rules of 
law and creating the necessary institutional infrastructure that helps maintain the efficacy of 
such rules. These institutions include for instance, property rights, the judiciary, the 
education system, and other social provisions. Secondly, as the distributor of income, the 
state is responsible for maintaining fairness in sharing the income generated in the economy 
and preventing any opportunistic behaviour of the stronger in acting to the disadvantage of 
the weaker.  Thirdly, as the promoter of economic growth, the state is responsible for 
increasing the size of the income. These roles are not mutually exclusive and can be 
sequential. For example, the first is a prerequisite for the third. The third role needs special 
emphasis in order to maintain the stability of the first and the second role. These roles can be 
accomplished through various means of state intervention.  
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Even though there is no formal definition of state intervention Biersteker (1990) attempts to 
distinguish state interventions in six forms, namely, influence, regulation, mediation, 
distribution, production, and planning. 
1) The state can influence or encourage certain behaviour of economic entities in 
the national markets through the implementation of fiscal, monetary, and 
industrial policies. The synchronised implementation of these policies could 
channel or direct investment to the sectors which are strategically important in 
promoting economic growth at a given point of time.  
2) Through regulation, the state can constrain or limit some unfavourable behaviour 
of its economic entities and direct their activities into the domain that is more 
favourable to the general public interest. These regulations could be, for instance, 
minimum wage legislation, environmental policies, and anti-trust law. 
3)  As a key moderator, the state can mediate the conflict of interest among social 
classes such as capitalist class vis-à-vis working class and people living in rural 
vis-à-vis urban areas. The social conflict of interest needs to be resolved in order 
to maintain social and political stability which in turn is necessary for achieving 
sustainable economic development.    
4) The state can attempt to distribute or redistribute economic resources and 
economic surplus accrued from domestic production. There are various means to 
do this, for example, the use of taxations and subsidies, the provision of basic 
human needs such as health care and education, and industrial location policies.  
5) The state can assume the role of producer, particularly with regard to intangible 
public goods such as human capital, defence, property rights, private contract 
enforcement, and tangible public goods such as parks, lighthouses, seaports, 
airports, rail, and road. These projects can be carried out by the state enterprises 
or in the form of public-private partnership.  
6) The state intervenes in the market as the planner. That is, the state assumes the 
responsibility to rationalise the entire process of development and sets out the 
desired outcome in order to intervene appropriately.  
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Similar to the role of the state, these forms of state intervention are not mutually exclusive. 
Therefore, to bring out the most effective use of these interventions, they should be carried 
out in a complementary way to each other. It is observed that every state intervenes in its 
economy as a means of undertaking its roles. In the context of development literature, it is 
largely accepted that the role of the state and its corresponding interventions play a crucial 
role in development of the country. See, for example, (Ozawa, 1979; Amsden, 1979; Fine 
and Stoneman, 1996; Krugman 1996; Rodrik, 1999; Reinert, 1999; and Chang, 2003).  
Kuznets (1981, p.59) stated that the spread of modern economic growth placed a greater 
emphasis on the importance and the need for organisation in national sovereign units. Fine 
and Stoneman (1996) also points to the role of the state when making a distinction between 
the successful cases of East Asian NICs and the failing cases of Latin America. It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that successful economic development is largely determined 
by the actions of the state. 
Among the extensive list of tasks that the state should undertake in order to promote 
economic growth and development, this study focuses mainly on the task of creating the 
formation of domestic entrepreneurs and how the liberalisation of FDI might impede this. It 
is argued that the mismanagement of inward FDI by the state would hinder the creation of 
domestic entrepreneurs which in turn would impede further development. The importance of 
entrepreneurial class has been greatly emphasised by Gerschenkron (1965), Lewis (1980) 
Amsden (1994) and Fine and Stoneman (1996). As mentioned in Chapter 2, firms are the 
key engines of capital accumulation in a capitalist economy and the economic performance 
of a country depends largely on its firms‟ performance. However, the creation of the 
entrepreneurial class in the less developed countries can be successful only with the support 
and intervention of the state. This would include visionary economic planning such as 
identifying the right strategic industries or even potential national large firms and helping 
them to create competitive advantage. Accordingly, the state is responsible for supplying 
skilled labour and infrastructure for the firms, and protecting domestic firms from, or when 
necessary pushing them into, competition.          
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In practice, the state may not find it easy to act in accordance with the above principles due 
to both internal and external constraints. The internal constraints are, for example, domestic 
political environment, the formation of social classes, and the institutional infrastructure. 
The external constraints are, for example, the global and regional economic and political 
environment, the legal obligations incurred by the participation in several international 
institutions and the consent to bilateral and multilateral agreements. The interaction of these 
factors forms the degree and the scope to which the state interventions may be carried out 
and this in turn shapes the developmental path of an economy. 
The following section will give an overview of the prevailing ideology during the second 
half of the twentieth century. It will be clearly seen how this ideology has affected the role 
of the states in developing countries and their ability to decide on the choices of domestic 
policies in general and the FDI-related policies, in particular.  
 
3.2.3 FDI-related Development Policies 
In modern economic theory, openness and liberalisation are seen as means of achieving 
economic growth and development. This notion is reflected in many development policies 
advised to developing countries mainly by the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). FDI-related policies are no exception. An increasing pressure on 
developing countries to liberalise FDI, as a result of the liberalisation of capital control, 
started in the 1970s (Harvey, 2007, p.90). Hanson (2001) noticed that since the 1980s, many 
developing countries at any level of development have dramatically reduced barriers to FDI. 
This trend accelerated in the 1990s. In addition, fuelled by the presumption of positive 
spillover and potential benefits of FDI on economic growth, developing countries took one 
step further, that is, not only creating a set of policies to promote FDI, but also offering 
various forms of incentives to attract FDI. An alternative explanation given by Harrison 
(1994) was that, following the disappearance of commercial bank lending in the 1980s, FDI 
has increasingly become an external source of finance for developing countries. During this 
time, many developing counties issued several policies and offered a range of incentives in 
order to attract an inward FDI. These policies would include tax holidays, exemptions for 
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import duties, and free remittance of profits. Thus, governments in developing countries 
were pushed into vicious competition for capital in the hope of technological spillovers. 
Hanson (2001) also notes that these tax privileges are mostly enjoyed by TNCs, but not by 
local firms in the same line of activity. This section will first examine the intellectual root 
behind the forces to liberalise. Then, the following section will examine whether or not the 
assumptions of theories that advocate the benefits of FDI hold under the liberalised regime. 
It will also seek to justify an attempt to prioritise foreign capital over domestic capital 
through various forms of incentives. 
The ideology that drives liberal policies is known as neo-liberalism. It is worth examining 
this ideology, which has influenced every corner of economic and political aspects of life, at 
all levels, individual, national and global levels. In so doing, an insight into the political, 
philosophical, and economic foundations of neo-liberalism could be gained. Generally, it is 
observed that the rapid globalisation during the past half decade is driven and influenced by 
the dominance of neo-liberalism. Specifically, this ideology has accelerated the globalisation 
through influencing policies on international trade and investment. Many scholars in the 
international business discipline also notice that the ascendency of TNCs is highly related to 
the development of globalisation (Rugman, 1981, 2005; Dunning, 1993, 2001; and Rugman 
and Oh, 2008). Buckley and Casson (2009, p.1573) point out that the direction of causality 
has not yet been decided. However, it is obvious that the economic dominance of TNCs and 
the globalisation are interrelated and facilitated by neo-liberal ideology.  
3.2.3.1 Neo-liberalism and its Impact on FDI Policies 
„Neo-liberalism‟ was firstly coined by Alexander Rüstow in 1938 (Hartwich, 2009, p.6). 
The term refers to the liberal ideology that values individual freedom, free market economy 
and a limited role of the state. The word „liberal‟ points to the origin of this idea which 
comes from classical liberalism, advocated by Adam Smith and David Hume in the 
eighteenth century. Its prefix „neo‟ is meant to show that the idea is a variant from the 
original in that instead of advocating unrestricted liberty, the original neo-liberalism, 
advocated mainly by Alexander Rüstow, Ludwig Von Mises and Friedrich Von Hayek, 
argues for a market economy under the limited guidance of the state. As pointed out by 
Cassidy (2009) and Hartwich (2009), the meaning of neo-liberalism today has greatly 
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transformed from its original meaning particularly on the extent to which and in what 
direction the state should intervene in economic affairs. Recent neo-liberalism, influenced 
largely by financial economists from the Chicago school of economics, overemphasises the 
efficiency of market mechanism, so much so, that it argues for virtually no intervention from 
government. This largely results in liberalisation and deregulation. The distinction between 
the original and the recent neo-liberalism lies in the extent to which the role of the state is 
necessary. Even though both agree that the state should have a limited role, the original neo-
liberals, however, do accept that the market does inherit some forms of imperfection. 
Therefore, they argue for a strong role for the state in addressing these imperfections. 
However, Hayek (1944) maintained that one should bear in mind that the state‟s 
interventions incur the limits and that the state could become corrupted if it becomes too 
strong. As for the recent neo-liberalism, they can be regarded as reactionary. They favour 
unfettered market economy and suggest a minimalist role for the state. 
The force of recent neo-liberalism directly asserts power over the formation of FDI-related 
development policies. This is reflected in a set of policies widely known as the Washington 
Consensus which constitutes standard reform packages for developing countries. According 
to Williamson (2004) who coined this term in 1989, in the late 1990s, the Washington 
Consensus was seen as containing the more promising development policies in the light of 
fading importance of the Latin American economic development policies, such as, import 
substitutions and regulations for FDI. Not only were these policies pushed forward by a 
group of powerful global leaders, leading neo-liberal economists, who support these policies, 
also claim that their suggestions are based on the more rigorous theories that are in line with 
scientific approaches  (Bourdieu, 1998).  
At the height of neo-liberal era in the 1990s, Williamson (1990) listed ten policies that he 
believed everyone in Washington, more or less, saw as necessary for development in Latin 
America. The policies in that reform are: 
1) Fiscal discipline – large deficits are not advised as they could lead to balance 
of payment crises and high inflation; 
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2) Reordering public expenditure priorities – only pro-growth and pro-poor 
expenditures are encouraged such as expenditure for education and health 
care. This also means that industrial subsidies aimed at a few national large 
firms should be abolished; 
3) Tax reform – this suggests a tax system that would combine a broad tax base 
with moderate marginal tax rates; 
4) Liberalising interest rates – this implies the liberalisation of financial sectors. 
That is both short-term and long-term international financial flow should not 
be restricted; 
5) A competitive exchange rate – the exchange rate should either be 
undervalued or correctly valued. This policy ensures that no overvaluation 
would take place;  
6) Trade liberalisation – integration into the global economy or trade openness 
is believed to be the right direction towards development; 
7) Liberalisation of inward FDI – as inward FDI is presumed to be beneficial for 
growth, it should not be controlled; 
8) Privatisation – this policy is taken from Thatcher‟s UK government. It is 
believed that private enterprise is more efficient than public ones. However, 
Williamson (2004) notes that successful privatisation depends on how 
privatisation is undertaken and regulated ex post;     
9) Deregulation – This focuses specifically on the reductions of barriers to entry 
and exits whereas the regulations on safety and environmental concerns are to 
be maintained; and 
10) Property right – this is a key institution of the capitalist system. In order to 
ensure that the development will evolve in a capitalist way, this institution 
needs to be maintained.  
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Consideration is now given to the standard development policies that most developing 
countries have adopted since the 1970s. The direction of the recent progress of these policies 
or the degree of liberalisation, particularly with regard to FDI, can be seen in Harvey (2007). 
He lists the policies that the IMF suggested to Iraq in 2003. At that time, many developing 
countries under the supervision of the IMF and the WB, including Thailand, had already 
adopted these policies, each to a different degree but all subject to the same direction. Firstly, 
these policies demand the full privatisation of public enterprises in developing countries. 
Secondly, they require the full ownership right by foreign firms and full repatriation of 
foreign profit. Thirdly, foreign enterprises should be entitled for national treatment. Lastly, it 
is maintained that there must be no trade barriers. As these policies are adopted by many 
developing countries, they have significantly shaped these countries‟ economic environment.  
It is reasonable to anticipate that these policies have limited and redirected the role of the 
state in many aspects, particularly, in the area of competition between foreign and national 
firms which directly affects the formation of domestic entrepreneurs. Baumol (2002) 
asserted that independent entrepreneurs are far more important to growth than economists 
have traditionally thought. This study will add that these entrepreneurs must be local in the 
first place otherwise the path of economic growth may derail from the sustainable route. 
However, domestic entrepreneurs should be promoted in parallel with the promotion of 
Schumpeterian innovation. Unless these two institutions are nurtured by the state, economic 
development under a free-enterprise economy would not be possible (Baumol, 2002).  
The following section will provide an alternative analytical framework assessing the impact 
of FDI on growth under the circumstances where the state is weak and the power of foreign 
capital is strong. This study argues that the impact of FDI on host developing countries 
whose market is shaped by neo-liberal policies is likely to be similar to that advocated by 
dependency theory. The analytical framework, proposed by the critics of FDI also stresses 
more the nature of the TNCs and their impact on market competition in the host developing 
countries. It will further show that this alternative framework could prove more compatible 
with the recent economic environment in most developing countries, particularly in Thailand, 
under neo-liberal dominance. 
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3.3 Critical Perspectives on FDI and Economic Growth 
The previous section pointed to what aspects neo-liberalism is related to the liberalisation of 
trade and FDI, the deregulation and re-prioritising of public expenditure which imply the 
discouragement to protect an infant industry and the use of industrial planning. Protectionist 
policies are instruments that the state could use to incubate and nurture its entrepreneurial 
class and domestic firms. As mentioned earlier, firms particularly, a large firm is a key 
engine of capital accumulation which is also capable of producing knowledge and 
technology (Schumpeter, 1942). This section presents the theory that can be used to explain 
the impact of FDI on development under the circumstances where the state of the host 
developing countries can, to a limit extent, intervene in the market and where TNCs are left 
unregulated. This analytical framework explicitly takes into account the monopolistic power 
of TNCs over the weak domestic firms under the environment where the state in host 
economies appears not to address the competitive incompatibility between the foreign and 
domestic enterprises. This type of conceptual frameworks can be drawn from dependency 
theory and several works by Hymer (1970, 1971, 1972, and 1979).  
This line of thought tends to suggest the negative impact of FDI on economic growth in less 
developed nations. Among various propositions, the central tenet of the argument is that an 
entry of TNCs would reduce competition in the market of developing countries, impede the 
growth of the local firms and induce the net capital outflow ex post.  It advocates that 
relying on the injection of foreign capital and technology for economic development could 
possibly render them more dependent on the advanced nations for further growth. Even if 
the development does take place, it is likely to be clustered on the foreign capital-intensive 
sectors and unlikely to be fairly largely redistributed to the rest of the economy. This, in turn, 
would trigger an uneven economic development and inequality. This, in the long run, can 
induce political instability even a civil war. Clearly, this type of growth is not promising for 
a sustainable development.  
These critical perspectives had been lively advocated in the 1970s. Dunning (1994) stated 
that during this decade, the attitude towards inward FDI was highly critical, if not downright 
hostile. However, in the 1980s, there was the transitional period where neo-liberalism set up 
its dominance and became fully settled by the end of the decade. It is an increasing 
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dominance of neo-liberalism that induced the change of heart towards FDI attitudes and 
regulations in host developing countries. The rise of neo-liberalism, in turn, is said to be 
promoted by two historical events. Firstly, the international debt crisis of the early 1980s 
which sparked from Mexico and rapidly spread among Latin American countries, showed 
that over-reliance on the state doing everything can be disastrous (Res and Motamen-
Samadian, 1987). Secondly, it is due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union and its satellite 
communist countries (Chang, 2003). These events were interpreted as the failure of the state 
in promoting efficiency and growth. The recent friendly attitudes towards inward FDI then 
fully took place in the 1990s. Harrison (1994) assigns the change in attitude to the need for 
an alternative source of new capital and technology when the public borrowing was no 
longer available. She added that it was also due to an increasing number of countries whose 
development failed because of strict regulation on international trade and investment.  
From Dunning (1994)‟s perspectives, he ascribed this change of heart to several reasons. 
Firstly, it is due to the renewed faith in most countries in the workings of the market 
economy. Secondly, since the 1980s, there are increasing numbers of countries, including 
the Eastern European countries, which started to adopt the capitalist economic system. 
These countries need to integrate with the global economy and drawn on external resources 
for development. Thirdly, he notes that in the 1990s, TNCs are the main producers and 
organisers of the knowledge-based assets which are essential to business success and to 
economic growth. This makes TNCs the principal, cross-border, disseminators of 
technology. For this reason, TNCs‟ investment, FDI, is welcomed by all countries especially 
developing nations where not only capital but knowledge-based assets are scarce. Lastly, the 
globalisation which emphasises a regional integration and the realignment of economic 
systems and policies urges most governments to reappraise the costs and benefits of FDI so 
that they can tailor their policies towards FDI in such a way that serves their national 
development plan.  
Recently, Chandra and Kolavalli (2006) asserted that the inducement of FDI has become an 
important strategy in technological adaptation for most countries (Harrison and Rodríguez-
Clare, 2009).  The attitude towards inward FDI has fully swung to the opposite of that of the 
1970s. As a consequence, the development of the theoretical frameworks used for the 
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critical assessment of the inward FDI on growth has been barely advanced and hardly 
discussed in recent literature. This study will revisit these works and show that they are still 
relevant when used to assess the impact of inward FDI under the contemporary global 
economy. Specifically, this study will show that under the dominance of neo-liberalism, the 
propositions and predictions, made by the critical perspectives may be more in line with 
empirical and historical observations, particularly in the case of Thailand than, those derived 
by the mainstream perspectives.   
3.3.1 Dependency Theory and Political Economy of TNCs 
Dependency theory, like all other ideas, is the product of a particular place, Latin America 
and of a particular time, post-colonial. The distinctive intellectual root of dependency theory 
lies in Marxist economics and the experience of the, so-called, Third world economists such 
as Raul Prebisch (1982), Ferdinan Henrique Cardoso (1977), and Theotonio Dos Santos 
(1970). Seers (1983) explained that dependency theory is the result of political suppression 
and economic distortions that these foreign intellects have witnessed in their developing 
countries. These economic and political upheavals are induced by the necessity to become 
involved with the global economy. Their points of view and propositions are worth being 
regarded as „complementary ways of looking at the world‟ to the mainstream economic 
theory, postulated by European and North American intellectuals. Nevertheless, dependency 
theory suffers from some shortfalls inherited from its style, which usually lacks the rigours 
of the neo-classical standard. Moreover, the dependency theorists have been claimed to be 
somewhat too ideologically inclined to Marxism. Lastly, there is no unity in the propositions 
made in dependency theory.  
Despite these shortfalls, dependency theory is worthy of considerations as an additional 
analytical framework in this study.  Firstly, it possesses a distinct approach to development. 
That is, while the neo-classical and modern growth theories limit their analysis to economic 
forces and the availability of factors of production, the dependency approach also embraces 
the internal and external political and economic forces that cover a wide range of socio-
economic and political factors. Neo-classical and dependency theory, although critical of 
one another, are by no means a substitute for one another. Thus, if both theories and their 
predictions are equally incorporated into a unified framework, one could expect a fuller 
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analysis than by using only a single approach. Secondly, dependency theory is found to be a 
relevant analytical framework because it is analysed in the context where the nature and the 
capacity of TNCs in relation to that of domestic firms in developing countries are fully 
acknowledged.  Lastly, even though there are various propositions made on the prospect of 
development in developing countries by the dependency theorists, they all appear to agree 
on the possibly negative impact of FDI in developing countries. The dependency theory also 
suggested more indicators, compared to the neo-classical, that can be used to depict 
indications of the negative impact of FDI on the host countries. These are, for example, an 
income inequality, an unhealthy balance of payments (BOP) and the displacement of 
indigenous firms.       
Dependency theory argues that the dependence on foreign capital is possibly one of the key 
factors that deters developing countries from a sustainable growth path. This theory explains 
that the world consists of „core‟ and „periphery‟ nations. The former refers to the advanced 
and technologically-leading economies, such as some powerful European states, Japan, and 
the United States. The latter signifies the developing countries, whose political and 
economic powers are limited. The periphery and the core are economically interdependent. 
Stallings (1995) observed that it is true. Especially after the 1980s, the world economy has 
become even more interdependent. That is the periphery provides the core with their 
national resources and the economic surplus generated from their domestic activities. In 
exchange, the peripheries rely on the core economy for capital and technology as means for 
their development. The transfer of resources is carried out not by military force but by legal 
obligations and commercial activities, such as, international agreements and international 
trade and investment. The repatriation of profits and natural resources back to the advanced 
countries is legitimised by the enforcement of property right and the civil contract, promoted 
under the free market economy. It can be said that an increase in activities of TNCs 
contribute significantly to an increase in a global economic interdependence. Vernon (1967) 
and Hymer (1979) have predicted this phenomenon long time ago and the political forces 
and the role of the state are central in their analyses. The striving of the periphery to develop 
and the need of the core to maintain its rate of growth in the advanced nations reinforce the 
interdependence of these two types of nations and characterise the contemporary world. 
However, it is important to note that the economic interdependence between the core and 
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periphery has also reinforced uneven development. Uneven development is a Marxist 
concept which refers to the situation that even though capitalism does generate growth in 
some areas, it also restricts growth in other areas.  
Palma (1981, pp.21-64) observes that there are three, principal, evolutional phases from the 
pure Marxist analysis of capitalist development in the less developed countries to the 
development of dependency theory. The first and foremost one is postulated by Marx and 
Engels‟ analysis of capitalism. They argue that the high stage of capitalism can be realised 
in developing countries through colonialism and free trade. The industrialisation in 
backward countries is triggered by historical progressiveness.  
The main proponent of the second phase is Vladimir Lenin in his seminal work „Imperialism, 
the Highest Stage of Capitalism‟, published in 1916. He maintains that the development of 
capitalism in backward countries will be eventually possible but subject to many difficulties, 
due to late industrialisation. His work contributes to the core of the dependency analysis of 
capitalist development in less developed countries. Lenin‟s idea is a product of the Russian 
experience at the beginning of the twentieth century. He sees that, at the highest stage of 
capitalism, monopolistic power surmounts competitive power as a result of the need to 
maintain the high rate of capital accumulation by the monopoly capitalists in advanced 
nations. Thus, they seek to export their capital to less developed countries where the return 
on investment is greater than that in their home countries. Moreover, these advanced nations 
still need natural resources, often found in less developed countries, to further their home 
development. As this foreign capital comes along with the knowledge of new modes of 
production and organisation, it also triggers socio-economic changes in less developed 
nations. 
The difficulty of the late development advocated by Lenin (1916) is in contrast to the 
argument of Gerschenkron (1965) who saw the advantage of backwardness. From the 
Russian experience, Lenin pointed out that the slowness and difficulties of capitalist 
development can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, it is due to the weakness of the 
bourgeoisie. In neo-classical terminology, the bourgeoisie may be regarded as the domestic 
entrepreneurial class which is necessary for advancing the capitalist development. Secondly, 
he assigns the effect of competition from Western Europe as a cause of deterring the growth 
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of modern industry in Russia. Lastly, he points to the great survival capacity of the pre-
capitalist structure. One of the peculiarities of his analysis is that the weakness of the 
bourgeoisie can be partly explained by the monopolistic competition induced by the 
Western foreign capital. This point is relevant to the central argument of this thesis which 
argues that unregulated FDI can hinder the process of development in the developing 
countries by impeding the development of domestic entrepreneurs.  
Despite this, Lenin still acknowledged that foreign capital did accelerate the process of 
industrialisation but, in parallel, it also created the dependent nature of development. On the 
monopolistic power induced by foreign capital, Lenin elaborated that this was caused by the 
far greater efficiency of foreign capital with which the domestic capital is unlikely to 
compete. In fact, the problems that Lenin identified are common to all nations that take up 
„late‟ industrialisation. It should be noted, however, that as much as the mainstream 
perspectives downplay rent-seeking behaviours of TNCs, Lenin downplayed the possibility 
that foreign capital could induce a greater degree of competition as well in industries where 
domestic firms are relatively strong vis-à-vis foreign firms. With regard to the role of the 
traditional structure, which also refers to the indigenous ruling class, Lenin sees that its 
resistance and its adaptability to the capitalist changes play an important role in the process 
of industrialisation. From Lenin‟s perspectives, despite the difficulties of the late 
development, the capitalist transformation could still be achieved in the less developed 
countries once imperialism is demolished.   
The third phase where the formal dependency theory developed has its root in the seminal 
work of Paul A. Baran, an American political economist, ‘the Political Economy of Growth’, 
published in 1957. Baran‟s work was developed at the same time when there was an 
intellectual movement in Latin America, led by Raul Prebisch. This movement attempted to 
respond to the monetarism of neo-classical economics which started to manifest itself in the 
reforming policies that most of the Latin American countries had been forced to implement 
in exchange for the financial help from the IMF. Unlike the traditional Marxism and 
Leninism that emphasise the international economic exploitation induced by the process of 
the late development, the feasibility of the successful capitalist development is the main 
attention of dependency theorists.  
Chapter 3: Literature Review   
 91 
There are two general assertions made on this issue. While some argue that successful 
industrialisation is feasible only with the intervention of the state, others argue that it is not 
possible. The latter takes into account the role of the traditional, dominant, ruling class in the 
less developed countries and the possibility that they would cooperate with imperialist 
power or TNCs. The capitalist transformation would inevitably shift economic surplus from 
this class to the new class that is about to be created by capitalist development, that is, the 
entrepreneurial class or the bourgeoisie. Hence, the traditional ruling class would look to 
preserve their economic and political privileges by avoiding or deterring full capitalist 
development. This creates the condition for alliances between the traditional ruling class and 
imperialism. Under these circumstances, the completely capitalist transformation can hardly 
be achieved and less developed economies may risk remaining underdeveloped forever.  
Based on historical events, the imperialist concept, argued by dependency theorists, were 
observed at least in two countries, for example, Harvey (2007, p.7) points out that 
Pinochet‟s Chilean coup d’état in 1973 was backed by the U.S. Later, Chile was the first 
developing country that experimented with neo-liberal development reform. In the case of 
Thailand, Baker and Pongpaichit (2005) note that soon after his visit to the U.S., General 
Sarit led the coup d’état in 1959. He, then, became very powerful in Thai political history. 
His junta government declared that Thailand was the American ally against Communism in 
the Indo-China region. During his time, the relationship between Thailand and the U.S. 
flourished. The economic legacies that General Sarit left the country are the American free 
market development model and a close relationship between the Thai technocrats and the 
World Bank and the IMF. Since then, national economic development in Thailand has been 
supervised by the WB and the IMF. Several policies were implemented in exchange for a 
great amount of financial aids on several development projects. This set Thailand to later 
embrace neo-liberal reforms particularly after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997.  
3.3.2 Capital Dependency Theory 
Capital-dependency theory is an extract of propositions, made by dependency theorists, 
which is related to foreign investment in less developed countries. The essence of their 
research question is similar to the economic studies reviewed in section 3.2. Nevertheless, 
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capital dependency theory is mostly discussed in sociology and tends to give an opposite 
point of view on the impact of FDI on economic development. This theory advocates that 
FDI is a device for transferring wealth from poorer to richer nations under the control of 
TNCs. Their proponents argue that FDI can produce economic growth only in the short run 
(Kentor, 1998) because while FDI may generate growth in the short run it also creates the 
dependence on further foreign capital investment for further growth. This is detrimental for 
economic development in the long run. This is particularly true in the case where TNCs 
control a disproportionately large share of economic activities in the host economy and 
where the foreign and domestic sectors are separated with poor linkages between them.  
Under these circumstances, the state policies are often held hostage to foreign interest 
(Kentor and Boswell, 2003, p.301) and the prospect of the long-term growth of such 
countries is questionable as the host governments have limited capability to act in their own 
interest. Dixon and Boswell (1996) found that there were an increasing number of cases 
where FDI appear to have caused a negative effect on development. Similar arguments and 
empirical findings are also found in Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985), Dixon and Boswell 
(1996), Kentor (1998), Arrighi, Silver and Brewer (2003) and Kentor and Boswell (2003). 
These authors generally advocate that culminating effects of an inward FDI would render 
developing economies disarticulated. Besides, FDI would cause the slower growth rate in 
the long term and induce greater income inequality. Among the scattered propositions made 
by dependency theorist on the impact of FDI on development, Biersteker (1978) and 
Milberg (1999) have succinctly pointed out a number of channels through which FDI could 
possibly distort the economic growth in developing countries. These channels are (i) transfer 
of resources, (ii) displacement of indigenous entrepreneurs, (iii) inappropriate technology 
and improper pattern of consumption, and (iv) inequality and stratification induced by FDI 
via changes in income distribution. Each of these channels will be discussed below. 
Transfer of Resources 
Critics of FDI assert that it is misleading to perceive FDI always as a net inflow of resources. 
This point has been raised when the definition of FDI and its measurement has been 
discussed in Chapter 2. However, for an illustration, capital will be taken as an example. 
Penrose (1956) noted that when the earnings generated by investments are greater than the 
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initial capital outlay, there will be a stream of profits to be repatriated from the host 
countries. Under this context, the inflow of capital will be surpassed by the outflow of 
income payable to foreign investors and the host countries would experience capital 
leakages. The outflow of resources could also be disguised by the transfer pricing (Hymer, 
1979). Besides, Marin and Schnitzer (2006) showed that FDI is frequently financed in the 
host countries without an international capital movement.  Thus, in many cases, FDI does 
not induce fresh new dollar investment as widely perceived and most likely to generate the 
capital leakages in the form of income transfer.  
The outflow of capital can also be in the form of imports of services and intermediate goods 
triggered by an inward FDI. This can be observed from the balance of payments (BOP). 
Milberg (1999, p.109) asserts that when FDI triggers so much import and causes the outflow 
of capital remittance, an inward FDI is likely to depress the equilibrium of the BOP in 
recipient, developing countries. Consider the case where TNCs from advanced countries set 
up their operations in developing countries that do not produce technology, but where cheap 
natural resources and low-cost labour are abundant. Under a free market economy, it can be 
expected TNCs will import all technological-intensive capital goods produced elsewhere 
more efficiently and use them in combination with the cheap labour and natural resources 
specific to the host countries. Moreover, some foreign technical services are required in 
order to operate the imported capital goods. Thus, imports of services are also expected to 
rise.  
Moreover, even though FDI does induce new capital to the economy, it should not be taken 
for granted. In accounting perspectives, the new capital is a liability that the residents in the 
recipient countries are liable to foreign investors. The compensation paid for this liability 
takes several forms such as dividends, management fees, royalties, interest, and profits. 
These are transferred through an income entry in the current account.  Thus, the only entry 
in which FDI could contribute a positive effect on the BOP is an export of goods, given that 
FDI is export-driven in nature. This type of FDI generally exports finished products either to 
a third market or to the home countries of the TNCs. It should be noted that if these export 
transactions are conducted intra-firms, that is, between the wholly own subsidiaries and the 
headquarters, it is likely that these transactions are subject to transfer pricing. This would 
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underestimate the export values of the host countries and, thus, deteriorate their terms of 
trade. For a thought experiment, Figure 3.1 illustrates the hypothetical BOP that reflects the 
above scenario where FDI triggers more outward transfer of resources, assuming that the 
exchange rate is constant. 
FIGURE 3.1: A HYPOTHETHICAL BOP DEPICTING THE SCENARIO WHERE INWARD FDI 
CAUSES LEAKAGES IN CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Milberg (1999, p.109) 
Figure 3.1 shows that an inward FDI in technological and capital dependent, developing 
countries tends to cause leakages more than surplus in the balance of payment. It can be seen 
that, under these circumstances, an inward FDI could affect positively only one out of the 
three main entries in the current account which is the trade balance. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
the net current account is likely, though not necessary, to be pushed into deficits.   
In developing countries, deficits in the current account are mostly addressed by the surplus 
in capital account which means an increase in liabilities of the residents to TNCs. Clearly, 
for capital-dependent developing countries, they do not only rely on the TNCs‟ investment 
for further growth but they also need inward FDI to maintain their BOP equilibrium. This 
scenario also implies that exports generated from domestic firms are more desirable than 
those from TNCs. This is because the exports from domestic firms incur less capital outflow, 
at least no outflow of income, and represent the real competitiveness of that developing 
country.  
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An outflow of natural or physical resources may well be disguised in FDI induced exports. 
Hymer (1979) and Dunning (1994) noted that foreign investment in primary sectors, such as, 
mining and forestry, would also create an outflow of natural resources. This is in line with 
the empirical evidence given by Alfaro (2003) who found that FDI in primary sectors has a 
negative impact on economic growth. 
Displacement of Indigenous Entrepreneurs 
The economic distortion induced by an inward FDI takes place through the displacement of 
the indigenous entrepreneurs. This point challenges directly the FDI-led growth hypothesis 
which argues that FDI induces more competition. While the FDI-led growth hypothesis 
states that FDI-induced competition would break the local monopoly, dependency theorists 
argues that FDI is likely to impede the formation and the growth of domestic firms, if not 
drive them out of the market due to the superior competitiveness of TNCs. Chapter 2 shows 
that TNCs are large in size and usually have competitive advantages due to their economies 
of scale, global network, technology and access to a pool of different resources of different 
qualities. Whereas, domestic firms in developing countries, at their best, can only take the 
form of a large family or national firms, by their limited resources and organisational power, 
without the protection of the state, are likely to be put at a disadvantage. 
On empirical evidence, the crowding-out effect of FDI in host country is inconclusive. 
While De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) and Agosin and Machado (2005) found that FDI 
displaces domestic investment, Misun and Tomsik (2002) do not find any support. More 
specifically, De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) notice that the crowing-out effect could be 
reversed in the long run. However, it must be noted that their evidence is drawn from the 
Belgian chocolate industry where domestic firms are known to have a great expertise in this 
line of business. Thus, the entry of foreign firms may discourage domestic investment, only 
initially. Once domestic firms have calculated how to react, retaliation will definitely take 
place. The competition can then be preserved. By way of contrast, domestic firms in 
developing countries are known to be mostly small, inefficient, scattered and technological 
incompetitive. The entry of large and strongly efficient firms would leave no room for small 
firms to grow without the protective and supporting policies from the host, developing 
countries‟ government.  
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In the case of Agosin and Machado (2005) who drew data from Latin American countries, 
they reported a crowding-out effect. Similarly, Udomkerdmongkol and Morrissey (2008) 
conduct a cross-country study, using data from 36 low and middle-income countries 
covering the period 1995-2001. They found that FDI tends to displace domestic private 
investment. Misun and Tomsik (2002), working with data from three Eastern European 
countries, found a crowding-in effect in Hungary and Czech Republic but a crowding-out 
effect in Poland. 
In the case of missing industries, that is, the production of goods which have never been 
produced domestically prior to an entry of TNCs, FDI tends to position domestic firms as 
their satellite companies. Consider the case of the automobile industry in a country where 
there is no national car policy. An entry of TNCs will only create the suppliers of the 
automobile parts for the TNCs. The suppliers are satellite domestic firms to TNCs and 
operate mainly at the lower tiers of industry involving a relatively low level of technological 
sophistication. It must be noted that the higher the industrial tier, the higher the rate of return 
on investment. This, in turn, will determine the rate of capital accumulation of the countries 
whose firms participate in different tiers of the industrial hierarchy.  
From the experience of the NICs, domestic firms can grow large enough to reap and enjoy 
the super profits generated at the higher tier of the industry only with the assistance of the 
state, through various supports in the form of industrial policies such as, subsidies and 
requirements for joint-venture as a mode of entry especially in the highest tier of an industry. 
If domestic firms are left to be a satellite forever, this would affect the process of 
accumulation of wealth, not only at the firm level but also the national level. This is because 
the size of profit in the lower tier of the industrial hierarchy is far less than that in the higher 
tier, assumed from the number of incumbents in each tier. 
In the case of the countries where neo-liberal development policies prevail such as, Thailand 
and Mexico, based on their automobile industries, it is observed that local firms, to their best, 
serve only as suppliers to TNCs and never become TNCs‟ direct competitors. As mentioned 
earlier, in the absent of TNCs, it is likely that these satellites domestic firms would need 
some form of cooperation and possibly government subsidies to serve the local market as 
car producers. However, as to why the sub-optimal policies are adopted in stead of the 
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optimal ones, it can be explained as follows. Once TNCs is chosen or prioritised over local 
firms, domestic entrepreneurs could still benefit from FDI through an establishment of 
vertical linkages and act as periphery firms. This scenario is well studied under FDI-led 
growth studies and has been reviewed earlier. However, in this case, even though growth is 
generated in some sectors, it is sub-optimal because domestic firms are not forced to 
produce technology and knowledge since they develop a common vested interest with them. 
Domestic firms may even be complacent with their situation and do not consider challenge 
the market position of TNCs. It is true that these satellite domestic firms might retain a 
handsome part of the surplus created by foreign operations in domestic economy. On this, 
dependency theorists argue further that this part of wealth will only be held and shared 
among few domestic elites. It would probably be used for their extravagant consumption. In 
the case where it is reinvested, the reinvestment is not meant for innovation but for 
maintaining their political network which would be served as means for securing and 
gaining further static economic rents. This topic will be discussed in more details later. 
Furthermore, Biersteker (1978) advanced that the driving-out effect does not only occur by 
the disparity in competitive advantage and greater efficiency attached to foreign capital, it 
sometimes takes place by buying-out practices. Merger and acquisition (M&A) plays an 
important role. These practices take place when TNCs use their domestically generated 
profits to buy out domestic firms that can be found in related industries or even their 
domestic rivals. The buying-out practices are also facilitated because developing countries 
may not have good competition law in place to regulate market competition and regulate the 
anti-competitive conducts of firms. It is essential to note that investments stemming from 
these practices, according to the accounting standard of the IMF, are also counted as FDI. 
This emphasises the fact that not all dollars registered as FDI generate fresh foreign capital 
nor do they add new productive capacity to the local economy. Moreover, this data 
registration principle could cause misleading results when the FDI is used to assess 
empirically the impact of FDI on the host country.  
It should be noted that the displacement of indigenous entrepreneurs reinforces the market 
positions of TNCs in the local market which, in turn, increases the propensity of the outflow 
of capital and resources. Without independent domestic entrepreneurs, the process of 
Chapter 3: Literature Review   
 98 
industrial decision making and the implementations will be taken by TNCs. This reduces not 
only the power of the host government on industrial planning but also raises the degree of 
dependency on foreign capital. On the autonomy of the state and development, Hirschman 
(1969) advocates that the achievement of industrialisation depends on domestically 
institutional reforms and the ability of the state to negotiate with social power groups whom 
might be a treat to the country‟s development, even those with military power. However, he 
emphasises that this is unlikely to be the case when the new and more dynamic industries 
are controlled by foreigners.  
When it was first stated, Hirschman‟s argument used to be a counterfactual argument. Now, 
the experience of economic development from Japan, NICs and China, with the exceptions 
of Hong Kong, the Gulf states, and India whose share of foreign activities to that of 
domestic are relatively high, has proved that it is the case. The history of successful 
development in these countries shows that their governments have played a significant role 
in directing FDI into the strategic industries where the state highly regulated (Chang, 2003). 
It also shows that, in some cases such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, their governments 
worked in corporation with domestic entrepreneurs to build up national competitiveness 
(Ozawa, 1979; Amsden, 1991; Il Sakong, 1993; Chang, 1993; Kim, 2000; Amsden and Chu, 
2003).  
The displacement of indigenous entrepreneurs would drive domestic employment to be 
clustered mainly in TNCs dominated sector, which can be in manufacturing and service 
sectors, and the public sector. Thus, under the neo-liberal regime in which the private sector 
is larger than public sector, it can be anticipated that domestic labour relations are mainly 
managed by foreign entrepreneurs. All of these would contribute to the reductions of 
development capability, even with growth in some sectors continues. The internally uneven 
development can even trigger social conflicts possibly between those who benefit from FDI 
and those who do not. More extensively, the conflict can take place between TNCs and the 
host government. In the case where the host government is allied with TNCs then the 
conflict would run between them and the non-governmental organisations that represent 
local people or the mass who do not benefit from FDI-led growth strategy. Similarly, the 
limited role of the state, constrained by neo-liberal reforms and their induced-economic 
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forces, could weaken the political capability of developing countries. When considering this 
in the light of liberalisation of foreign operations, the prediction and the arguments 
stemming from dependency theory appear to be more relevant.  
Inappropriate Technology and Improper Pattern of Consumption 
While the above topic addresses the pecuniary externality of FDI, that is, its impact on 
competition, the counter argument to technology transfer conveyed by an inward FDI, can 
be divided into three points (Biersteker, 1978, pp.9-17).  Firstly, as discussed in section 
3.2.1.2, when the empirical evidence of FDI-generated spillovers was reported to be 
inconclusive, critics of FDI argue that it is because little technology is transferred. This is 
mainly because TNCs have virtually no incentive to tolerate technological leakages, in 
particular, to their potential local rivals. Moreover, without the local content requirements 
imposed by the host government, TNCs may prefer to import intermediate goods produced 
more economically elsewhere. It follows that, as market transactions are a means of 
technological transfer, the importation by TNCs would reduce transactions between 
domestic firms and TNCs. Thus, the propensity for technological transfer should reduce 
accordingly (Amsden, 2003). Besides, their research and development activities are mostly 
concentrated in home countries where highly skilled labour is abundant and their interaction 
with the TNCs‟ executives can be set up promptly, as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
expenditure on R&D is notoriously known to be significant and large enough to be 
compensated only with monopolistic returns. Thus, TNCs would pursue the monopolistic 
position.  
Secondly, critics continue to argue that technology transfer by TNCs, if it takes place, 
appears to be inappropriate to the local environment, both in terms of technological 
production and consumption pattern. For example, while the stylised facts show that 
developing countries are abundant with unskilled labour, technology transferred to 
developing countries is mostly capital-intensive and more suitable to developed countries. 
The explanation for this is that technology is not only created but also largely intended to be 
commercialised in advanced nations (Vernon, 1979). Inappropriate technology and improper 
consumption patterns are accepted in developing nations partly because of international 
demonstration effects and the impact from heavy use of marketing strategy (Hymer, 1979). 
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However, exceptions can be increasingly observed in final products, such as, household 
products. This is because the adjustment to local demand for final products does not take a 
large sum of additional investment. On production technology, the alteration to suit local 
conditions is still limited. Without competitive forces or legal obligations, the producers of 
these technologies have less incentive to alter the nature of technology to suit the 
composition of resources in host developing countries. In this case, modern and traditional 
sectors in host developing countries would become even more disarticulated. 
The third point raised by the critics of FDI refers to an inappropriate pattern of consumption 
in less developing economies as a result of the transfer of inappropriate technology. It is true 
that an entry of TNCs clearly induces product improvement at lower price and enlarges the 
existing product variety in the domestic market (Vernon, 1967). However, among other 
Marxist critics who see that, by way of demonstration effect, the lifestyles of the rich are 
emulated by the poor. Hymer (1979) argues that TNCs would distort the pattern of 
consumption in developing countries by altering their attitudes, values, lifestyles, and 
technological development. Biersteker (1978, p.14) points out that the mechanism by which 
TNCs distort the pattern of consumption are often tied with the growth of foreign firms in 
domestic market and their use of marketing strategies. As TNCs grow in a domestic market, 
they also take over the decision on what to produce and in what quantity. Thus, the choices 
of products and their price available in host developing markets are accordingly determined 
by TNCs. The power of TNCs over the pattern of consumption would grow even larger in 
the absence of domestic competition. To be fair, one has to take into account that changes in 
the pattern of consumption are also naturally triggered by the process of industrialisation. 
Hence, this case is debatable but there are still some elements of truth. Vernon (1967) 
suggests that the changes induced by TNCs are inevitable but the degree of distortions in 
patterns of consumption can be regulated by the host government policies. In case of failures 
to do so, it is host government that is responsible, to some extent, for what happens and is 
open to blame. 
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Inequality and Social Stratification 
The domination of foreign control over domestic productive activities, the displacement of 
domestic entrepreneurs and the introduction of inappropriate technology and pattern of 
consumption all contribute to an inequality and an uneven development. Dependency 
theorists (Sunkel, 1973; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Evans, 1979 and 1995; Evans and 
Timberlake, 1980; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985; Dixon and Boswell, 1996, Kentor and 
Boswell, 2003) strongly argue that the penetration of TNCs induce changes in social 
stratification, that is, they trigger change in the hierarchical arrangement of individuals into 
disproportionate division of power and wealth in the host developing society. However, 
instead of changing for the better, FDI is likely to cause changes for the worse as the social 
stratification induced by FDI tends to increase income inequality and the division between 
rural and urban sectors. This results from various policies which may be the product of an 
alliance between traditional ruling elites less developed nations and TNCs. When FDI is 
promoted, it reinforces not only the formation of the centre-periphery model of the world 
political economy but also the centre-periphery structure within a country. Gradually and 
eventually, this would widen the income gap between local elites and the local mass in 
developing countries. Increasing income inequality in growing developing economies 
usually reflects the biased distribution of income towards the rich even though the size of the 
economy remains growing. This is because largely the benefit of development is selectively 
distributed to those who have political and financial power. In the long run, increasing 
inequality will work against development as it will induce political instability that will put 
the country in an unfavourable position for future foreign investment which in turn is the 
main impetus of growth for this type of economy. Without sufficient foreign funds, 
periphery economies would cease to grow and the economic downturn would even 
exacerbate the seriousness of domestic politics. The concept of social inequality has recently 
been presented in the mainstream economic model as seen in Basu and Guariglia (2007) 
which has been reviewed earlier.  
The mechanisms through which TNCs contribute to change in social stratification are for 
instance, employment, and transfer of inappropriate technology. Within a bigger picture, this 
can be explained as a process of global division of labour brought about by the 
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internationalisation of the TNCs‟ operations. Through labour market, this study showed that 
TNCs usually pay their local management a premium in order to reduce technological 
spillovers. This makes the minority of local, medium to highly skilled employees, direct 
beneficiaries of FDI. These employees, because of their career development and the will to 
emulate lifestyles of their employers, quickly developed vested interest, and adopted the 
value and lifestyles in common to their employers (Hymer, 1979). In parallel, these 
employees also enjoy privileges and an increasingly dominant position within their local 
society thanks to wage premiums and benefits they earn from TNCs. Thus, they tend to 
preserve their social position.  
Through the transfer of inappropriate technology, this study demonstrated that new products 
and new mode of production that TNCs introduce may only benefit a small number of 
domestic groups. In fairness, this problem can be alleviated using the state interventions 
particularly the use of industrial planning and redistribution but under the neo-liberal 
policies, the use of these types of interventions are significantly discouraged (Biersteker, 
1990). The economic and social distortions induced by an inward FDI through the above 
mentioned channels will eventually increase an inequality which would destabilise domestic 
stability. This becomes one of common characteristics of economic growth in most of 
developing countries after the 1990s.  
3.3.3 Dependency Theory and Neo-liberalism  
Dependency theory captures the critical aspects of FDI that could impede economic 
development, particularly in developing countries. It must be noted that despite being a 
complementary analytical framework for assessing the impact of FDI, dependency theory 
had underplayed several important elements for the analysis of FDI and growth. Firstly, 
dependency theory treats the government in host countries and domestic entrepreneurs as 
totally passive institutions which are unable to manage the conducts of TNCs and hence 
unable to change the path of the country‟s future development. This might be true in some 
cases where the state is very totalitarian and led by a group of elites, or a single person who 
lack not only goodwill but also an economic vision. However, the economic experiences of 
NIEs and Japan showed that the state and the domestic industrial capitalist class do play a 
crucial role in development process and can make a difference if it so wishes.  
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Even though underplaying the role of the state and domestic entrepreneurs is considered as a 
shortcoming of dependency theory, it does make the dependency framework suitable for 
analysing FDI and development under neo-liberal regime. Neo-liberal development policies 
tend to create a weak state when it comes to regulating trade and investment and over-
emphasises the market mechanism. As a result, neo-liberalism tends to unsuccessfully create 
a strong cadre of competitive domestic entrepreneurs. In the case where the domestic private 
sector is weak and where the state regulations on international trade and investment are 
limited, it tends to produce the market conditions from where dependency theorists made 
observations and developed their theory.      
Secondly, critics of FDI play down the aspect of value creation through an entry of TNCs 
and their technological spillovers (Dunning and Pitelis, 2009). It is undeniable that, in many 
cases, with their superior knowledge in production, an entry of TNCs, widens the varieties 
of products in domestic markets and offer better quality goods at a lower price. In fairness, 
the late development might not possible without FDI but it must be noted that the 
sustainable development could not be achieved neither without the interventions from the 
state. 
Thirdly, dependency theory treats FDI homogenously (Biersteker, 1978). As reviewed in 
Chapter 2, there are several types of FDI, such as, market-seeking, resource-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking. Each type of FDI is likely to generate a 
different impact on the host countries as summarised in Appendix B. Hence, FDI should 
also be treated specifically within its context. In addition, critical perspectives might have 
been far too pessimistic to believe that FDI and development is a zero-sum game, whereas 
the non-zero-sum situation is possible. This implies the well-crafted policies towards 
managing inward FDI.  
Global development of capitalism is facilitated by political processes taking place at both 
national and international levels. Critics of FDI in the 1970s, for example, Evans (1979), 
argue that an alliance between elites in developed and developing countries has formed to 
secure the establishment of a centre-periphery structure in which only one-third of the 
world‟s population is enjoying the benefits while the other two-thirds are left behind (Hymer, 
1979). This uneven development gives rise to some dependency theorists who question the 
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possibility of a complete capitalist development. From the experience of the NICs‟s 
development, it is observed that a successful capitalist development can be made possible 
only when the economic inequality is kept to the minimum. However, despite difficulties of 
being late in development, the states in NICs still succeeded in breaking the centre-periphery 
structure of the world economy and led their nations to a high income status while most of 
their counterparts did not. These successful states are known for their authoritarianism, their 
interventions in the market, and their explicit support for domestic entrepreneurs.  
In contrast, those states that fail in development are mostly known to be weak and politically 
corrupted. The ruling elites in the unsuccessful countries such as those in Latin America and 
Africa tend to be frequently challenged by other domestic political rivals. The domestic 
political vulnerability in part forces them to make alliances with external political supporters, 
which are mostly the powerful countries. In return, these ruling elites need to accept the 
conditions, imposed by powerful nations, of which one of the main clauses is to be lax with 
the foreign operations in their territory. These conditions are, in fact, share similar grounds 
to the neo-liberal reform policies.  
Thus, even in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries, the topics that development scholars discuss are 
changed to, for example, globalisation and development, the technological spillovers from 
FDI, the failure of Washington Consensus, the effectiveness of the IMF and the World Bank 
as international organisations that are responsible for ensuring that capitalism would work 
smoothly for every country, and the eradication of global poverty, the very nature of these 
problems might be said to be similar to what dependency theorists were discussing fiercely 
back in the 1970s. However, there is one difference.  
3.4 Summary 
This chapter approaches FDI from the macro-economic point of view. It shows that when 
FDI is analysed in a growth context, it is usually perceived as a long-term capital flow which 
brings not only additional capital but also advanced technology to host countries. As capital 
and technology are among key sources of growth, FDI is then presumed to be beneficial to 
host economies. For these reasons, the conventional perspectives, derived mainly from 
growth economics, advocate that FDI is beneficial to a host country‟s economic growth. 
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This is because additional capital helps to reduce the saving-investment gap in a host 
country. Technology that is expected to be generated through spillovers will help to increase 
the productivity of the nation as well as to upgrade the host country‟s competitive advantage 
along the path of its development. Technological spillovers are theorised to take place in the 
following channels, namely, demonstration effects, labour turnover, vertical and horizontal 
linkages. The likelihood that these spillovers would take place, in turn, depends on, for 
example, the technological gap between the host and the home countries, the trade regime 
and the level of financial development and human capital in the host countries.        
The evidence in support of the positive impact from FDI on economic growth, both drawn 
from case studies and cross-country studies, is inconclusive. In the cases where the positive 
impact of FDI is presented, it is conditional on the factors, such as, the level of human 
capital, the trade regime, and the level of financial development in the host countries. It 
points to the role of the state in shaping domestic markets in such a way that the positive 
spillovers are likely to be materialised. This is in line with the argument found in the 
international business discipline which asserts that the impact of FDI is specific to context 
and it requires the state interventions to materialise the benefits from FDI. The study then 
reviewed the contemporary FDI regime. It is seen that the contemporary FDI regime and 
economic development model that most of the developing countries are implementing is 
largely influenced by neo-liberal ideology where the roles of the state in regulating FDI are 
kept to the minimum. Neo-liberalism is in favour of free trade and free capital movement. It 
also believes in market efficiency gained through an increase in competition but it seems to 
ignore the fact that TNCs who produce FDI are anti-competitive in their very nature. In 
addition, as this ideology appears to prioritise a market mechanism over the state‟s planned 
direction and the state‟s regulation, it tends to create the market conditions in developing 
economies where TNCs are left to their freewill. 
As a result, it follows that in host developing countries where neo-liberal FDI and 
development policies prevail, one is likely to observe a weak state and the competition in 
which relatively weak and unprotected domestic firms rival directly with stronger TNCs. It 
can then anticipate that such competition is likely to drive out domestic entrepreneurs and 
undermine the incubation of a strong domestic capitalist class which is necessary for a 
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complete capitalist development. Under these circumstances, FDI is unlikely to benefit host 
countries because the policies that host countries adopt do not seem to create the 
institutional configurations that facilitate the occurrence of positive impact from FDI. 
Moreover, it is likely that as TNCs are left to freely pursue their growth strategies, this tends 
to create the economic and social phenomenon where dependency theorists observed such as 
an uneven economic development. 
The literature review then introduced a complementary analytical framework that may be 
useful to assess the impact of FDI under the dominance of neo-liberal policies. This 
analytical framework is derived mainly from dependency theory. It argues that FDI is likely 
to be detrimental to economic development. It must be noted that dependency theorists 
maintain that economic growth generated by FDI remains achievable. However, the type of 
economic growth that FDI generates may not support developing countries in achieving 
complete capitalist development. This is because FDI-induced growth may cause the 
problem of transfer of resources, displacement of indigenous entrepreneurs, inappropriate 
use of technology, and social inequality. More specifically, a passive state, inefficient 
domestic entrepreneurs, and over-reliance on FDI, would only make a developing country 
become more capital and technological dependent on advanced countries. In these 
circumstances, developing countries may not fully benefit from FDI.  
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to link together a number of theoretical concepts to explain inward 
FDI and economic growth from three major disciplines, namely, international business, 
growth economics and political economy. It seeks to join the theoretical approach to FDI 
from both institutional aspect and macroeconomic aspect in a single framework. 
Theoretical discussion about the relevant concepts has already been presented in Chapter 2 
and 3. The direction of the discussion, in this chapter, will be channelled directly to the 
generality of the research question; how FDI affects the development of host developing 
countries.  
This study resorts to the unified framework, developed by Dunning (1981), namely, the 
Investment Development Path (IDP). It is a single, dynamic framework that shows the 
relationship between FDI and a full path of economic development. This framework 
represents the evolution of the international, direct investment position of a country across 
its path of development, that is, from the early stage of development where an income per 
capita is low to the later stage of development where the income per capita is high.  
The original IDP represents the case where the full capitalist development is achieved. 
However, an altered IDP can also depict the dependent capitalist development that is argued 
by dependency theorists. More specifically, the negative impact generated by an inward 
FDI, under the neo-liberal influenced can also be depicted by the altered IDP. In parallel 
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with the conceptual presentation of the two possible scenarios of development in relation to 
FDI, the study also develops an exogenous FDI-growth model, which is able to represent 
the aggregate production function of an economy that benefits or suffers from international 
investment. 
This chapter is structured in the following order. Section 4.2 introduces the original IDP 
framework where the positive impact of FDI is presented. Also in this section, another 
possible scenario where FDI negatively affects economic growth will be elaborated using 
the alternative IDP framework. Section 4.3 presents the modified neo-classical production 
function which is designed as a theoretical platform for empirical analyses in Chapter 6. 
Section 4.4 presents a summary.  
4.2 An Integrative Framework of FDI-Growth Concept  
To conceptualise the link between FDI and economic development in a market economy, 
and in order to achieve fuller analysis, one needs to take into account the role of the host 
government and its domestic firms. This is because the state, in principle, has a direct role 
in promoting economic growth by shaping the market environment, thanks to its absolute 
power in the creation of law and order. It is the type of the market environment that the 
state creates that in turn determines the impact of FDI on economic development. The state 
is also responsible for designing and implementing growth-enhancing policies which serve 
not only the country‟s economic development but also the improvement in the welfare of 
most, if not all, citizens. A domestic firm represents a type of economic institution that is 
highly capable of allocating resources effectively and accumulating capital better than many 
other form of economic institution. It is also where most of the nation‟s productive 
capability is stored. As depicted by Penrose (1995), she noted that the economic success of 
a nation depends very much on the number of effective firms it hosts. To be more specific, 
Lewis (1980) and Amsden (1994) correctly point out that the effectiveness of domestic 
firms plays a leading role in economic development. It is an innovative and productive 
capability which is stored in domestic enterprises that drives the country into the even 
higher stage of economic development. It must be noted that the effectiveness of national 
firms, in turn, depends largely on its government policies that directly shape the market 
environment in which these firms compete.  
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The framework, elaborated in the following sections, seeks to capture the interplay of the 
formation of ownership-specific advantages of the local firms vis-à-vis those of TNCs, 
across the development path of the host countries which adopt a FDI-Growth nexus as one 
of their growth strategies. However, as the dynamic framework does not provide the 
theoretical model that can be used for an empirical analysis on the impact of FDI, a static 
exogenous growth model is then proposed to serve this objective. The dynamic conceptual 
framework to which this study resorts is the Investment Development Path (IDP), proposed 
by Dunning (1981), and reiterated by Dunning (1986, 1988, 1993, and 1997), Dunning and 
Narula (1996) and Buckley and Castro (1998). Dunning (1981) advocated that there is a 
systematic relationship between a country‟s net outward investment (NOI) and the stage 
and the structure of a country‟s economic development.  
In the IDP, the Net Outward Investment is the key indicator. It is measured by the stock of 
outward FDI minus the stock of inward FDI. According to Dunning (1981, p.110), the NOI 
position can reflect the OLI advantages that a nation and its firms possess relative to those 
possessed by foreign countries. However, it should be noted that what the NOI reflects most 
evidently is the difference between the specific advantages owned by domestic firms and 
TNCs. It must be noted that the specific advantages owned by domestic firms reflect the 
country‟s productive capability. Thus, it can be reasoned that the NOI can reflect the 
difference between the productive forces of the nation to that of the rest of the world. The 
stage of development in this framework, approximated by income per capita, can be 
classified into five categories according to the propensity of a country in receiving inward 
FDI and producing outward FDI (Dunning and Narula, 1996). It is worth mentioning that, 
out of the stages which will be reviewed below this study focuses mainly on the second and 
the third stages as they are most relevant to the stage of economic development in Thailand 
(Duran and Ubeda, 2001 and Bende-Nabende and Slater, 2005).  
4.2.1 First Scenario: the Investment Development Path 
The Investment Development Path (IDP) was originally developed by Dunning (1981). He 
used the IDP to depict the hypothetical case of successful capitalist development of open 
economies that participated in late industrialisation. It can be said that the IDP framework 
shares the common analytical grounds with the old development economics where the 
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broad socio-economic processes and structural changes are taken into account. Specifically, 
it emphasises the role of the state as an agent of change and the nation‟s productive 
capability as an impetus of perpetual growth. In this framework, it is assumed that these 
developing countries were open to international investment and relied on inward FDI as one 
of their main sources of economic growth. Figure 4.1 depicts the original concept of IDP. 
FIGURE 4.1: INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT PATH 
 
Source: Adapted from Dunning and Narula (1996)  
Figure 4.1 depicts five stages of economic development in relation to the position of NOI. 
The y-axis depicts the NOI while the x-axis represents the GNI per capita. An initial point 
suggests that the NOI is zero but it does not necessarily mean the GNI per capita should be 
zero. Dunning (1981) pointed out from his cross-country observations during 1967-1975, 
that international investment would take place only after a threshold of income per capita is 
reached. 
The first stage refers, particularly to the early development of poor developing countries. 
Developing countries that embraced the liberal market economy after the World War II can 
also be classified into this category. It is seen that the NOI, at this stage, takes a negative 
value and tends to move downward. This represents an increase in stock of inward FDI 
while outward FDI virtually does not exist. Indeed, it is the result of differences between 
OLI advantages of a host economy and those of the rest of the world. On the ownership-
specific advantage, it is likely that there is little technological and capital accumulation 
taking place in domestic firms at this early stage. Hence, they do not produce outward FDI. 
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Existing domestic firms tend to be protected by the government and operate in labour-
intensive manufacturing and primary industries. Regarding locational advantages, these 
newly open countries offer opportunities for TNCs to benefit from accesses to their 
resources, such as, natural resources, cheap unskilled labour, growing domestic market and 
participation in a bid for the concession of infrastructure projects. In response to the low 
ownership-specific advantage of the local firms and the locational advantages of emerging 
nations, TNCs tend to utilise their higher ownership-specific advantages by internalising an 
international market transactions which results in making an inward FDI. It follows that at 
this stage, the nature of inward FDI is more likely to be resource-seeking and market-
seeking.   
The government intervention for development, at this stage, takes several forms (Dunning 
and Narula, 1996). First is the role of the producer of public goods. This refers to the 
provisions of the basic infrastructure necessary for economic development, such as, 
education, health care, irrigation, and transportation. Others are the roles of the regulator 
and influencer. This refers to the provision of institutional infrastructure, such as FDI 
regulations, serving to protect relatively weaker domestic firms and subsidies, serving to 
compensate the weakness of domestic firms in the light of international competition. 
Indeed, the provisions of public goods and appropriate institutional infrastructure also 
imply the role of the state as a planner. The creation of public goods is meant to ensure that 
private enterprises in the country would have an access to basic resources for a firm‟s 
growth. The institutional infrastructures are used to mitigate imperfections in the market 
that might impede the accumulation of the ownership-specific advantages of domestic firms 
in the long run.  
The second stage is the consequence of the first stage. It depicts an economy that has been 
integrated with the global economy for quite some time. At this stage, the NOI becomes 
more negative because of a continuing increase in inward FDI while domestic firms‟ ability 
to produce outward FDI remains limited. Despite the decreasing NOI, it is at this stage that 
an outward FDI, made by domestic firms should gradually emerge (Dunning and Narula, 
1996).  In parallel to this, it can be observed that income per capita continues to rise. It 
must be noted that the differential rate of growth of various countries can only be explained 
on a contextual basis. The types of inward FDI in the second stage can take the form of 
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resource- seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking. The third type of inward FDI is 
the product of the vertical integration of the productive value chains between TNCs and 
domestic firms, induced by improvement of the locational advantages of the host country. 
This is because the provisions of infrastructure during the first stage of development are 
largely materialised. Market-seeking FDI remains significant because an increase in income 
per capita would mean an increase in the size of the market. This gives a signal to 
entrepreneurs of a potential demand to be satisfied.  
Indeed, the capital imported during these stages will still be used to close the saving-
investment gap in the host economy. The technology and knowledge, attached to inward 
FDI, can contribute to improve the country‟s productivity. By the same token, it is crucially 
important to note that the more a country receives inward FDI without any attempt to 
increase its stock of productive capability, the more likely it is to become passively 
dependent on the global economy for ever more capital and technology. A complete 
capitalist development cannot be achieved if the economy is totally dependent on the richer 
countries, but it also cannot be achieved without their support. Thus, the state has an 
important role in putting forward strategic and dynamic strategies to balance the economic 
and technological dependence and attempts to minimise if not liberate from this 
dependence. One possible means to liberate from such dependence is through the creation 
of ownership-specific advantages, embodied in its domestic firms.   
The role of the government in this stage is no less, if not more, crucial than that in the first 
stage. It has to ensure that domestic firms could benefit from a growing market no less than 
their foreign counterparts, taking into account the inferior competitiveness of the local firms. 
It can be said that the institutional infrastructure that the state is liable to provide to 
domestic firms remains important as they could help domestic firms to accumulate and 
develop their ownership-specific advantages. Basically, in parallel to receiving FDI, the 
host government is liable to implement all the necessary policies that would help to 
materialise FDI spillovers as well as maintain the best possible scenario of fair competition. 
This is because market is not perfect particularly in the area where FDI is intensive. It is 
likely that these imperfections are in favour of TNCs, otherwise they would not have the 
incentive to internalise in the first place.  
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The third stage is characterised by an increase in outward FDI and a decrease in the 
negative NOI. As a result, the NOI position starts to head upward. Nevertheless, it remains 
negative but to a lesser degree. It is important to note that this scenario could only take 
place when domestic firms, to some extent, increase their ownership-specific advantages in 
relation to TNCs. Dunning and Narula (1996) suggest that at this stage, the country starts 
explicitly to experience structural changes in its comparative advantages. These structural 
changes are natural results of development, more importantly, the well-crafted development 
policies.  Similarly, factor prices will change. Wages tend to rise. The rising wages and 
factor prices erode the country‟s comparative advantage in labour-intensive activities. It 
must be noted that controlling wages would only increase market imperfections and 
economic distortions. In addition, maintaining low wages might even raise the risk of a 
country becoming locked in the specialisation of low value-added activities.  
In terms of domestic competition, the protection to domestic firms by the government 
during the earlier stages of development could be gradually lifted. It is assumed that 
domestic firms should accumulate enough ownership-advantages and are ready to compete 
directly with TNCs in some sectors (Dunning and Narula, 1996). At this stage, the role of 
the government, in supporting domestic firms, remains important even though to a lesser 
degree. The government could reduce its role to act as a facilitator of domestic firms once 
they have acquired a significant level of ownership specific advantages.   
Regarding outward investment by domestic firms, it is driven by two broad motivations. 
Firstly, outward FDI is meant to be market-seeking and efficiency-seeking. This outward 
FDI may serve as a means to relocate the once competitive domestic industries to a foreign 
territory whose economic environment still offers a favourable return on such investment. 
For example, as the economy evolves, minimum wages tend to rise and the country loses 
competitiveness in labour-intensive industries. Hence, its investors look to invest in 
economies where the labour cost remains low, such as the FDI that Japanese firms made in 
Thailand after signing the Plaza Accord in 1985. Secondly, it can be explained by strategic-
seeking FDI which is an international investment to acquire and control knowledge and 
technology available outside the home country. This asset is essential to upgrade the 
comparative advantages and accelerate the growth rate for the late industrialisation. The 
outward FDI during this period could serve as a means to address the structural change in 
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the home economy and helps to reinforce its ownership-specific advantages.  
In the fourth stage, the stock of outward FDI is greater than or equal to that of the inward 
FDI. The economy now exhibits the new pattern of specialisation and the number of the 
domestic TNCs increases. The economy then enters the last stage of development where it 
is fully industrialised. At the fifth stage, the net value of the outflow of FDI and the inflow 
of FDI, or the Net Outward Investment fluctuates around zero. It is important to note that 
the higher stage of development and the more its firms are equipped with ownership-
specific advantages, the less direct state intervention in the competition between foreign and 
domestic firms is needed.  More details of the fourth and the fifth stages can be found in 
Dunning and Narula (1996) and Duran and Ubeda (2001).  
4.2.2 Second Scenario: the Capital-Dependent State   
The state and its nature of intervention play an important role in determining whether a 
developing country would enter into the virtuous cycle of development or the vicious cycle 
of dependency. Whereas the first scenario represents a successful development path of the 
late industrialised countries whose government implemented development policies and 
successfully change its relatively backward economy towards a fully industrialised one. The 
second scenario represents a dependent development path that is depicted by the capital-
dependency theory. This scenario depicts the economic development that over-relies on 
inward FDI and where the state interventions, aimed for helping domestic firms equipped 
with ownership-specific advantages, are kept to the minimal. It will be seen that this 
scenario could also explain the phenomenon of the middle-income trap that a number of 
developing countries, including Thailand, are experiencing. If it is believed that the nature 
of specialisation dictates the national income, the middle-income trap could be explained as 
the failure of a country to upgrade successfully its comparative and competitive advantages 
over the path of its development. It points directly to a lack of productive capability, or the 
lack of ownership-specific advantages in domestic firms which, in turn, may be the result of 
over-reliance on inward FDI and the lack of the protection of domestic enterprises.  
It will be seen that the role of the state in the second scenario is similar to the role of state in 
the country where the neo-liberal development prevails. Figure 4.2 depicts the 
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hypothetically systematic relationship between the NOI and the stage of development in 
capital-dependent developing countries.  
FIGURE 4.2: DEVELOPMENT PATH OF A CAPITAL DEPENDENT STATE 
 
Source: Adapted from Dunning and Narula (1996)  
Figure 4.2 exhibits the scenario where a developing country, even after participating in an 
international economy for some time, fails to increase the nation‟s ownership-specific 
advantages relative to that of TNCs. The behaviour of the NOI during the first two stages of 
development are very similar to those of the first scenario and there are many reasons to 
believe that there should be great differences in institutional configurations embedded in the 
host countries, so much so, that the pattern of NOI exhibits differently in the third stage of 
development.  
More specifically, this study will point out that under the neo-liberal influence, several state 
interventions have been re-directed or suppressed in such a way that the neo-liberal state 
could not undertake the same set of policies portrayed in the first scenario. This can 
possible determined the difference behaviour of NOI between the first and the second 
scenarios and hence the different path of economic development. In fairness, the reasons 
behind the implementation of ineffective policies may not only be limited to the neo-liberal 
influence but also to the nature of domestic politics. Specifically, if there are political 
instabilities and corruptions, the provision of a basic infrastructure may not be as efficient 
as it intended. For example, the government budget, deemed to be spent on improving 
education, may be subject to corruption. As most parties involved in the project look to 
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maximise their own immediate benefits, the goals of increasing human capital cannot be 
achieved. Consequently, the country fails to improve the quality of resources which are 
necessary for further development.  
Nevertheless, the neo-liberal influence on development policy cannot be underplayed if one 
seeks to understand the contemporary policy environment in developing countries since 
they are suggested by the World Bank and the IMF to adopt a free market economy as a 
means to development. Clearly, this implies the embrace of international trade and 
investment with limited regulations as discussed in Chapter 3. In addition, on international 
politics, Amsden (2007, p.929) points out that the acceptance of a legitimacy of a 
government in developing countries by leading countries depends, to a large extent, on the 
liberal extent of the policy towards inward FDI. For this reason, the ruling elites in host 
developing countries are ready to adopt friendly policies towards inward FDI. In fact, in a 
country where the state is politically weak, its government appear to adopt the neo-liberal 
policy including lax policies towards inward FDI in order to gain international acceptance 
and induce economic growth.  
The case in point is that over-friendly policies towards FDI, even though it helps to increase 
locational-specific advantages of a nation to attract more FDI, may have an adverse effect 
on the creation of the nation‟s ownership-specific advantages that are embodied in domestic 
firms.  Under these circumstances, domestic firms might face difficulties in accumulating 
capital, technological and organizational skills as they are left to face with fierce 
international competitors since their inceptions. Therefore, these domestic firms are likely 
to be disadvantaged even in their domestic market, particularly when the country becomes 
more liberal towards FDI. Some domestic firms, however, may benefit if they position 
themselves as a satellite to TNCs, acting mainly as their suppliers. It is noted that this 
strategy, unless changed at a later stage, can be even anti-developmental as it tends to 
establish an outright dependent relationship at the firm level. Moreover, situating in a lower 
industrial hierarchy normally means being confined to the lower profitability and 
technology. As a consequence, the country might find difficulties moving towards the third 
stage of development due to the lack of capital and technological competitiveness.  
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An enduring and increasing magnitude of negative NOI could reflect an enduring and 
increasing gap between the ownership-specific advantages of domestic firms in relations to 
TNCs. In most case, this phenomenon is a result of the non-strategically constructed 
policies that aim to attract inward FDI. In other words, during the first and the second 
stages of development, instead of focusing on building the productive capability in 
domestic firms, the state focuses more on attracting FDI by providing the locational-
specific advantages for TNCs with a set of liberal policy.  
Emphasising on the creation of locational advantages over the formation of domestic 
ownership-specific advantages could be regarded as an opportunity cost for a sustainable 
economic development host developing country. For example, tax incentives may lower 
revenue for the host government. A state without adequate financial resource for 
development will then need to seek financial assistance from the World Bank or the IMF. 
This, in turn, would render them to adopt more neo-liberal policy. Inducing international 
competition into domestic market at a very early stage may prevent domestic firms from 
developing ownership-specific advantages.  
The locational-specific advantages of a capital-dependent state could take the forms of lax 
policies for foreign investors and tax privilege schemes, cheap unskilled labour, and easy 
access to natural resources. The locational advantages have two important implications on 
economic growth. First, they function as catalysts for economic growth as they help to 
stimulate more inward FDI. However, it must be noted that growth from inward FDI in 
capital and technological dependent country tends to be short-lived. Second, by their nature, 
they would not only make vulnerable domestic firms being exposed to fierce international 
competition without safeguards but also impede the transformation of domestic productive 
force necessary for further development. As there is no home grown productive capabilities, 
the government of a capital-dependent state has no choice but to maintain the locational-
specific advantages from lax policies towards FDI even they are anti-developmental in the 
long run.  
4.3 Theoretical Model 
This section presents a static exogenous growth model, designed to capture the impact of 
FDI on gross national income (GNI). This theoretical model aims to serve two main 
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purposes. First, it can be used to complement the above dynamic conceptual framework, 
though it will capture only a static relationship between the international investments and 
the income of the host developing economy during the second and the third stages of 
development. Second, it will be used as a theoretical platform for empirical analyses.  
This growth model takes the form of the Cobb-Douglas production function which is the 
most straight forward growth formulation and the simplest way to demonstrate the output 
elasticity of each factor of production in the equilibrium. These particular reasons render 
the Cobb-Douglas production function a very useful tool. Besides, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function is also empirically friendly, as it can easily be transformed into a linear 
form which is useful in regression analysis. Hence, the Cobb-Douglas production function 
is both informative and understandable for research in the field of economic development. 
Barro and Xala-i-Martin (2004) commented that development economists always prefer the 
simple theoretical model with a high empirical application rather than the complicated 
model with little possibility in empirical application. They argued further that this very 
reason explains why economic growth discipline and economic development discipline are 
drifting apart.  
However, despite being widely used, the Cobb-Douglas production function is still subject 
to several criticisms. For example, Kummerow (2002, p.15) contended that the Cobb-
Douglas over-simplifies economic reality and that its static property cannot reflect the 
production function of the real economy which tends to evolve through time. This is 
because the economic relationships are historical in nature. Furthermore, the objection of 
the Cobb-Douglas production function stems from the scepticism that the aggregate 
production function for a whole economy may not exist. This is because the whole 
economy is made up of a number of different industries whose production function could 
well vary. 
To overcome the static aspect of the Cobb-Douglas production function, it is possible to 
analyse the data with dynamic econometric methods, such as the Error Correction Model 
(ECM), the auto-distributed lag model, and the division of the whole sample into sub-
periods according to historical events. For the last criticism, Douglas (1976) had addressed 
this particular point himself. He refers to the empirical studies that tested his model in the 
form of the logarithmic formulation with constant returns to scale in inter-industry studies. 
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He mentioned that those studies accepted the hypothesis of the specification of the model 
and the constant returns to scale assumption. This implies that, to a significant extent, the 
production functions, regardless of industry, could well be explained in the Cobb-Douglas 
form. If all features of an industry can be formulated in the Cobb-Douglas form, then it 
should be possible to formulate the aggregate production function in the Cobb-Douglas 
form. It is undeniable that any economic production function of any industry requires at 
least two similar basic inputs, capital and labour, which are the key explanatory variables in 
the Cobb-Douglas production function. Hence, from a heuristic perspective, it is reasonable 
for this study to define the aggregate production function of an economy in the form of the 
Cobb-Douglas formulation.  
4.3.1 Static Exogenous Growth Model with International Investment 
The theoretical model presented below takes a departure from the standard neo-classical 
production function in which the factors of productions cover technology, capital and 
labour. In this setting, the standard model presents the state of the closed economy in 
developing countries where no international movement of capital or labour is allowed. It 
also represents the pre-liberalisation of direct investment. For simplicity, this model 
assumes no portfolio investment. This type of economy exhibits a constant return to scale. 
The equation can then be denoted as follows:  
),,( LKAFY               (4.1) 
where Y is the aggregate total output, A is the level of technology, K is domestic capital 
stock and L is quantity of labour. Equation (4.1) is a function of time and assumed Cobb-
Douglas production function. It then takes the form: 
 )1(LAKY                         (4.2) 
The level of technology, A, is assumed to be greater than 0 therefore A > 0.  α is the output 
elasticity of capital and 0 < α < 1. (1- α) is the output elasticity of labour. To briefly prove 
the properties of neo-classical growth model, the equation (4.2) can be written in intensive 
form as 
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Aky              (4.3) 
The equation (4.3) is derived by dividing the equation (4.2) by L . y and k  represents  the 
output and capital- labour ratio. The properties of a neo-classical production function are 
proved since 0)(' 1kAkf , and 2)1()('' kAkf . This means that the capital 
in this production function exhibits a diminishing return and the predictions of the standard 
neo-classical growth theory hold.     
When the developing economy is exposed more to the global economy and is driven by 
neo-liberal globalisation forces, either voluntarily or involuntarily, it starts to open its 
economy not only to the international trade but also to cross-border investment. For 
simplicity, the analysis intentionally excludes the movement of goods, service, and labour 
from the context. It also assumes that labour is homogenous. At this stage, it is necessary to 
extend the model of the quasi-closed economy found in equation (4.2) to the fully open 
economy setting.   
To formulate the open economy model with several types of investment, this study is 
influenced by the increasing-return models developed by Griliches, (1979), Findlay (1978), 
Romer, (1986), Lucas, (1988), and re-represented in the Cobb-Douglas formulation by 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 445) The model of an open economy, exhibited in 
equation (4.4), introduces two additional concepts. One is that of multiple products which 
refer to the segregation of types of factors of production. Second is the spillovers notion 
which refers to the technological transfer that eventually would increase the level of 
technology, a source of perpetual growth. The spillovers are the externalities which can take 
the form of being positive or negative. In the context of FDI and development, the sign of 
the spillovers depends on the economic context and the FDI related regulations in the host 
countries.  
The aggregate production function of the open economy can, thus, be written in the 
following form:    
)1(
toutintdtt
LKKKAY
tt
           (4.4) 
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where α remains the output elasticity of domestic capital and it is assumed that 0 < α <1. 
Newly introduced variables in equation (4.4) are 
tin
K  and 
tout
K . The former denotes the 
international investment made by a foreign investor in the domestic market (inward FDI) 
and the latter denotes the international investment made by a domestic investor in the 
foreign land, namely, outward FDI. Accordingly, δ denotes an output elasticity of inward 
FDI while β denotes an output elasticity of outward FDI. It is noted that during the first and 
the second stage of development, according to the IDP framework, 
tout
K may not be 
represented in the model due to its non-existence. 
tout
K will only become meaningful once 
the country produces outward FDI. However, the implications of equation (4.4) will not 
change even when there is no 
tout
K in the model. 
The introduction of these two variables and the possibility of spillovers lead to some 
amendments of the standard neo-classical assumptions made in equation (4.2). Thus, 
equation (4.4) represents an open economy in which capital mobility, specifically of an FDI 
nature, is allowed. The direct international investment, in turn, induces a spillover effect 
that would lead to a change in the return to scale of the whole model, depending on the sign 
of the spillovers. Hence, the constant return to scale assumption no longer holds.  
It is also important to note that the spillover effects, in this model, are captured in the form 
of elasticities of outputs rather than the level of technological change, A. It is reasonable to 
assume so. Based on Young (1994, 1995), Krugman (1998), and Bosworth (2005), there are 
many reasons to believe that economic growth in the early stage of development comes 
from an increase in factors of production, such as, higher rate of capital accumulation and 
quality improvement of the factors of production instead of growth in productivity.       
This model can represent two possible scenarios depicting the impact of FDI in relation to 
economic development and elaborated in section 4.2. It is assumed that the role of the state 
and its policies towards FDI and development govern the nature of the output elasticity of 
inward FDI, δ, and outward FDI, β. The first scenario, proposed by the conventional 
perspectives, explains that FDI would generate the spillovers to the developing economy 
because what comes with the foreign capital is a bundle of technological and managerial 
knowledge. Inward FDI in the developing countries, therefore, would help to reduce the 
saving and investment gap in the backward countries and generate a higher growth rate in 
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the process of capital accumulation which is essential for further growth. From the IDP 
framework, it is assumed that the government‟s of the host country has also adopted 
policies that help to create the ownership-specific advantages for domestic firms.  
The second scenario refers to the situation where the government plays a limited role in 
helping domestic firms to develop ownership-specific advantages and tends to favour FDI 
to a great extent. Under these circumstances, FDI actually hinders the development in the 
host developing economy, particularly in long term. The explanation is that FDI would 
displace the domestic investment and allow the transfer of both natural and financial 
resources to the investors‟ countries or the rich countries which are the core of the world 
capitalist system. As the competitiveness of domestic firms remain relatively weaker than 
that of TNCs, FDI takes an increasingly important role as an impetus for economic growth. 
So, the country becomes more dependent on foreign capital while it may not necessarily or 
fully, benefit from it.  
To depict the above two scenarios, the study assigns the change in
td
K ,
tin
K , 
tout
K  and tL  
by the same factor , this production function  yields: 
          (4.4a)  
          (4.4b)   
          (4.4c)  
From equation (4.4c) it can be seen that an increase in all variable inputs
td
K ,
tin
K , 
tout
K  
and tL , leads to an increase in tY by 
1 . Therefore this function is not necessarily 
homogenous at degree one. In other words, it can also be either homogenous at degree more 
than one or less than one, depending on the sign and value of the elasticities of output 
tin
K  
and
tout
K .  
The consideration is now made on the first scenario where the positive spillovers from FDI 
take place in the host developing economy thanks to efficient and appropriate policies, 
implemented by the host government. In this event, the summation of output elasticity of 
outputs with respect to inK  and outK  must be greater than 0. That is δ + β > 0. However, it 
)( )1(1 toutind LKKKAY ttt
)1()()()()( toutindt LKKKAY ttt
)( )1()1( toutind LKKKAY ttt
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must be noted that in order to maintain the diminishing return assumption on each type of 
factor of production, the summation of output elasticities of 
tin
K  and 
tout
K  should be less 
than one, < 1, so that, 1)(0 . Under this circumstances, each output 
elasticity, δ and β, is less than one. In this situation, each factor of production, individually, 
exhibits a diminishing return but at the aggregate level, the production function can exhibit 
an increasing return to scale which is depicted by λ. The positive δ points to the realisation 
of positive spillovers from inward FDI. The positive β may suggest the existence of 
ownership-specific advantages possessed by domestic firms and the country.  
Turning to the second scenario where the economy is embedded with a weak state, 
relatively incompetent domestic firms, and lax FDI policies, an inward FDI is expected to 
have a negative impact on the economy and an outward FDI is limited, or virtually non-
existent. This is because the effect of FDI depends on the nature of the host country‟s 
market and its adopted policies. In the absence of appropriate regulations and favourable 
economic environment, the second scenario, elaborated above, would take place. Under this 
situation, the externalities generated by inward FDI are likely to be negative and could have 
an adverse impact on economic development.  
In the case of a capital dependent state, 
tout
K  is assumed not to exist and can be ignored, 
the equation (4.4) can be re-written as follows: 
)1(
tintdtt
LKKAY
t
           (4.5) 
The output elasticity of inK is assumed to be less than zero but greater than minus one, that 
is, 01  Under these circumstances, the multiplier effect, , is less than one and the 
function exhibits a decreasing return to scale. This production function implies that an 
economy may suffer from leakage of resources, be it physical or financial, induced by 
inward FDI. This kind of production function is inefficient because it exhibits a 
diminishing return to scale. This means that, when there is a change by  factor in all 
variable inputs, it induces a change by less than  factor in the output. This scenario could 
take place if an inflow of capital, whose elasticity is denoted by δ, creates an outflow of 
capital and resources more than the initial inflow, for example, the case of a peripheral 
economy in the dependency theory.  
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The same holds for the case where superior foreign firms are introduced into a market 
where the domestic incumbents are relatively weaker and therefore eventually driven out 
from the market. Under this particular case, the domestic economy is losing its 
entrepreneurs and, thus, the major part of the entrepreneurial profits is captured by foreign 
investors who repatriate them back to their home countries. It is important to note that when 
01 , this production function is still capable of exhibiting growth in output but every 
unit of its output growth requires more than a one unit growth in all variable inputs. It can 
be said that this type of economic growth is a dependent development. In an extreme case 
where 1,  can take value of 0 , that is, the production function is homogenous at 
degree zero. This scenario represents the critical situation where, no matter by how much 
variable inputs are proportionately increased the output of the function remains unchanged.   
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has illustrated the conceptual framework and FDI-growth model which will be 
used for both the analysis of the Thai political economy in Chapter 5 and the empirical 
analyses of the impact of FDI on the Thai Gross National Income (GNI) found in Chapter 6. 
The conceptual framework points out that the role of the state and its policies towards FDI 
determine of the country‟s developmental path. If the state is strong and its developmental 
policies are in favour of the creation of the ownership-specific advantages for domestic 
firms, the country is likely to develop successfully productive capability which is important 
to liberate itself from the dependence on foreign capital and technology at the later stage of 
development.  
If the state takes limited protections fir domestic firms and creates the environment which 
benefits more TNCs, domestic firms tends to find difficulties in accumulating capital and 
technology. In this event, the stae could be viewed as lacking the economic vision, possibly 
due to genuine incompetence, political forces, or both. Hence, its developmental policies 
are likely to undermine the formation of the ownership-specific advantages of domestic 
firms. In this event, it is likely that the policy environment in the host country will increase 
the locational-specific advantages, which are more favourable to TNCs. Under these 
circumstances, the economy is unlikely to be able to liberate itself from dependence on 
foreign capital and technology. It may become a capital-dependent state that exhibits most 
of the economic characteristics that have been portrayed by dependency theorists.     
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The IDP framework, though being useful for analysing FDI conceptually, does not offer the 
direct theoretical platform for the empirical analyses on the impact of FDI on economic 
growth. Thus, the study has developed a static exogenous FDI-growth model to serve this 
purpose. It is seen that the exogenous FDI-growth model, depicted by equation (4.4) can 
portray the growth path of an economy in relation to international direct investment. The 
model can reflect both scenario where FDI is positively impact the economy and where it 
does not, depending on the nature of δ and β. The nature of δ and β, in turn, is governed by 
the competitiveness of the local firms and the policies used to construct the market in the 
host economy. Indeed, the model exhibit in equation (4.4) is not a complete model since the 
key output elasticities, δ and β, as well as the technology level, A, are still exogenously 
determined outside the model. However, this study attempts to develop a model that can 
explain the impact of FDI on the aggregate change of output, taking into account the binary 
effect of FDI. Hence, it can be argued that the models presented by equation (4.4) and 
equation (4.5) as well as the set of assumptions attached to them can be very informative 
and helpful for the use of both development economists and policy makers.  
The acknowledgement of the uncertain nature of FDI in advance prevents the policy makers 
from presuming the positive externalities attached to foreign investments. In addition, such 
a model tends to remind the policy makers that, in order to get the positive δ and β, the 
strategic policies need to be put in place to manipulate the occurrence of the most 
favourable outcome. The last but not necessarily least advantage is that even though the 
mathematical form of this theoretical model is unsophisticated and relatively simple 
compared to the more advanced endogenous growth formulation, it is empirically useful. 
This is because the Cobb-Douglas formulation offers a functional form which is compatible 
with linear regressions. Therefore, the interconnectedness between the theoretical 
formulation and the empirical specification could be made clear and evident. The next 
chapter, this study will give the review of the history of Thai political and economic growth 
in relation to FDI and the force of globalisation.  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the study of the Thai political economy in a descriptive style with the 
use of the analytic narrative method. It begins with the analysis of critical parts, which are 
FDI and its related policies, before proceeding to the analysis of the whole, which is the 
history of economic growth. The first analysis is focused on FDI. It represents the nature 
and volume of foreign operations in Thailand. Then, the analysis of FDI policy in Thailand 
will be introduced. The form and the degree of state interventions in relation of FDI in 
Thailand will be discussed. Also, in this chapter, the study of the concentration of FDI and 
Total Factor Productivity in Thailand will be comparatively reviewed. An analysis of the 
Net Outward Investment, the ratio of GNI to GDP, the terms of trade and the study of 
balance of payment will be provided. The analysis of the whole historical process of 
economic development that seeks to portray the characteristics of Thai economy in relation 
to external relations will then be followed. The holistic analysis should shed some light 
upon how FDI, under the neo-liberal policy environment, affects the process of growth in 
Thailand. Knowledge gained from the descriptive analysis in this chapter will help define 
the hypothesis used in the empirical study, found in the next chapter.  
Chapter 5 is structured in the following manner. Section 5.2 presents an analysis of the 
profile of FDI in Thailand.  Section 5.3 provides the background of the Thai political and 
economic growth experience, including a discussion on development in relation to FDI and 
FDI-related policies. A Summary is found section 5.4 where the study promulgates the 
hypothesis of the impact of FDI on the Thai economic growth path. 
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5.2 FDI in Thailand 
 
This section analyses inward FDI in Thailand. Since the 1960s, inward FDI began to flow 
into Thailand in response to the implementation of the Investment Promotion Act. It is 
useful to discuss the motives of the main foreign investors in Thailand. During the 1960s 
and the 1970s, the main source of inward FDI in Thailand was the U.S. This can be 
explained by American imperialism which prevailed in the world economy at that time. 
American foreign investment during these periods was meant to produce household 
products for domestic consumption and not to use Thailand as off-shore production bases 
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003, p.168). This was partly because the Thai economic regime, 
at that time, was under import substitution.  
In the early 1970s, inward FDI from Japan began to rise significantly. As depicted in Table 
5.1, Japanese investment exceeded that of the U.S for the first time in 1973. It is important 
to note that Japanese differed from American investment in the sense that Japanese 
investments were largely meant for re-exports.  
TABLE 5.1: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF NET INWARD FDI IN THAILAND CLASSIFIED BY 
COUNTRY 
Country/Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Japan 36.16 24.28 23.31 35.12 43.12 27.77 30.92 45.00 25.08 
US 39.51 46.94 18.90 54.46 9.50 12.97 21.95 11.54 10.61 
EU 15 8.87 11.02 14.10 10.89 6.83 8.98 18.14 5.15 11.25 
ASEAN 6 -0.33 0.61 3.97 1.44 0.83 1.41 1.19 0.51 0.74 
Singapore -0.07 3.05 7.05 -26.52 9.55 6.81 12.64 16.43 26.66 
Hong Kong 7.75 3.43 28.74 14.44 10.88 13.93 11.78 0.11 3.93 
Taiwan 0.04 0.11 0.05 3.93 11.50 4.82 5.65 0.45 0.95 
South Korea 0.07 0.72 0.25 -0.10 0.75 0.62 -0.13 0.42 1.42 
Others 8.00 9.84 3.63 6.34 7.04 22.69 -2.14 20.39 19.36 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source:  Bank of Thailand (2009) 
Note: 1. minus figure means divestment 
2. EU 15 includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. 
3. ASEAN 6 includes Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Cambodia and Laos. 
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Before proceeding to discuss more about Japanese investment in Thailand, it is instructive 
to discuss briefly the background of Japanese outward FDI. Even though Japanese direct 
investment became more distinctive after the creation of the Plaza Accord in 1985, Japan 
had started to enlarge her global stock of outward FDI long before that. Indeed, Japan had 
successfully identified that international competition had been taking a new form since the 
early stage of her own development (Ozawa, 1979). This meant that Japan was aware that 
global competition would no longer limit international trade but expand to international 
investment, particularly, to control over global productive means. Such control was no 
longer necessarily empowered by military force, but by productive capability, alternatively 
known as ownership-specific, and by monopolistic advantages in the international business 
discipline. It can be said that Japan was long aware of the new set of rules in the modern 
capitalism and made herself ready for a dominant position, with the help of Japanese TNCs, 
which, in turn, had grown from a development regime where inward FDI had, at best, 
played a limited role to play.  
Returning to Japanese investment in Thailand, as they were largely meant for re-exports, a 
rise in Japanese inward FDI increased the significance of Japan as a main trading partner of 
the country (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003). This situation made some Thai technocrats 
worry about the dependency of the Thai economy on Japan. So, from the 1970s onwards, 
the Japanese government tried to improve the situation by, for example, reducing the 
import tariff for Thai products and increasing financial aid. During the 1980s where the 
average share of inter-governments aids stood at 0.3 % of total GDP
4
, Japanese financial 
aid represented two thirds of the amount (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003). Parallel to this 
was an increasing dominance of Japanese FDI in Thailand.  
Japanese direct investment had been a majority source of inward FDI up until 2006 when 
Singapore became the biggest foreign investor in Thailand for the first time. The increasing 
significance of Singaporean investment might be explained by the maturity of Singapore‟s 
sovereign wealth funds, such as the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, and 
Temasek Holding. It can be argued that a sovereign wealth fund is an alternative form of 
TNCs. It is an institution that is used to expand control over productive means in foreign 
markets. The emergence of sovereign wealth funds and their impacts on international 
                                                          
4
 Own calculation. Thai balance of payments, IMF (2009) 
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economic and relations are interesting but are beyond the scope of this study.  The 
dominance of Singapore inward FDI is a new phenomenon. So far, there is virtually no 
study dedicated to explain this. With the simplest intuition, one might explain this as an 
attempt of the Singaporean government to establish its dominance and a certain degree of 
control over the regional, if not global market.  
Figure 5.1 also shows an important aspect of inward FDI in Thailand. According to Kentor 
and Boswell (2003), the percentage share to total foreign investment classified by a country 
can reflect the structure of foreign capital dependence. Furthermore, they postulate that a 
high level of concentration will inhibit long-term economic growth in developing countries. 
Indeed, the structure of foreign capital concentration in Thailand is not as bad as in 
Honduras in 1967 where British investment represented almost 98% percent of total FDI in 
the country. However, when combining the share of the largest foreign investors, namely, 
Japan, U.S. and either Singapore or Hong Kong, their investment represent nearly two-
thirds of the total FDI. It is, therefore, likely that these countries, collectively, would have 
more political and economic bargaining power than that of the Thai government.  
Foreign investment concentration, however, is not the only indicator of the economic 
significance of FDI in the host economy. Among researchers on capital dependency, for 
example, Dixon and Boswell (1996), Firebaugh, (1996), Kentor, (1998), Soysa and Oneal, 
(1999), and Kentor and Boswell, (2003), the stock of FDI to GDP is another appropriate 
measurement that could be used to represent the degree foreign capital penetration. From 
the Thai data, it can be seen that while the foreign investment concentration as well as its 
combinations has been slightly varied over the past three decades, the penetration of 
foreign capital in Thailand has significantly increased, particularly after the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997, Figure 5.1. 
FIGURE 5.1: RATIO OF FDI TO GDP FROM 1980-2009 
 
Source: United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (2010) 
Chapter 5: Thai Economic and Political Background 
129 
 
FDI has been a major source of growth in Thailand since the 1980s. Phongpaichit and 
Baker (2003) documented that inward FDI during that time flew to export-orientated 
sectors. As they noted that FDI came with the new establishment of factories and that the 
country was experiencing an expansion of industrial sector, it can be inferred that FDI 
during the 1980s were largely green field investment. Table 5.2 shows that FDI in the 
1980s were indeed clustered in the industrial sector. Despite a rapid growth in the industrial 
sector led by inward FDI, the foreign capital stock represented only five to ten percent of 
the total GDP.      
TABLE 5.2: NET FLOW OF INWARD FDI BY ECONOMIC SECTOR  
Sector/Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Industry 63 47 62 79 56 33 71 63 56 
   (Manufacturing) (50) (33) (26) (31) (48) (28) (64) (53) (45) 
Agriculture 0 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Service 37 53 33 19 43 67 29 37 43 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2009)  
The destination of inward FDI during the first half of the 1990s was different from other 
periods. In the early 1990s, due to the liberalisation of the capital account, this caused a 
boom in the domestic, real estate sector. Thus, from 1992, the main destination of FDI 
shifted to real estate and financial which are classified under the service sector. This pattern 
remained until 1995, as depicted in Table 5.2, and halted in 1997 when the bubble burst 
and the crisis took place. After the crisis, inward FDI in Thailand shifted back to the 
industrial sector, particularly in manufacturing. However, it should be noted that this 
generation of FDI was largely in the form of Merger and Acquisition (M&A) (WIR, 2000; 
Brimble, 2002; Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003). M&A FDI after the crisis was encouraged 
by two key factors, the devaluation of Baht and the fire-sale of assets after the bust (Chang, 
2003). Thus, it can be said that a significant rise in FDI both in volume and in intensity 
after the crisis may not necessarily contribute to the creation of new productive capabilities.       
As this study focuses mainly on the impact FDI on economic development at macro-
economic level, it is therefore useful to review some key studies on FDI in Thailand that 
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worked on the industrial level as these findings would help increase an understanding of 
the effect of FDI at aggregate level.    
5.2.1 Empirical Studies of FDI in Thailand 
 
A number of empirical studies have been conducted to assess the impact of inward FDI on 
the Thai economy using data at the industrial level. Along with these micro-level studies, 
this section will illustrate the relation of inward FDI in relation to exports, technological 
transfer, and market concentration, respectively. 
Sibunruang-Brimble (1992) found that FDI had a significant impact on Thai exports 
(Pupphavesa and Pussarungsri, 1994). In her previous study, Sibunruang (1986) revealed 
that foreign-invested firms had a large share of total exports from the electronic and 
machinery industries. Similarly, Rasiah (2003), employing data from 71 electronics firms in 
Thailand and Malaysia, found a strong statistical linkage between foreign ownership and 
exports. Kohpaiboon (2006) analysed data from the industrial census in 1997. He found that 
almost 60 % of manufacturing exports were produced by foreign plants. However, in terms 
of employment share, foreign firms account for only 35 % of manufacturing employment. 
This suggested that TNCs may use capital-intensive technology. Athukorala (2004, 2006) 
confirms that export success in Thailand can be largely explained by the entry of TNCs 
since the mid-1970s. More specifically, Athukorala (2004) acknowledged that the export 
boom after the crisis was induced largely by the devaluation of the Thai Baht.  
Tamboonlertchai (2009) reported that tax incentives, firm‟s experience, and a presence of 
foreign ownership positively affect local firm‟s decision to export. Thanadsillapakul (2010) 
analysed data of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Thailand in 2006. She found that 
SMEs, almost all owned by Thais, represented 99.5 % of total private enterprises in 
Thailand. The other 0.5% of private enterprises were large in size and dominated by foreign 
ownership. She pointed out that while SMEs accounted for roughly 30% of total export, 
large enterprises accounted for 70%.  
On technological transfer, Pupphavesa and Pussarungsri (1994) quoted that Khantachai et 
al., (1987) found that foreign invested firms in Thailand usually had a higher capital to 
labour ratio than Thai firms. This implies that the technology adopted by TNCs may not 
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generate the optimal number of employment. It may well be regarded as an inappropriate 
technology. Similarly, Dahlman and Brimble, (1991) found that the transfer of technology 
in Thailand through sub-contract arrangements was minimal because TNCs were not willing 
to transfer knowledge. Pupphavesa and Pussarungsri (1994) conducted a survey of twenty 
four firms from the electronics and machinery industries. Of these, there were nineteen 
foreign invested and five Thai firms. They found no indication that a firm‟s size affects the 
speed and scope of technological transfer. Most importantly, they found that virtually all 
Thai suppliers gained a low level of technological transfer. By way of contrast, Rasiah 
(2003) carried out interviews with TNCs and local firms in the electronic sector in Malaysia 
and Thailand. He found anecdotal comment suggesting a significant transfer of technology 
from TNCs to local firms.  
Ramstetter (2002) measured productivity by the value added per plant. He conducted a 
panel study using firm-level data during 1996-1998 from the Thai industrial census. His 
results, calculated from the translog production function, suggested that foreign invested 
firms in Thailand were not necessarily more efficient than their local counterparts. More 
specifically, Ito (2004), focusing on the Thai automobile industries during 1996-1998, 
found similar evidence. She reveals that foreign invested plants producing, motor vehicle 
bodies and motor vehicle parts seemed to have lower capital productivity than local plants. 
This again points out that foreign owned firms in Thailand tend to use higher capital-
intensive technology (Khantachai et al., 1987; Kohpaiboon, 2003). Kohpaiboon (2006) 
worked on the industrial census data in 1997. He measured spillover by labour productivity 
and found that labour productivity in locally-owned plants appeared to be positively 
correlated with FDI in the sector where the effective rate of protection was low.  
Kohpaiboon (2009) used an industrial survey during 2001-2003 and measured spillover by 
the value added in domestic plants. He found no evidence of vertical spillover in the 
samples and that horizontal spillover existed only in sectors where the trade regime is 
liberal.  
On market concentration and FDI, there is only one study that seriously and empirically 
worked on this aspect. Kohpaiboon and Ramstetter (2008) examined the relationship among 
producer concentration, conglomerates, foreign ownership and protection in Thai 
manufacturing firms after the crisis 1997. They found that the production concentration, 
foreign ownership and the propensity to export in most Thai manufacturing industries began 
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to increase shortly before the start of the economic crisis in 1997. Interestingly, in contrast 
to the conventional belief that liberalisation brings more competition, Kohpaiboon and 
Ramstetter (2008) revealed that, in Thailand, market concentration tended to be lesser in the 
protected sectors rather than the liberalised sectors.  
In summary, TNCs‟ operations in Thailand are largely located in export sectors. They also 
account for the major part of total exports from Thailand. Next, the spillovers from TNCs to 
Thai local firms are not abundantly supported by empirical studies. Lastly, TNCs in 
Thailand use capital-intensive technology and tend to operate in highly concentrated sectors. 
The next section will analyse the policy environment in which TNCs in Thailand are 
carrying out their operations. This may help to understand the evidence drawn from the 
above studies better.      
5.2.2 FDI Policies in Thailand 
 
Economic phenomena can equally be explained by economic theories and policy 
environment. In this section, this study provides the overview of FDI-related investment 
policies in Thailand. In the early 1960s, the Thai government started to launch a friendly 
FDI regime for foreign investors. Most of the FDI incentives in Thailand take the form of 
fiscal incentives. According to Nikomborirak (2004), the current Thai FDI regime is 
shaped by three main laws. These are the Foreign Business Act (FBA) of 1999, the 
Investment Promotion Act (IPA) of 1977 and the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand 
Act (IEA) of 1979. She describes that the FBA draws the scope and identifies conditions 
under which a foreign entity may carry out business transactions. The IPA guarantees 
foreign investors‟ protection and offers fiscal incentives to favourable projects. The IEA 
specifies investment incentives specifically for factories located in industrial zones. In 
addition to this, the Thai FDI regime is also shaped by bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
investment treaties as well as Free Trade Areas (FTA). Since their inception until now, all 
three laws governing FDI regime in Thailand have increasingly become less restricted. The 
details of the changes made are summarised in Table 5.3. 
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TABLE 5.3: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FDI POLICY REGIME 
Period Policy Development 
State capitalism 
(1940s–1950s) 
• state monopolisation in imports and exports in many industries or sectors. 
Import substitution 
(1958–71) 
• 1st Economic Development Plan (1961–66) focused on the reduction in direct 
government involvement in the economy and greater promotion of private 
investment. 
• Import substitution policy introduced. 
• High levels of protection provided for capital-intensive industries such as 
automobiles. 
• High tariffs imposed on finished consumer products. 
• Industrial Promotion Act of 1960 establishes an organization which later 
became the Board of Investment, marking the beginning of tax incentives. 
• Tariff structure revised several times to give greater protection to domestic 
industries. 
• Balance of payments problems arise due to the import of parts and 
components, leading to discussion of the sustainability of the import 
substitution policy.  
Export promotion 
(1972–92) 
 
• 3rd Economic Development Plan (1972–76) emphasized a shift from import 
substitution to export promotion. 
• Investment law revised in 1972 to provide exemption from duties on raw 
materials and intermediate items for exporting industries. 
• Alien Business Law of 1972 enacted, prohibiting foreigners from entering 
several business areas. 
• 21 of 72 provinces designated as investment zones. 
• Investment Promotion Act enacted in 1977, introducing income tax holidays 
and 50% reduction in import duties on machinery. 
• Four investment zones established in 1978. 
• Tax incentives in raw materials and machinery reduced for Bangkok and 
Samut Prakarn, to promote deeper industrial decentralization. 
• A series of the Thai baht devaluations take place between 1983 and 1991. 
• Investment Promotion Act revised in 1987, introducing tax privileges and 
refunds, industrial zones and export-processing zones. 
• 6th Economic Development Plan (1987–91) aims to improve income 
distribution and reduce economic disparity. 
 
Promotion of 
industrial 
decentralization 
(1993–96) 
 
• 7th Economic Development Plan (1992–96) aims to reduce income disparity 
between urban and rural areas and promote sustainable development. 
• Investment Promotion Act revised in 1993 to promote industrial 
decentralisation, with generous incentives provided to investment projects 
located outside Zone 1. 
• Local content requirements eliminated for motorcycles in anticipation of the 
TRIMs Agreement of 1993. 
Post-crisis 
liberalization I (1997 – 
2004) 
 
• Liberalization extended as part of the IMF-led reform package. 
• Foreign Business Act of 1999 enacted, allowing full foreign participation in 
most manufacturing industries. 
• Condominium Act revised in 1998 to allow foreigners to wholly own 
buildings on two acres or less of land. 
• Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee established to monitor 
and accelerate debt restructuring. 
• ASEAN Investment Agreement adopted in 1998. 
• Bankruptcy Act revised in 1999 to establish a central bankruptcy court. 
• Local content requirements eliminated for vehicle assembly in 1999. 
• Foreigners allowed owning 100% of shares in promoted manufacturing 
projects in 2000. 
• Local content requirements in diary products eliminated in 2003. 
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Period Policy Development 
Post-crisis 
Liberalization II (2005 – 
2009) 
 
• FTA signed with Australia in 2007 
• FTA signed with New Zealand in 2007. 
• FTA signed among ASEAN, Australian and New Zealand in 2007 
• FTA signed with Japan 2007 
• FTA signed with Peru in 2007 
Source:  Extended from Nikomborirak (2004) 
Department of Trade Negotiation (2010) 
 
From Table 5.3, it can be seen that an institution responsible for attracting and facilitating 
foreign investors is Thailand‟s Board of Investment. This institution, initially created to 
promote private investment, now focuses largely on attracting FDI. BOI‟s fiscal incentives 
provide all investment benefits available to foreign investors. These benefits include, for 
example, a guarantee against the state‟s nationalisation and monopolistic competition from 
the state-owned enterprises, liberal terms of remittance of profits, corporate income tax 
holidays for the first eight years, zero tariffs on imports of intermediate inputs, no 
obligation to use local contents and no restrictions on exports. Non-tax incentives include 
investment privileges for foreign investors, land-ownership rights, and permission to bring 
in foreign personnel. Obviously, apart from having a pool of cheap unskilled labour, lax 
and friendly policies towards FDI are among Thai locational-specific advantages that have 
helped to attract FDI to the country.    
It is noticed from Table 5.3 that while FDI- related policies appear to be geared to increase 
locational specific advantages in Thailand, they seem not to be helpful in assisting 
domestic firms to accumulate and develop ownership-specific advantages. In other words, 
instrumental policies, used to increase the technological spillovers from TNCs to domestic 
companies, have gradually been lifted. For example, the requirements to use local content 
and domestic personnel, restrictions on capital movements have gradually been aborted as a 
result of neo-liberal forces. In this situation, the possibility of materialising positive 
spillovers from inward FDI in Thailand become even less, bearing in mind that domestic 
firms have had relatively fewer ownership-specific advantages, compared to TNCs. Thus, 
under the current policy environment, the weakness of domestic firms, vis-à-vis the TNCs, 
become even more apparent. Furthermore, the law allowing 100% foreign ownership is 
more likely to shift the decision by foreign firms to establish wholly owned subsidiaries 
rather than to conduct a joint venture with domestic firms. If this scenario takes place, it 
can be expected that domestic firms would have less access to the new technology attached 
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to foreign operations.  Moreover, this policy works against the empirical evidence showing 
that a joint venture is the mode of TNCs entry that correlates most with the existence of 
positive spillovers (Aitken and Harrison, 1999).  
Indeed, the statistics show that the number of 100% foreign-owned firms has been 
increasing. Table 5.4, as reported by the BOI (2010), shows the distribution of projects that 
were granted tax privileges from the government agency. On the basis of their ownership, it 
can be seen that the tax incentive scheme was initially enjoyed more by domestic investors 
and joint ventures than foreign-owned firms. Since 2000, as the law had been changed 
allowing for 100% foreign ownership in promoted industries, the composition of ownership 
of the projects, has been altered accordingly. While the share of wholly-owned domestic 
firms slightly decreased, that of joint ventured firms dropped significantly to nearly a half 
of what it was in the early 1970s. In 2008, the share of 100% foreign-owned firms being 
granted investment incentives even surpassed the wholly-owned domestic and joint 
ventured firms.  
TABLE 5.4: DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS BEING GRANTED INVESTMENT INCENTIVES ON 
THE BASIS OF OWNERSHIP 
Ownership 
Percentage Share to Total Projects 
1960-1974* 
 
2007
+ 
 
2008
+
 
100% Thai 34% 32% 32% 
100% Foreign  3% 33%  36% 
Joint Venture 
(For equity>10%) 
63% 35% 32% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Note:  * calculated from registered capital 
     + calculated from number of total projects  
Source:  Office of the Board of Investment, Research Division (BOI, 1974) 
 Office of the Board of Investment, Office of the Prime Minister (BOI, 2010) 
 
Taking a closer look at the breakdown of the ownership of registered capital between Thai 
and foreign-owned firms in Table 5.5 (p.141), it can be seen that domestic capital benefits 
from the investment incentive scheme at a diminishing pace. By way of contrast, foreign 
capital gradually enjoys the benefits more. During the first fifteen years of the investment 
promotion, Thai investors were the main beneficiary of the policy. More recently, however, 
the pattern has been reversed. More foreign capital has registered to receive the tax 
incentive grants.  
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TABLE 5.5:  STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC SHARE OF REGISTERED CAPITAL IN 
GRANTED PROJECTS 
Unit: 
(Billion  
Baht)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
year 
% 
year 
% 
year 
% 
year 
% 
year 
% 1960-
1974
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Thai 9.2 71.3  3.3 11.3  8.8 25.3  4.0 10.2 21.8 27.6 
Foreign 3.7 28.7 26.0 88.7 26.0 74.7 35.0 89.8 57.2 72.4 
Total 
registered 
capital 
12.9 100 29.3 100 34.8 100 39.0 100 79.0 100 
Source:  Office of the Board of Investment, Research Division (BOI, 1974) 
 Office of the Board of Investment, International Affairs Division (BOI, 2008) 
 
The reverse pattern can be partly explained by the recently Thai government attempt to 
provide incentives to promote technological-intensive industries as a result of the need to 
upgrade the country‟s comparative advantages. The targeted industries are, for example, 
alternative energy, high-tech businesses, environmentally-friendly materials production, 
mega-projects including utilities, tourism and real estate businesses, and high-technological, 
agricultural businesses. However, as domestic firms are not competitive in these sectors, 
most eligible projects for the grant are owned by foreigners. It can be argued that, because 
the country lacks capabilities, it has to create incentives to attract foreign firms, who are 
capable of conducting such investments.  
 
However, it is important to question that, with the given policy environment that shapes the 
Thai domestic market, how likely are the positive spillovers to take place.  Moreover, under 
the weak and fragmented national innovation system that is not linked to the country‟s 
economic development level (Intarakumnerd, Chairatana, and Tangchitpiboon, 2002) and 
with no explicit state intervention to assist domestic firms financially and technologically, 
the possibility that Thailand would have a set of competent domestic firms, performing as 
efficient receptors of foreign technology spillovers, is unlikely. Besides, the diminishing 
amount of domestic capital may point to a decreasing capability of domestic entrepreneurs 
to withstand the force of international competition. It may also point to the failure of the 
state in creating a defensive mechanism to global competition, embodied both in its 
domestic firms and institutions, from an early stage of the country‟s development.  
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It might be instructive to undertake a brief, comparative study on FDI-related policies and 
incentives between Thailand and South Korea. According to the information provided by 
the BOI (2009) and Invest KOREA (2009), it is observed that the conditions for FDI 
incentives, provided by the Thai government, compared to that of the South Korea, are 
significantly different in detail. For example, the South Korean regulations specify the 
minimum value of a foreign investment project that can be eligible for tax incentives is 
US$ 30 million in the manufacturing sector, and US$ 2 million in research and 
development. Besides, the process of transfer of technology will be periodically checked by 
the local authority. The Thai regulations, on the other hand, make no distinction between 
sector minimum requirements and require no process of inspection of technological transfer. 
Under The Thai regulations, there is only one single minimum requirement applicable to all 
promoted industries including from manufacturing, service, and agriculture. The Thai 
minimum requirement for eligible projects, excluding cost of land and working capital, is 
only one million Thai Baht, equivalent to about US$ 28,000. Moreover, the Thai 
Investment Promotion Law does not distinguish between domestic capital and foreign 
capital. This might initially appear to be favourable to Thai firms with lower capital but the 
problem is that foreign and Thai firms are treated equally regardless of their competitive 
ability and size. The simplistic Thai regulations might adversely affect the efficiency of 
materialising the positive spillovers from FDI. This simplicity may be explained by the 
neo-liberal ideology that prioritises the market mechanism rather than the planned co-
ordination among institutions in the market. 
 
From Table 5.3 (p.138), it can be seen that from 2000 onwards, Thailand increased its 
involvement in bi-lateral and multi-lateral investment agreements, and Free Trade 
Agreements, for example, with ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Such 
agreements usually involve some clauses on FDI.  This participation raised concerns 
among national academics and activists (Sussangkarn, 2003; Thanadsillapakul, 2004, 2010). 
Most importantly, Thanadsillapakul (2010) points out that, in many cases, the authority 
hastily finalised the agreements without careful study and did not encourage public 
discussion on sensitive issues. These concerns deserve independent studies of their own. 
This study will only point out that, on top of the BOI‟s packages, there are more 
advantages offered to foreign investment in the Thai territory such as an agreement to 
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compensate for losses in the event of revolution. This simply means that, supposing that 
there are two plants, one being national and the other being foreign-owned, in the case of 
insurgency where the two plants happen to be damaged, the government is obliged by law 
to compensate the foreign firm, whereas whether or not its own national firm will be 
compensated is uncertain. It is true that the agreement is mutually applied. However, taking 
into account that most of the countries with which Thailand has entered into agreements are 
those who produce more outward FDI and that their domestic politics are relatively mature 
and stable when compared to Thailand, the potential benefits and inherent liabilities may 
not be distributed equally.  
5.2.3 Patterns of FDI in Thailand and Total Factor Productivity 
 
The previous section shows that the country has a lax and friendly FDI regime that helped 
to attract a significant volume of inward FDI. Prior to conducting empirical tests assessing 
whether or not these inward FDI empirically explains the country‟s long term growth, this 
section will descriptively investigate if the sector where FDI has been mostly clustered is 
the same sector where the rate of growth of Total Factor Productivity is the highest.  
In so doing, Table 5.6 is a reproduction of Table 5.2 (p.134) with more detail in order to 
show the percentage share of the net inflow of FDI in Thailand by industry. The intensity 
of inward FDI in each industry, in principle, should reflect both the ownership-specific of 
domestic firms and locational-specific advantages of the country. However, as Thai firms 
and TNCs appear to be competitive in different sectors, the sector where foreign 
investments are mostly clustered may not necessarily reflect the sector in which Thailand is 
most competitive. Rather, the density of FDI in each sector may reflect the locational-
specific advantage, such as the availability of resources and favourable policies towards 
FDI. Ramsletter and Sjoholm (2006) suggest that data in Table 5.6 can be read as an 
indicator of TNCs‟ confidence in different activities in Thailand.  
Assessing Table 5.6 through locational advantage analysis, it can be seen that, in the 1970s, 
the textile industry was attractive to FDI. Textile industry is labour-intensive using heavily 
unskilled labour which is abundant in Thailand. Later on, the pattern of manufacturing FDI 
gradually changed. From 1980 onwards, electrical appliances, machinery and transport 
equipment as well as chemical industries were created by foreign investments and received 
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a majority share of inward FDI in the manufacturing sector. It should be noted that even 
though the products from these industries constitute the largest share of Thai export 
products, it can hardly be said that Thailand has ownership-specific advantages in these 
products as they are mainly produced by TNCs. Should TNCs leave Thailand tomorrow, 
her export products would probably be primary and relatively low-technology intensive 
products.      
Indeed, the ownership specific advantage embodied in Thai firms in each industry can be 
deduced by the output share produced by domestic firms in a given industry. Kohpaiboon 
(2003) analysed data from the Industrial Census in 1997. He found that an output share of 
foreign plants to total industry was relatively large in electrical appliances, machinery and 
transport equipments, chemical and scientific equipments.  These industries are capital- and 
technologically intensive and their products are manufactured with exclusively foreign-
owned technology. By way of contrast, the share of output by Thai plants was dominant in 
industries, such as, footwear, textile, leather products, furniture, and toys. These industries 
are relatively labour-intensive and use technology which is relatively widely available. 
TABLE 5.6: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF NET INFLOW OF FDI IN THAILAND BY SECTOR 
Sector/ Industry 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008 
Manufacturing 50.18 26.13 47.87 64.36 45.17 
   -Food and Sugar 5.14 2.35 2.48 3.31 2.42 
   -Textiles 15.57 -0.04 2.74 -0.12 0.61 
   -Metal and non Metallic 1.30 1.23 4.45 -2.97 5.19 
   -Electrical Appliances 2.07 11.57 19.49 18.03 4.05 
   -Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 
2.49 2.38 3.82 23.30 12.85 
   -Chemicals 8.85 5.51 6.67 13.98 4.21 
   -Petroleum Products 11.21 0.05 4.67 1.04 6.38 
   -Construction materials 0.49 0.03 0.02 2.06 0.18 
   -Others 3.03 3.02 6.52 5.74 9.29 
Financial Institutions 5.82 -4.62 7.10 4.73 20.21 
Trade and retails 26.28 19.38 19.96 2.41 10.10 
Construction 10.51 20.21 5.10 -0.06 -0.23 
Mining and quarrying 2.09 15.41 1.76 -9.77 7.22 
Agriculture 0.00 5.42 1.18 0.02 0.09 
Services 5.10 11.91 3.17 15.93 7.90 
Investment 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.52 -8.28 
Real Estates 0.00 6.16 13.01 2.46 13.54 
Others 0.00 0.00 0.86 16.39 4.29 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Bank of Thailand, (2008) 
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Recently, due to the further liberalisation of the domestic financial sector, the privatisation 
of the formerly state-owned enterprises and legal ease to foreign investment in the real 
estate sector, it is noticed that financial institutions, services and real estate started to 
receive significant amounts of inward FDI. In summary, inward FDI in Thailand was 
concentrated only in a few industries in the economy, and particularly in industries that are 
vibrant and profitable.    
FDI in Relation to the Growth Rate of Total Factor Productivity 
This section compares the concentration of FDI against the changing pattern of economic 
activities in Thailand. The overview of the share of GNP by industrial sector is provided in 
order to give the pattern of structural change in Thailand. Then this study will find out 
whether or not the FDI intensity happens to be in the same sectors where there is a high 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP). From Table 5.7, it can be seen that, from 1980, the 
manufacturing sector makes up the biggest part of the Thai Gross National Product (GNP) 
and it is also this sector where FDI prevails. The other three sectors which make up a 
significant part of the Thai GNP are agriculture, service and wholesale trade and retails. 
TABLE 5.7: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN 
Sector/ Industry 2008 2000 1990 1980 
Manufacturing 37.70 35.40 28.15 23.17 
Construction 2.96 2.55 6.07  4.60 
Mining and quarrying 3.64 2.15 1.62  0.75 
Agriculture 12.14 11.62 13.72 20.26 
Services 11.36 11.78 12.03 12.64 
Banking, and Real Estates 6.54 3.00 5.63 3.11 
Wholesale trade and retails 14.18 14.66 17.60 17.97 
Others  11.48 18.84 15.18 17.50 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board, (NESDB, 2008) 
In common with other nations on their development path, the agricultural share of Thai 
GNP gradually declined from 20% in 1980 to 12% in 2008. The manufacturing, services 
and trade sectors, on the other hand, have been enjoying increasing shares of GNP. It is 
reasonable to deduce that a significant amount of resources moved out from the agricultural 
sector to the manufacturing and service sectors. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that, except for 
the agricultural sector, there is a preliminary correlation between the size of the sector 
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share of GNP and the intensity of foreign investment. The inflow of FDI appears to be 
clustered in sectors that account for a significant part of total GNP. Thus, it is interesting to 
know if these industries exhibit a higher growth rate in TFP, where FDI is highly clustered 
compared to those of the industries where domestic investment prevails.   
In so doing, stylised facts and empirical evidence on TFP growth in Thailand will be drawn 
from the literature. There have been, among others, five major studies conducting growth 
accounting using Thai data. They are Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996, 1998), Sitthikul 
(2001), Chandrachai, Bangorn, and Kamjara (2004), and Bosworth (2005). The 
methodological approach of each study has been compared and discussed in detail in 
Bosworth (2005). As the objective of this section is to provide a rough overview on 
whether or not the TFP is highest in the sector where inward FDI is clustered, the details of 
growth accounting used in these studies will not be discussed here. Bosworth (2005) is a 
good source for this information. Detailed results of these studies are found in Appendix C.  
Basically, major productivity studies in Thailand classified the economy into three major 
sectors, namely agriculture, industry, and services. The classification of economic sectors 
is generally made in accordance with Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996, 1998).   At the 
aggregate level, the above studies found that the output growth in Thailand, from 1977-
2004, can be generally explained by an increase in the growth rate of capital stock and 
labour respectively. The growth rate of TFP accounts only marginally for the growth rate 
of Thai output over the past three decades.  When looking at the average TFP growth rate, 
classified by sectors, it is seen that the sector which has the highest average growth rate of 
TFP is agriculture. However, among others, Bosworth (2005) found that the average 
growth rate of TFP in industry became the highest among the other sectors only after the 
crisis. Besides, he also noted that Thailand‟s growth has been relatively capital intensive. 
This is because the growth rate of Thai capital stock is slightly greater than that of the 
output. Furthermore, compared to other industrial countries, the capital-output ratio in 
Thailand remains somewhat low (Bosworth, 2005) despite showing an increasing trend 
from the 1980-2000 (Pholpirul, 2005). Since the capital-output ratio has an inverse 
relationship with capital productivity, it can be inferred that investment in Thailand can still 
be made more efficient.    
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As discussed earlier, inward FDI has been clustered mainly in the industrial sector where 
the TFP growth has been found to be modest, and in many cases, negative. This suggests 
that output growth in this sector can only be explained by increases in factor inputs such as 
labour and capital. For example, Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996, 1998), using data from 
1977-1990 and 1980-1995, found that the average TFP growth rate in industrial sector 
during these two periods were -0.6% and -0.7% respectively. Similarly, Sitthikul (2001) 
found that the average TFP growth rates in the manufacturing sector during 1980-1996 
stood at -0.5%. Chandrachai, Bangorn, and Kamjara (2004), gathering data from 1977-
1999, found no TFP growth in the industrial sector. Nonetheless, in contrast to the above 
studies, Bosworth (2005), using a more extended set of data, found that the average growth 
rate of TFP in industrial sector from 1977-2004 was 0.4%. Bosworth (2005) takes into 
account the structural change in the economy induced by the financial crisis in 1997. He 
breaks down the whole sample into two sub-periods, which are 1977-1996 and 1999-2004. 
He finds that the average growth rate of TFP in manufacturing from 1977 to 1996 was 
relatively small, exhibiting only 0.4%. However, after the crisis, during 1999-2004, the 
average growth rate of TFP had increased to 2%.  
The variation in the findings of these studies resides mainly in two factors. Firstly, there is 
a variation in the measurement of labour inputs. While some studies made adjustments for 
differences in labour quality, some did not. Secondly, different empirical findings can also 
be explained by the difference in subjective choice of weights attached to the growth rates 
in capital and labour. This, in turn, affects the calculated magnitude of TFP growth rate. 
Despite the variation in these findings, it can be reasoned that, over the past thirty years, 
the average TFP growth rate in industrial sector was relatively modest. It is counter-
intuitive, at least, through conventional perspectives, to observe that Thai industry, which 
was the mostly FDI-intensive sector, produced a poor average TFP growth rate even 
though the growth of the economy was clearly fuelled by this sector through foreign 
investment. This suggests that, perhaps, FDI had a limited contribution to the improvement 
of productivity. Moreover, the positive spillovers from FDI may not have optimally 
materialised. If this is the case, it can then initially be explained by the shortcomings of the 
industrial policies which, in turn, were the products of the interaction between domestic 
and international political economies.    
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5.2.4 Thailand in the Global Economy 
 
This section examines several key indicators, reflecting the international competitiveness of 
Thailand over the past three decades in relation to the rest of the world. These indicators 
are the Net Outward Investment position as suggested in Dunning (1981), and the ratio of 
GNI to GDP. Moreover, it will analyse the Terms of Trade, and the country‟s balance of 
payments as discussed in the dependency theory. 
 
Net Outward Investment and income per capita 
Net Outward Investment (NOI), measured by the difference between outward FDI stock 
and inward FDI stock, represents the international direct investment position of a country. 
It also reflects the extent to which domestic enterprises possess ownership-specific 
advantages that foreign enterprises do not have. A positive NOI indicates that domestic 
enterprises are globally competitive and possess a stock of investment abroad. A negative 
NOI refers to the reverse position.  
In the case of Thailand, from 1980 to 1997, the country‟s NOI appeared to be negative, 
behaving generally in line with the Investment Development Path that was depicted by 
Dunning (1981), Figure 5.2 (p.134).  The Thai NOI slightly decreased from 1980 to 1987 
as a result of opening up of the economy to FDI. After the materialisation of the Plaza 
Accord, the decreasing rate of NOI accelerated and behaved in the manner depicted by 
Scenario 1, described in section 4.2.1. Between 1987 and 1996, Thailand was enjoying a 
boom period largely induced by the growth of the export-led manufacturing sector, which 
in turn was driven by an inward FDI. As a result, the negative NOI increased steadily 
during that time. The rate of change of the negative NOI steeply increased from 1997 
onwards, mainly due to the impact of the financial crisis in that year. The pattern of Thai 
NOI appears to be the same as that of resource rich countries depicted in Dunning (1981, 
p.121). It is also noticed that, with every rebound, the Thai NOI dropped in the following 
period. This makes the rebound in 2008 worth noting.  
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FIGURE 5.2: NET OUTWARD INVESTMENT AND GNI PER CAPITA 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, (2009) 
             Unit (y, x): US$ Million, year 
 
From Figure 5.2, one might deduce that Thai domestic firms, as a whole, possess fewer 
ownership-specific advantages vis-à-vis TNCs. The steep drop of NOI from 1997 pointed 
to an important structural problem in Thailand, that is, the lack of vitality of domestic firms. 
In an unfettered market, every crisis is likely to drive out the weakest and help consolidate 
the survivors. It follows that the Asian financial crisis in 1997 helped to drive out Thai 
firms and enhance the position of foreign firms even more in the Thai domestic market. 
Maybe this happened because domestic firms were lacking competitive advantage, which is 
the key engine of a defensive mechanism when facing foreign competition. Moreover, as 
Thai NOI appears to decrease extensively, this suggests that the Thai economic growth 
path may follow the pattern of NOI in Scenario 2, depicting a capital dependent state, 
described in section 4.2.2.  
There are several sectors that can explain the reason behind the failure of domestic firms to 
fight back the global competition, even in their own territory. First, it is due to the lack of 
strategic and specific industrial policies by the government from an early stage of 
development. The matter was exacerbated when policy instruments that were meant to help 
absorption of spillovers from FDI were gradually lifted after the 1997 crisis and then 
replaced with more liberal policies that could become even anti-development. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, most of the FDI-related policies in Thailand tend to 
focus more on creating locational-specific advantages rather than creating a market 
environment that helps to develop the ownership-specific advantages of domestic firms. As 
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a result, more incentives were given to TNCs to internalise their activities domestically and 
reap the largest part of the surplus, that is, the entrepreneurial returns. 
Secondly, it is because Thai governments in the past mostly played the role of a weak state 
when it came to economic affairs. More specifically, past governments believed in the 
market so much that they neglected that TNCs, as well as FDI, are the results of market 
imperfections. It could be argued that the effective way to deal with them is to use well 
designed regulations that could serve the national interest. It is also understood that the 
failure of the state was largely due to unfavourable domestic politics and the neo-liberal 
hegemony. 
Thirdly, the inability to develop ownership-specific advantages can be partly explained by 
the failure of domestic entrepreneurs themselves. Thai economic history shows that most of 
her domestic entrepreneurs are merchant capitalists rather than industrial capitalists. Thai 
conglomerates were largely grown from protected industries. However, they are not 
competitive in technology-intensive production. For example, Kohpaiboon (2006, 2009), 
using data from the Thai industrial census in 1996, reported that there were only five 
industries from the sample where locally owned-plants had higher labour productivity 
compared to that of foreign-owned firms. These were alcoholic beverages, veneer sheets 
production, tobacco, toys and paper pulp. Clearly, productions in these industries rely on 
relatively established and widely available technology. Whenever the country economically 
advances further, the competitiveness of domestic firms will be challenged. It can be 
argued that the Thai state did not give any incentive or stimulus to its domestic firms to 
become industrialised, contrary to the practices of the Japanese and South Korean states.   
In summary, Figure 5.2 shows that the NOI in Thailand is significantly deteriorating. This 
also presents that Thailand, throughout her modern economic history, has always been a net 
recipient of FDI, with an increasing magnitude. In the next paragraphs, this study will 
examine other economic aspects that are related to an inflow of FDI.    
Gross National Income and Gross Domestic Products 
Thai GDP expresses the total value of output produced within Thailand over a given period 
of time, regardless of the country of origin of the labour or capital that produces those 
outputs. Thai GNI measures the income earned by Thais and Thai capital anywhere in the 
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world.  Generally speaking, GNI is derived from GDP less net taxes on production and 
imports, less compensation for employees and property income payable to the rest of the 
world, plus the corresponding items received from the rest of the world. More specifically, 
the difference between GNI and GDP is the amount of income received from the rest of the 
world, less income payable to the rest of the world, that is, the net transfer payment. This 
amount covers, for example, earnings arising from overseas investments (FDI), and other 
types of financial assets (PI), entrepreneurial returns on investment, and worker remittances.   
No less than the NOI, the ratio of GNI to GDP can also reflect some aspect of an economy 
in relation to international investment as well as its maturity. In particular, the GDP of a 
country that either receives or produces FDI extensively can be misleading in representing 
the wealth of the nation. Indeed, most advanced nations, particularly, U.S., U.K., and Japan, 
all have positive NOI. Thus, their GNI is larger than their GDP due to the return on 
investment outside their own country. Harvey (2007) noted that a secret source of 
American wealth, after WWII, was their income, generated from a large stock of American 
investment abroad. By the same token, any country whose NOI is negative tends to have 
GNI less than GDP. Thailand is no exception, Figure 5.3.  
FIGURE 5.3: RATIO OF GNI TO GDP FROM1970-2008 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2009) 
 
In 1970, Thai GNI was slightly greater than GDP. The higher GNI might come from the 
remittance of Thai workers aboard. As soon as Thailand became a strategic destination for 
FDI, her ratio of GNI to GDP gradually dropped, with fluctuations. In 1980, the ratio stood 
at 0.99. Then, it decreased to 0.98 in 1990. For comparative reason, it should be noted that 
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in the case of Mexico, Gallagher and Zarsky (2007) claimed that, to be an enclave economy, 
her ratio of GNI to GDP has never gone lower than 0.98. In 1998, after the crisis, the ratio 
dropped to 0.965 before it bounced back to 0.98 in 2000. Recently, the GNI/GDP ratio 
made a new record, dropping to 0.96. While it may not seem significant representing the 
difference of GNI to GDP in index fashion, it is interesting to note that in US Dollar terms, 
the ratio of 0.96 in 2008 means that Thais had to spend US$ 10.4 billion less than what was 
produced domestically. Because of this, Bosworth (2005, p.4) points out that, to a large 
extent, economic growth in Thailand has been financed by the country‟s own resources. 
Then, further notes that 
 ‘Income payments on FDI and foreign debt have been largely offset  
by wages and remittances of overseas workers.’ 
Yet, it is difficult to conclude that the remittance of Thai workers could „offset‟ income 
payments of FDI and foreign debt. This is because the majority of Thai workers abroad 
work in unskilled sectors and earn subsistence wages in foreign lands. However, it can be 
expected that the income payments on FDI are entrepreneurial returns and, by definition, 
they are larger than subsistence wages. So, given the status quo of the country, it is rarely 
possible that the outflow of income could be largely addressed by the remittances of 
overseas workers. One way to increase the GNI/GDP ratio for Thailand is to produce 
outward direct investment. However, if domestic firms have limited ownership-specific 
advantages, it is difficult to envisage a case where international investment generates a 
positive profit.  
As mentioned earlier, the ratio of GNI to GDP in advanced capitalist countries is usually 
greater than one. As much as it is expected that the NOI in developing countries would 
some day become positive, as it represents a higher stage of development, the ratio of GNI 
to GDP is also expected to be greater than one when the economy becomes more mature. 
However, this is not the case in Thailand. Even though the country has integrated with the 
global economy for a considerable time, the ratio of GNI to GDP has only been 
deteriorating. Both the country‟s NOI and the ratio of GNI to GDP show no sign of the 
economy becoming more mature.  
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Thailand’s Balance of Payments 
Balance of payments is a statistical statement that summarises the economic transactions of 
an economy with the rest of the world at a specific time period (BPM5, 1993).
5
 The 
information found in the balance of payments represents the interaction of an economy to 
external forces, such as international trade and investment. This interaction is a sum of 
collective actions of economic agents in the economy. Apart from looking at the efficiency 
and the effect of FDI on GNI, changes in the country‟s balance of payments can also reflect 
the impact of FDI in the host country. 
In Chapter 3, the literature review showed that FDI is likely to lead to an outward transfer 
of resources. These transfers, whilst they cannot be directly observed, as that would require 
access to the data at firm-level, can be indirectly identified by examining the current 
account in the balance of payments. The current account constitutes three major entries, 
namely, balance on trade of goods, balance on trade of services and balance on income. 
The first two entries record exports and imports of goods and services. The last entry 
records compensation of employees and investment income. Generally, the net balance of 
income should be more or less the same as the difference between GNI and GDP.      
Figure 5.4 shows the net balances on goods, services and income entries. It is noticed that, 
even during the economic boom period from 1986 to 1996, except for a net surplus in 
balance on services from 1986 to 1990, all three entries exhibited a deficit balance. This 
resulted in net current account deficits during this period despite the belief that the 
economic boom was thanks to export-led growth and the promotion of a FDI regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Balance of Payments Manual, 5
th
 Edition, IMF, 1993 
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FIGURE 5.4: NET BALANCE ON GOODS, SERVICES, AND INCOME FROM 1975 - 2008 
 
Source:  Balance of Payments, IMF, (2009) 
 Unit (y, x): US$ Million, year 
 
 
At that time, Thailand did not suffer from the deficits in current account because she had 
hosted a large volume of inflow of capital both FDI and PI which resulted in a capital 
account surplus, Figure 5.5. However, a surplus in capital account does not only mean an 
increase in liabilities to the rest of the world, it may increase economic vulnerability to 
external shock such as capital flight and divestment. The Asian financial crisis is a clear 
example. In the case of Thailand, it is reasonable to say that the reverse of short-term 
capital, PI, did trigger the financial crisis, caused by the pre-mature liberalisation of 
financial account, during the boom.  
 
It could be argued that it was the liberalisation and deregulation of FDI at the early stage of 
development which caused a distortion in the structure of the economy and impeded 
Thailand for further development. One key structural distortion was an absence of strong 
domestic entrepreneurs. Taking into account these two factors, it is not surprising to see 
that, under the liberal and open economy, each crisis would only enhance the position of 
foreign firms who appear to be stronger than their domestic counterparts.    
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FIGURE 5.5: NET CURRENT ACCOUNT AND NET FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
 
Source: Balance of Payment, IMF, (2009) 
             Unit (y, x): US$ Million, year 
 
After the crisis, the pattern of the current account dramatically changed. The devaluation of 
the Thai Baht and a large inflow of FDI which sought to use Thailand as its production 
base caused a surge in exports of goods from Thailand. Consequently, the export share of 
GDP in Thailand increased significantly to more than 70% in 2006. This should be 
economically sound as long as the majority of these export products are produced by 
domestic capital and controlled by domestic entrepreneurs. However, this is not the case 
for Thailand. Thanadsillapakul (2010) shows that, in 2006, 99.5% of private enterprises in 
Thailand were owned by domestic citizens. However, these 99.5% constitute mainly small 
and medium-sized enterprises that have a share in national exports of only 29.6%. The 
export from TNCs‟ operations in Thailand takes up 70.4% of the total exports. It can be 
expected that these export-oriented, foreign-owned firms would eventually repatriate their 
profits back to their home countries, or to where their accounts are registered. This can be 
partly depicted in the income entry.     
Figure 5.6 presents the cumulative net balance of three major entries in the current account. 
It is seen that the biggest source of cumulative deficits is found in the balance of income. 
From 1975 to 2008, the cumulative deficits in income balance totalled US$ 73 billion. Of 
this, the cumulative outflow of payable income after the crisis until 2008 is US$ 57 billion, 
nearly 80% of the total cumulative deficits over the past three decades. So, the massive rise 
in Thai exports by TNCs may induce the outflow of capital in income balance.    
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FIGURE 5.6: CUMULATIVE NET BALANCE ON GOODS, SERVICES, AND INCOME 
 
Source:  Analytical Balance of Payments, Thailand, IMF, (2009) 
 Unit(y): US$ Million 
 
Furthermore, Thailand does not only export heavily, she also imports goods and services 
significantly, Figure 5.7. As pointed out by Phongpaichit and Baker (2003), the export 
products, produced by TNCs in Thailand, were largely made with imported intermediate 
and capital goods. The heavy reliance on imported capital goods not only reflects a high 
volume of imports of goods but also in the balance of services, the second largest source of 
deficits. The service entry records, for example, the transactions derived from the use of 
tangible assets, communication, transportations, media, loyalties and licence fees. As 
transportation, communications and media remain protected sectors, it can be deduced that 
outward payments in the service balance may stem from the use of foreign tangible assets, 
loyalties and licence fees.   
FIGURE 5.7: INWARD FDI, EXPORT AND IMPORT OF GOODS, IMPORT OF SERVICES AND 
INCOME PAYABLE  
 
Source:  Balance of Payments, IMF, (2009) 
 Unit (y, x): US$ Million, year 
Chapter 5: Thai Economic and Political Background 
152 
 
All in all, it must be noted that the situation of the current account post-crisis is relatively 
better than the pre-crisis period. However, the economy also becomes more vulnerable to 
changes in external factors. Considering the great volume of leakages generated in the three 
main accounts, only a slight drop in exports could cause, Thailand‟s current account to 
return to deficit. As the main exporters are TNCs, the government has no other choice, at 
least in the short run, but to encourage export-oriented foreign investment even more, in 
order to keep the economy going. If the current account moves into deficit, it would be 
addressed by a surplus in the financial account which in turn will increase the foreign 
liabilities to the countries and may cause further leakages of resources in the future. 
Thailand might then be said to be a capital-dependent state.      
Figure 5.8 plots inflow of FDI against the outflow of income payable to the rest of the 
world. The figure depicts that these two series appear to be negatively correlated. Most 
importantly, it is seen that the magnitude of the outflow of income appears to be greater 
than that of inward FDI. In addition to this, the deficits in income balance show no sign of 
decreasing over the past three decades. It also appears that the more the country liberalised, 
the larger the leakages became.  
FIGURE 5.8: INWARD FDI AND INCOME PAYABLE TO THE REST OF THE WORLD 
 
Source:  Balance of Payments, IMF, (2009) 
 Unit (y, x): US$ Million, year 
 
In summary, based on BOP observations, it can be argued that liberalisation of the Thai 
economy in accordance with the neo-liberal development model tends to make the Thai 
economy more dependent on the global economy, through TNCs‟ investment and the need 
to export. The patterns found in the Thai BOP over the past three decades are similar to the 
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hypothetical case, described roughly by Hellenier (1989) and Milberg (1999), where FDI 
might be detrimental to the balance of payment, as well as threatening the prospect of 
sustainable development.  
Thailand’s Terms of Trade  
So far, it has been shown that Thailand has been increasingly involved in international 
trade through inward FDI. International trade has become an important element 
contributing to the growth of the national wealth. In this section, this study conducts a 
preliminary examination by looking at the country‟s terms of trade over the past half 
century. The terms of trade adjustment, or the terms of trade effects, reported in Figure 5.9, 
equal the capacity to import, less the export of goods and services at constant price, in US 
Dollar terms. More specifically, WDI (2008) reports that the terms of trade effects are the 
difference between the value of exports, deflated by the import prices index, and the value 
of exports, at constant prices. Mora (2006) stated that positive terms of trade are part of a 
catching-up process. However, it is seen that, since the early 1980s, terms of trade effects 
in Thailand have only become increasingly negative, over the past fifty years. They appear 
to be an inverse function of the degree of liberalisation of trade and investment. For 
example, when the country was still relying on exports of primary products, and when 
inward FDI remained limited, during the 1960s and 1970s, Thailand enjoyed the gains from 
trade illustrating the positive terms of trade during these periods.  
FIGURE 5.9: TERMS OF TRADE IN CONSTANT PRICE US$ 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators, (2009) 
 Unit (y, x): US$ Million, year 
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However, from the 1980s onwards, when the country implemented export and FDI-led 
growth policies, the terms of trade started to drop slightly before falling significantly 
shortly after the Asian crisis. There are several possible reasons to explain this. First, 
during the first half of the 1980s, the government attempted to devalue the Baht in order to 
make the country‟s exports artificially competitive. Second, noting that Thailand has 
always relied on imported intermediate and capital goods for export products, the 
devaluation had a detrimental impact on the terms of trade. Therefore, in 1997, when 
Thailand decided to float her currency, the Thai Baht was devalued by more than twice of 
its initial value. This eventually resulted in a plummeting of the terms of trade, as depicted 
in Figure 5.9. Thirdly, as the terms of trade effect are partly explained by the volume of 
trade, the sharp deterioration of the terms of trade, after the crisis, can be attributed to a 
significant increase in international trade volume since 1998, Figure 5.7. Fourthly, it is 
noted that most of Thai exports were made by TNCs, and therefore may be subject to intra-
firm trade. This type of trade could lead to a deterioration in the terms of trade if the 
transfer pricing practices are being operated. Lastly, the world began to experience the 
surge in oil prices since 2001, peaking in 2008. The rise in oil price during this period also 
contributed to the deterioration of the terms of trade of the country. 
 
5.3 Brief History of Modern Thai Political and Economic Growth 
In this section, the study presents, both economically and politically, the Thai growth 
records in relation to the liberalisation of FDI. Since the late nineteenth century, Thailand, 
even though it had never been colonised, had adopted colonial policies (Evers, 1987, p.766). 
Therefore, prior to the post-war period, her economy exhibited the feature of a dual 
economy in which the traditional or rural sector was separated from the modern or export-
orientated sector. In the late 1980s, Evers (1987) asserted that this feature represented a 
„peripheral capitalist economy‟ according to dependency theory and the World-system 
concept. This suggests that the country is not likely to be resistant to openness, or the 
penetration, of Western influence.   
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Throughout her history, despite having a liberal economy, the Thai government had hardly 
adopted the liberal ideology in politics. Since the Siamese revolution in 1932 which 
marked the change in the political regime from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional 
monarchy, most of the Thai governments were led by military dictatorships and ex-military 
officers. The power structure in Thailand, fractional and complicated, contributes largely to 
the domestic political instability. This, in turn, inevitably affects the path of the country‟s 
economic development. 
The economic development in Thailand may be regarded as one of the most interesting 
cases in East Asian development studies, particularly under the hegemony of neo-
liberalism and in relation to the management of inward FDI. Whereas the developmental 
path of Japan and newly industrialised economies (NIEs), did not, to a significant extent, 
share the common practices, described in the Washington Consensus (Amsden, 2003, 2007; 
Chang, 2003), the developmental path of Thailand can be said to be the product of the 
Washington Consensus. Thailand has implemented all the major orthodox development 
policies guided by the World Bank and the IMF since the beginning of the 1960s. In the 
early 1970s, Thailand embarked on export promotion policies in parallel to a FDI-led 
growth strategy. In contrast with other East Asian countries, however, Thailand has never 
identified specific industries or sectors to be formally promoted (Nokomborirat, 2004). 
Neither were there any national firms selected to receive special privileges, or protection 
against international competitors. In other words, Thailand has hardly used subsidies for 
her own domestic firms or been unfriendly to international investors.  
Thailand‟s industrialisation process has taken place as a result of changes in international 
political economy, amid domestic political upheavals. The genesis of modern capitalist 
development in Thailand can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century. However the 
point of departure of the historical review in this study starts from the 1970s. This is 
because it was only from then that Thailand adopted seriously the export promotion and 
FDI-led growth strategy. More specifically, FDI only started to play the significant role in 
Thai economic growth from the 1980s onwards. During this period, policies driven by the 
neo-liberal ideology, for example, trade liberalisation and fiscal discipline, were being 
implemented. Furthermore, regarding the availability of data, complete series of key 
variables on the quarterly basis, such as inward FDI, can only be traced back to 1977. Next, 
during this period, from the 1970s to present, East Asian nations have been exhibiting 
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various degrees of economic development. This has been largely due to the difference in 
actions taken and policies implemented by their governments, possibly with regard to FDI 
policies. This difference can reflect the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of neo-liberal 
development reforms that Thailand has adopted as the model of her development.  
Before proceeding further, it is instructive to give a brief political and economic 
background prior to the 1970s. Phongpaichit and Baker (2003) documented that WWII had 
brought significant changes to Thai economic development. The end of the WWII had 
strengthened domestic capital and altered the nature of the relationship between domestic 
entrepreneurs and the state. Not long after the end of WWII, the world was moving towards 
the cold-war period and the South East Asian region was flooded with anti-communist 
sentiment, as well as experiencing the heat of the Vietnam War. The then military junta, led 
by Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsonggram took the first attempt to promote domestic 
investment (Siamwalla, 1975). However, it was not totally successful (Pupphavesa and 
Pattamasiriwat, 1987).  
This might be explained that the investment promotion under this nationalist government 
focusing more on protecting farmers and national peasants against an increasing 
commercial domination by Chinese immigrants, who constituted the majority of the Thai 
capitalist class. In brief, as the then government implicitly discriminated against a group of 
able domestic entrepreneurs, the synergy between the state and domestic entrepreneurs 
could not materialise. That was contrary to what happened in Japan and South Korea. 
Additionally, Thailand had a limited infrastructure in the 1950s to encourage FDI. This 
problem, however, was overcome in the following decades. Economically, Europe and 
Japan suffered severely from the war. Their international economic expansion had been 
constrained and then halted. Most of their businesses in Thailand were abandoned. This 
ownership vacuum provided domestic entrepreneurs in Thailand the opportunities to take 
over high value-added sectors such as banking, insurance and petroleum. This, in turn, 
helped to accelerate the rate of capital accumulation for domestic entrepreneurs. 
It can be said that the contemporary Thai economic development path is largely shaped by 
policies that were implemented, and institutional infrastructure that were established, by the 
military government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. He took power from Plaek by 
conducting a coup d’état in 1957. It is important to note that his coup d’état, took place 
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after he visited the U.S. and had been cordially acknowledged by the United States, the 
country of democracy (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). Unlike his predecessor, Sarit was 
more liberal and less nationalist. During his visit to the States, he was informed by U.S. 
officers that economic development was crucially important to Thailand and that it could 
be facilitated by foreign direct investment (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996, p.156).  
Due to the fear of communist expansion in the Indo-China region and the instability of 
domestic politics, Sarit and the U.S formed an alliance. Under his regime, Thailand 
formally started receiving extensive aids and military assistance from the U.S. Indeed, Sarit 
was very keen in committing to fight against communism. Some of the key military 
officers even believed that this was the way to get more money from the U.S. 
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003, p.157). At the beginning of Sarit‟s term in office, the state 
promoted the process of capital accumulation of domestic entrepreneurs who also benefited 
not only from financial aids provided by the U.S but also from an increase in domestic and 
regional demand as a result of the Korean War. Also, in this period, the World Bank started 
to formally assist the process of development in Thailand. Even though the country 
voluntarily accepted the World Bank‟s assistance, it is documented that Sarit was informed 
by President Kennedy that the acceptance of this assistance was one of the criteria that the 
U.S. took into account when considering giving financial aid to the country (Phongpaichit 
and Baker, 2003).   
During the 1960s, there were two institutional establishments that deserve to be highlighted. 
Firstly, it is the establishment of the office of National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB). This institution is responsible for designing the national economic and 
social development plans, issued every five years. This five-year plan acts as a framework 
for economic development. It must be noted that the national technocrats who run these 
institutions had graduated from U.S. universities. The patron of NESDB at the time was the 
World Bank which financed all the major infrastructure programmes. The first three 
economic and social development plans were written by American consultants. As 
Phongpaichit and Baker (2003) pointed out, the above suggested the U.S.‟s strategic 
influence over Thailand‟s development path. 
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Secondly, Sarit was committed to create a good business environment for foreign investors. 
As a result, he established Thailand‟s Board of Investment (BOI). This institution was 
initially designed to promote both domestic and foreign investment by granting fiscal 
incentives to favourable investment projects. However, later on, BOI‟s main objective 
appears to have shifted to attract and to facilitate direct foreign investments in Thailand. 
Parallel to this, in order to assure a favourable environment for investment, the then 
government went further by abolishing labour unions and outlawing all kinds of strike 
(Dilokvidhayarat, 2007).  
Since Sarit came into power until the early 1970s, Thailand adopted an import substitution 
regime similar to other developing countries at that time. The Thai economy was growing 
largely by the expansion of domestic demand, government spending and private 
investments in import substitution. Even though the industrial section had rapidly expanded, 
the economic growth in the 1960s had been driven largely by the agricultural sector 
(Jitsuchon, 2002). This was because, thanks to the government expenditure in infrastructure 
such as irrigation system and rail roads, farmers had more access to land further away from 
the river and better facilities to transport their products to the markets. These agricultural 
products were largely meant for export. Jitsuchon (2002) notes that the foreign and 
government revenue generated from the growth of agricultural outputs in this period was 
used to finance the investment for import substitution. It must be noted that the nexus of 
capital accumulation was clustered in monopolistic and oligopolistic industries that 
belonged to a small group of Chinese and aristocratic businessmen and high-ranked 
military officers. These groups of people have benefited from industrialisation and much of 
their wealth was generated from the surplus in the agricultural sector (Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 1996). Indeed, the majority of the population in the agricultural sector remained 
outsiders in the process of Thai economic development.     
 
5.3.1 Political and Economic Development from the 1970s to Present   
 
The early stage of Thai development was strengthened by the establishment of 
macroeconomic institutional infrastructure and the implementation of strict fiscal discipline. 
As a result of a successful macroeconomic management in the 1960s and the exploitation 
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of national resources, Thailand started to produce high profits from agricultural goods and 
experienced a rise in investment in import-substitution manufacturing sectors (Jitsuchon, 
2002: Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003). Other East Asian economies, such as Taiwan and 
South Korea also began their export-led growth regime. These factors contributed to the 
shift in development regime to export promotion. As suggested by the World Bank and the 
Bank of Thailand (BOT) the export-led growth strategy was, for the first time, specified in 
the third economic and social development plan. In order to encourage investment for 
exports, the government passed an Investment Promotion Act (IPA) in 1977, authorising 
the BOI to provide incentives to foreign investors (Nikomborirak, 2004 and 
Tamboonlertchai, 2009).  
The 1970s 
The 1970s were marked by both political and economic instability in Thailand. In terms of 
politics, domestically, there were two democratic movements in 1973 and 1976. The 
confrontations between the progressive left-wing and the right-wing military, ended with 
victory for the latter. Internationally, during the first half of the 1970s, there was the 
ongoing Vietnam War. In terms of economics, domestically, Thailand faced a volatile 
growth as depicted in Figure 5.10. This is partly due to the transition from an import 
substitution to the export promotion regime. Internationally, Thailand was also affected by 
the energy and oil crises which characterised this decade.  
FIGURE 5.10: PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE OF GDP FROM 1970-2008    
 
Source: World Development Report (2009) 
              Unit (y, x): percentage, year 
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On domestic politics during the 1970s, Jitsuchon (2002) noted that any government formed 
after 1976, would not be able to ignore the needs of people. His claim is based on a 
significant increase in government expenditure since then. This phenomenon was not 
exactly the result of domestic political movements but was more due to investment banks 
in New York starting to offer loans to governments in developing countries more readily in 
order to recycle petrodollars, as private banks perceived that sovereign debts were less 
risky. Nevertheless, the loans were not necessarily offered cheaply. Not only Thai 
governments but also those of other developing countries at the time had excessively 
increased their public debts. The phenomena resulted in the sovereign debt crisis of the 
1980s. Thailand, too, suffered the impact of the crisis.  
During the 1970s, Thai economic growth was modest and volatile, Figure 5.10 (p.164). 
Firstly, it was partly because the export-led growth strategy was still in its transition. Many 
policies at that time were not fully supportive of the new growth strategy, for example, 
imports of capital goods still faced high tariff. Secondly, the global economy was 
experiencing oil and energy crises in 1973 and 1979, respectively. The US attempted to 
appreciate the value of the US dollar in order to reduce the cost of oil imports. 
Consequently, as the Thai Baht was pegged to the US dollar at the time, this reduced the 
income from exports. These events are responsible for the first drop in GDP growth rate in 
the first half of the decade. Thirdly, government spending has been affected by a high level 
of corruption among politicians. Hence, the government continued to spend extensively on 
infrastructure and the procurement of arms and munitions, even though the Vietnam War 
had ended. Besides, not only had the U.S. evacuated from the region after the fall of Saigon 
in 1975, the U.S. also had reduced the financial aids that were once given to Thailand. 
Consequently, Thai governments at that time had to borrow heavily to finance their 
spending. Fourthly, from 1974 to 1976, inflow of inward FDI had been decreased from 
US$192 to US$80 millions, mostly from American investments. Accordingly, this had 
reduced the growth rate of the economy by half. The fall in the growth rate, however, was 
short-lived as the country started to receive a new wave of FDI from Japan and Western 
European countries, who had already recovered from WWII. As depicted in Figure 5.10, 
the second surge of GDP growth during the 1970s can be explained by the inflow of FDI 
from TNCs based in Japan and Western Europe.  
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The 1980s 
In the 1980s, domestic politics were relatively stable. In this decade, Thailand had changed 
her political leader only once, in 1988. Throughout the 1980s, the country was not ruled by 
a junta government. However, it was still led by ex-military officers. World politics in this 
decade experienced the struggle of the central planning economies and eventually their fall. 
In parallel, there was an establishment of neo-liberal ideologies both in Britain and the U.S. 
The era of left and right-wing confrontation was gone. Any form of social solidarity was 
replaced by individualism, family values, private property, and personal responsibilities. 
The wind of free trade and investment was formed and set ready to roam the world.   
At the start of the decade, Thailand was still suffering from the second oil crisis and the 
debt crisis, accrued from the previous decade. These problems were detrimental to the 
balance of payments so much so that Thailand had to borrow from the IMF in 1982, Figure 
5.5 (p.155). This event is significant because the country once again had to accept external 
supervision on a policy-making process. As neo-liberalism was already set off, the advice 
from the IMF at the time was nothing but the neo-liberal policy reforms which were mostly 
confined to market liberalisation in terms of trade and investment. These policies have 
already been discussed in Chapter 3. To be fair, it can be argued that the successful 
implementation of export-promotion policies and FDI-led growth strategy in the 1980s was 
the first time that neo-liberalism started to shape the Thai economy. It did indeed give a 
good start. 
In the mid-1980s, Thailand was entering into her golden age. The global phenomenon that 
marked the beginning of the economic boom in this decade was the creation of the Plaza 
Accord in 1985. This agreement was the result of the U.S. having experienced a recession 
that was characterised by rising trade deficits particularly with Japan. It was signed by five 
powerful nations, namely, the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, and Britain. The Plaza 
Accord is an agreement to depreciate the US Dollar in relation to the Japanese Yen and the 
German Deutsche Mark. This agreement had significant impacts on the Thai economy in 
connection with FDI. First, as the Japanese Yen appreciated in relation to the US Dollar up 
to 89%, this made several Japanese industries that were once competitive, no longer so. 
These industries were textile, chemical and manufacturers of electrical appliances. As a 
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result, the inflow of Japanese FDI to Thailand more than doubled during 1985 and 1986, 
Appendix D.  
As a result of pegging her currency with the US Dollar, Thailand could no longer tolerate 
the continuing appreciation of her currency. She depreciated her currency twice in 1981 
and 1984 by 8.7 % and 14.8 %, respectively (World Currency Yearbook, 1985). These 
events, in combination with the export promotion and FDI-led growth strategies, had 
increased the attraction of Thailand‟s locational-specific advantages even more for foreign 
investors, after 1985. For example, a cheap Baht reduced the cost of investment and 
increased the competitiveness of Thai-made products in the global market.  
A significant increase in inward FDI in 1986 had triggered a considerable rise in the 
country‟s economic growth and exports, Figures 5.7 and 5.10. From 1986 to 1987, the 
growth rate had increased from 5.5% to 9.5%. The then government spontaneously 
perceived that export promotion and inward FDI could help mitigate the adverse effect of 
the economic crisis that had taken place in the earlier decade. Thus, in 1987, it went further 
to promote foreign investment for exports, reduce import tariffs on immediate inputs, and 
abolish export tariffs on various products (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003; Nikomborirat, 
2004). It was the first time that, apart from American investment, the government allowed 
100% ownership for foreign investors of other nationalities. In 1988, the government 
decided to stop controlling large investment projects. Even though this could potentially 
cause distortions in competitive environments, there was no objection from any technocrat. 
The General Secretary of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), 
at that time, proposed that Thailand should leave the market to decide where and what to 
invest and that state intervention in investment and industrial development should be kept 
to a minimum (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003). The country was so excited to grow, that no 
one seemed to have time to think strategically. Indeed, it can be said that an increase in the 
country‟s locational-specific advantages, shaped by the neo-liberal ideology, came at the 
cost of the country‟s environment (Bello, Cunningham, and Poh, 1998) and the strength of 
its domestic private sector.   
During the second half of the 1980s, Thailand‟s sources of growth were from exports, 
expansion of the domestic market, reduction in oil price, an increase of income from 
tourism that result in a slightly surplus in service balance, and an increase of remittance 
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from Thai workers. From 1988 to 1991, Thailand experienced an average growth rate of 
11%. An inward FDI, during this period, was mainly market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking and clustered mainly in the industrial sector. In principle, this inward FDI should, 
for example, help to upgrade the existing technology in knowledge, stimulate domestic 
entrepreneurship and increase competition. The analysis of FDI in the previous section did 
not seem to support this. However, an obvious economic characteristic did emerge, that is, 
from this time onwards the Thai developmental path became more reliant on exports and 
inward FDI.  
Figure 5.11 shows that from 1985 to 1995, the share of export to GDP had doubled from 
20% to 40%. Phongpaichit and Baker (2003) and Jitsuchon (2002) pointed out that the 
manufacturing sector, dominated by TNCs, grew rapidly in response to the above policies. 
The share of manufacturing in exports had increased six-fold during the second half of the 
1980s. However, the agricultural sector had grown relatively slowly. As a result, this sector 
did release a pool of cheap and unskilled labour to serve the growth in the manufacturing 
sector. The industrialisation process developed rapidly.     
FIGURE 5.11: EXPORT OF GOODS AND SERVICES AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008) 
              Unit (y, x): percentage, year 
 
The 1990s 
In this decade, politically, it can be said that the country started to enjoy more 
parliamentary politics even though Thailand experienced a coup d’état in 1990 and short-
lived political instability in 1992. In 1997, Thailand, for the first time in its history, had a 
constitution that was drafted by the popularly-elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly. In 
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terms of global politics, the beginning of the 1990s was marked with the end of Cold War, 
characterised by the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the centrally-planned economies. These political events had significant implications for the 
global economy. They accredited liberal capitalism. Facilitated by the rise of neo-liberal 
hegemony, the world appreciated that a market economy is the best form of economic 
system and that free trade and free movement of capital are solutions to development and a 
key to economic prosperity. It is also observed that there was competition among 
developing countries to attract more inward FDI. 
Economically, in Thailand, still feeling high from the economic boom, the interim 
government in 1991-1992, whose cabinets were composed of the same group of U.S. 
graduated technocrats who are in favour of unfettered market economy, proposed that 
Thailand should further liberalise her financial sector. Phongpaichit and Baker (2003) 
documented that these technocrats believed that financial liberalisation could make 
Thailand become the financial hub of the South East Asian region and that the domestic 
monopoly in the banking sector would be abolished. Thailand experienced economic 
growth in the reverse pattern to that of the previous decade. During the first half of the 
1990s, Thailand‟s average growth rate remained impressive. The average growth rate 
between 1990 and 1996 was about 8.6%.  
The democratically-elected government during 1992-1995 carried on this project and 
established the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) in 1993. The BIBF was an 
institution that attracted money from the United States, Japan, and Europe and lent in 
Thailand, through various local and foreign banks, with a lower interest rate (Siamwalla, 
Vajragupta and Vichyanond, 1999). Consequently, Thailand experienced a surge of inward 
portfolio investment (PI) within a short period. The inflow of PI increased from US$ 924 
millions to US$5.5 billions, Figure 5.12. In 1993, Thailand received more PI than FDI for 
the first time in her history. This inflow of cheap cash encouraged domestic entrepreneurs 
to indulge in foreign loans extensively. Most of them saw no necessity to hedge against the 
currency risk as the domestic currency was under the managed peg regime for at least three 
decades. This excessive inflow of short-term capital continued until 1997.  
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FIGURE 5.12: INFLOW OF FDI AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT FROM1975-2008  
 
Source: Analytical Balance of Payment, (IMF, 2009) 
              Unit (y, x): Million of US$, year 
 
The premature liberalisation of the financial account marked an end of the economic boom. 
In 1997 and 1998, the country experienced financial and currency crises. These were the 
result of the pre-matured liberalisation of the financial account. As the global economy was 
highly integrated, the crisis then spread to other Asian countries such as South Korea and 
Malaysia. The growth rates for these two years were negative levelling at 1.4 % and 10.5%, 
respectively. Since then, even though the country‟s growth rate has bounced back, it has 
never regained the impressive momentum it once enjoyed.      
The crisis may be studied through international finance perspectives, looking at excessive 
inflow of capital and its sudden reverse (Radelet, et al., 1998). However, through the eyes 
of domestic economic historians, Phongpaichit and Baker (2003, p.204) also emphasised 
the institutional configuration in Thailand. Amid the abundance of cheap cash, most 
domestic entrepreneurs were only competitive in some sectors of the domestic market 
where the government still provided protection. These sectors are, for example, media, 
communications, agricultural products and real estate. However, in the export sectors, 
TNCs are more competitive because of their superiority in technology and better 
knowledge in global networks. Thus, only a number of efficient and visionary domestic 
entrepreneurs managed to benefit from the flood of these capitals. It was also during this 
time that Thailand saw a little surge in her outward FDI, as a result international investment 
conducted by this group of able entrepreneurs. It must be noted that these entrepreneurs, 
with the possible exception of the Charoen Pokphand group, whilst being successful 
compared to other domestic counterparts, are not industrialist capitalists in their nature 
because they do not produce knowledge and technology as most TNCs from industrialised 
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nation do. The business successes of these entrepreneurs resulted from close connections 
with politicians. In many cases, some of these entrepreneurs are involved in politics 
themselves.  In fact, not only domestic entrepreneurs seek a patronage from the ruling elites, 
Peng, Yu, and Wang (2001) empirically found that TNCs in Thailand appeared to have 
more military directors than domestic firms.  
As domestic entrepreneurs are not competitive globally and as only few of them used the 
excess of inflow of capital to invest abroad, this resulted in over-investment and 
speculation in areas such as real estate and the stock market, where domestic entrepreneurs 
found themselves most comfortable. Besides, the excess inflow of capital was also used to 
finance personal consumptions. Taking into account all these factors plus the accumulating 
deficits in the current account against the inflexible regime of exchange rate, the Thai Baht 
was attacked by the collective attempts of international hedge funds by mid-1997. Bank of 
Thailand depleted all of the country‟s national reserves to protect the Thai Baht. On the 2nd 
July 1997, Thailand was forced to change its exchange rate regime to a floating regime and 
seek help from the IMF. As the IMF identified the cause of the crisis as having too much 
intervention from the state (Hewison, 2005), the second wave of neo-liberal pressure on the 
country‟s development policies began.     
This financial crisis had a significant implication on the Thai economy in relation to inward 
FDI. Using the neo-liberal rhetoric, the IMF suggested that Thailand should enhance their 
market-orientated policies and allow foreign investors to conduct business more freely. 
These included, for example, an increase in the number of sectors where foreign investors 
could have a hundred percent ownership, the liberalisation of service sectors, and the 
privatisation of the state-owned enterprises (Hewison, 2005). Consequently, it is observed 
that, by 1999, the volume of inward FDI had increased equal to the amount of the total for 
the period from 1986 to 1997, the boom period. Most of these direct investments were 
targeted to buy domestic assets at fire-sale prices. Thus, they were not meant to create new 
production facilities but to take the control over the existing production facilities that once 
belonged to domestic entrepreneurs. Phongpaichit (2005, 2006) and Kohpaiboon and 
Ramstetter (2008) saw that the crisis only helped to transfer monopolistic and oligopolistic 
power in several sectors from domestic entrepreneurs to foreign investors, without any 
change in the rate of concentration of these sectors. Kohpaiboon and Ramstetter (2008) 
also noted that a large portion of FDI after the crisis was used to finance buyouts of Thai 
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partners in joint-ventures.  From this crisis, it appeared that domestic entrepreneurs were 
out-competed and bought-out from the competition with the help of their own government 
(Hewison, 2005). 
From 2000 to Present 
The crisis in 1997-1998 not only triggered change in economic environment and growth 
performance, it also caused changes in domestic politics. The economic crisis and the force 
of neo-liberalism in Thailand gave way to the rise of a populist politician, who is a self-
made tycoon from the economic boom, Thaksin Shinawatra (Phongpaichit, 2005). This was 
similar to the experience of Peru and Argentina in the 1990s when the populist President 
Fujimori came into power in Peru, and President Menem, in the case of Argentina. In 
Thailand, facilitated by the 1997 constitution, Thaksin‟s newly-established party was 
democratically elected with a landslide victory in both elections in 2001 and 2005. 
Phongpaichit (2005) and Hewison (2005) agree that the rise of Thaksin was partly a 
collective reaction of domestic capital in Thailand to the neo-liberal forces which are more 
favourable to international capital or TNCs.  
Most interestingly, the flagship policies of Thaksin went beyond the protection of domestic 
capital. They emphasised an increase in social safety nets for the grass-root population who 
had been left out from enjoying the benefits from the economic development over the past 
century. Thaksin‟s political campaign had a nationalist tone and very much emphasised 
inclusivity. The main political opponent to Thaksin at the time was the right-wing 
Democratic Party whose alliance and the party itself not only had preference for neo-
liberalism but also put all those policies into action. The preceding government which was 
led by the leader of the Democrat Party was perceived as nothing but a „lackey‟ of foreign 
interests (Hewison, 2005, p.318).  
The success of Thaksin‟s campaign towards grass-root people reflects one important thing. 
The development model that Thailand has been implementing over the past decades was 
incapable of addressing the „dualism‟ in its economy. In 1981, the country‟s GINI Index 
was 45. Despite the fact that the reduction of income inequality between urban and rural 
areas has been classified as a high agenda item in the national social and economic 
development plan since 1987, Thai GINI index has never gone below 42. In 2010, Thai 
GINI index remains relatively high at 43 (WDI, 2010). Clearly, the benefits from economic 
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development in Thailand have been enjoyed by only a small fraction of her population, 
namely, the aristocrats, Chinese businessmen, and high-ranking, civil and military officers. 
Probably, it is because these groups of people have access to the lucrative sectors, driven 
by foreign investments or technology. A series of political instabilities since 2006 suggest 
the polarisation between the minority rich and the majority poor, and seem to confirm the 
presence of uneven development within the country. It is undeniable that the recent 
political turmoil is the result of the blind implementation of neo-liberal economic 
development in the past which has generated both the polarisation between urban and rural 
population and income inequality (Bello, Cunningham, and Poh, 1998; Motonishi, 2003; 
and Bello, 2010). Indeed, the majority poor still remain outside the circle of economic 
prosperity that the country has accumulated so far. Recently (Bello, 2010), the statistics 
show that Thailand exhibits the highest rate of income inequality in Asia. The vulnerability 
of domestic politics would threaten the confidence of foreign investors and that can only be 
addressed in the short term with more FDI-friendly policies. 
Even Thaksin‟s governments failed to re-direct Thailand to a better path of development. 
His government was created thanks to a nationalist rhetoric embedded in his policies, but in 
practice, it is observed that neo-liberal policies were further implemented. For example, his 
government decided to liberalise the energy sector and made a vain attempt to privatise the 
state-owned Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). Further, several local 
content requirements in a few remaining industries, such as dairy products, have been lifted. 
As mention earlier, the GINI index showed no sign of improvement. Anuchitworawong 
(2007) assessed the effectiveness of Thaksin‟s programme to alleviate the poverty at grass-
root levels. He showed that the implementation of such a programme was ineffective as it 
did not reach the poor but did help a number of non-poor, better-off members of the 
population. Moreover, Thaksin‟s reputation and his integrity had been heavily challenged 
during his second term. The period of stable domestic politics ended in September 2006 
when there was a coup d’état. The coup was organised by right-wing, royalist military 
officers. 
From 1999, the economy started to recover with a slight drop of growth rate in 2001 due to 
the global recession. However, the second wave of neo-liberal policies changed the 
structure of the Thai economy. The degree of market liberalisation was extended. The 
country started to rely even more extensively on export sectors, particularly in the 
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technological-dependent products that are produced mainly by the TNCs. Even though the 
government advertised itself as the guardian of Thai capital, the overall trend of an 
incoming FDI was increasing, Figure 5.12 (p.170). Parallel to this, the share of exports to 
GDP had also doubled from about 40% in 1995 to 73% in 2006, Figure 5.11 (p.168). 
However, these exports, mainly produced by TNCs, appear to rely on imported components 
and technology. This is why the country also experienced an increase in import of goods 
and services, Figure 5.7 (p.156). The key sectors responsible for growth are now dominated 
by foreign investors (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003; Kohpaiboon, 2006; and 
Thanadsilapakul, 2010). This economic feature suggests that Thailand may have become a 
capital-dependent state. As the TNCs‟ exports are the main sources of economic growth, 
the government tries to ensure a favourable environment for their investments. This, in turn, 
means more generous tax incentives and more lax FDI-related investment policies.  
Recently, there has been a great concern in the country, mostly at academic level, regarding 
the middle-income trap that the country might be experiencing. One of the challenges in 
upgrading the nation‟s comparative and competitive advantages is the requirement of a 
high level of commitment by foreign investors. Domestic entrepreneurs play only a limited 
role in this process as they lack the ability to produce knowledge and technology. This is 
partly because the government did not try to give them any incentive to do so. Unless they 
are truly and naively believers of liberalism the past governments were fairly weak and 
lacking economic vision. The Thai developmental path was determined by external factors, 
such as foreign investors‟ decisions, rather than well-crafted policies. The growth rate and 
economic performance in Thailand after the crisis were moderate and lacking in vital 
momentum. It should be noted that, as foreign operations become more essential to the 
Thai economic growth, the state might have less power to regulate them in such a way that 
serves national interests.    
5.4 Summary 
 
Over the path of economic development, Thailand has largely reacted passively to the 
changes in the global political economy. Thai governments in the past, though trying to 
pursue an export-led growth development model, did not make strategic interventions to 
enhance the productive capability of domestic firms. Indeed, past governments tended to 
Chapter 5: Thai Economic and Political Background 
170 
 
leave the country‟s development in the hands of the market mechanism which always 
favours the fittest. The problem is when the domestic firms, from an early stage of 
development, were not protected or given incentives to be productively and technologically 
capable of surviving Schumpeterian competition. The fittest that survive are mostly TNCs. 
By way of contrast, it is observed that the governments of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
had done the opposite to Thailand. They nurtured their domestic firms, where the 
productive capabilities are stored, and which later on became the nations‟ TNCs. Soon, 
these national TNCs, as well as the states, could work in corporation to upgrade the 
country‟s comparative and competitive advantages making them suitable for a higher level 
of development. These lines of actions have never been reflected in Thai economic 
development history.  
The failure of Thai governments in the past to incubate domestic entrepreneurs may be 
attributed to several reasons. First, it is due to non-homogenous ethnicities among the 
ruling and affluent classes in the society. For example, in the 1960s, the ruling military 
were those who come from the local Thai population, whereas the capitalist class was made 
up mainly by Chinese immigrants. However, this problem should be reduced over time as 
these people have been merged through marriage and their participation in a limited elite 
society over the past century. Secondly, it is due to the lack of economic vision of the past 
leaders and their loose commitment to the country‟s prosperity. Thai political history 
constantly shows the case where politicians, military officers, and businessmen were 
involved in collusion and corruption (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2003; Bello, Cunningham 
and Poh, 1998; and Chang Noi, 2009). Thirdly, due to the divisions within the domestic 
power structure, governments chose to resort to international recognition to cement their 
legitimised position domestically. The cost of doing this is to connect more directly to the 
global economy, regardless of the readiness of the country‟s economic conditions. Fourthly, 
the nature of rent that most of Thai firms have been seeking and benefitting is different 
from that of TNCs. While the latter was rather a Schumpeterian rent-seeker, the former was 
confined to static rent. This partly explains why they appear to be sluggish and satisfied 
with the status quo. In turn, to create an institution capable of being a Schumpeterian rent-
seeker, for the late developed countries, requires a strategic and significant effort from the 
state. Lastly, the path dependence concept may help to explain why more recent 
governments may have limited choices to manage the economy for the better. For example, 
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economic and legal constrains may arise from past decisions such as the participation in 
international agreements which contain clauses that are not beneficial to the country, and 
the implementation of ineffective policies. To reverse or abandon such agreements or 
policies may be too costly.  
The lack of productive capability in Thailand can be partly explained by the lack of the 
state‟s support. It can be argued that the matter was exacerbated by the implementation of a 
FDI-growth strategy, in particular, the creation of export sectors with foreign investments. 
Thai economic history shows that the past governments focused more on implementing the 
policies that help to increase the country‟s locational advantages in such a way that it 
encourages TNCs more than domestic companies to internalise their transactions and to 
gain from the market and development. Thailand shares two common institutional aspects, 
as depicted in the dependency theory, namely, the weak state and weak domestic firms. The 
institutional configuration in Thailand, in turn, may be explained by the combination of the 
neo-liberal development model and the unfavourable domestic politics. Moreover, Thailand 
also has a number of socio-economic features that have been described in the dependency 
theory, such as, leakage of resources, income inequality, the diminishing power of 
domestic capital, and an increase in dependency on foreign capital and technology. In 
addition, the review of empirical studies on FDI in Thailand using data at industrial level 
does not appear to support the presence of positive spillover from FDI. It can be argued that 
all of these point to the ineffectiveness of the liberal, FDI-led growth policies as a model 
for development and the unworthiness of the generous tax incentives, enjoyed mostly by 
the TNCs.     
The analysis of the Thai political economy in relation to FDI tends to indicate that Thailand 
may not fully benefit from FDI. In fact, the country may even be experiencing adverse 
impacts. As far as the method of analysis is concerned, this study has strongly used 
deductions based on the historical evidence and theory. In the following chapter, this study 
will empirically analyse the impact of FDI on the Thai economic development using 
econometric tools. In so doing, this study hopes to justify its argument with the use of more 
objective analytical methods.      
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Chapter 6: Empirical Analyses, Data Description, and Results 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, this study showed that Thailand has some economic traits indicating it to be a 
capital dependent state. These features include, for example, a deteriorating position of the 
terms of trade, an enduring, negative Net Outward Investment (NOI), the falling ratio of 
Gross National Income (GNI) to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a significant import of 
technology, an increasing outflow of income, and the vulnerable position of the balance of 
payments (BOP). Thus, there is a need for an empirical assessment on the impact of an 
inward FDI on Thai economic growth. For academic purposes, the empirical results would 
reveal the nature of the externalities that inward FDI has in Thailand. Therefore, it will add 
empirical evidence on the subject matter to the existing literature. It could also indicate the 
most relevant theory that can be used to explain the Thai growth process in relation to FDI. 
In practice, the evidence could assess the effectiveness of neo-liberal policies towards the 
operations of TNCs in the country and justify generous tax incentives, used to attract more 
FDI.  
In general, this Chapter attempts to test hypotheses and estimate relationships, derived 
from economic theories and certain historical events in Thailand. In particular, the 
objectives of this chapter can be set out as follows. Firstly, the study seeks to identify if 
there is an equilibrium relationship between pairs of key variables, namely, FDI and GNI, 
Chapter 6: Data Description, Empirical Analyses, and Results 
  
 
 
173 
domestic investment and GNI, trade openness and GNI, FDI and income account deficits, 
and FDI and imports. This will be carried out using the Engle and Granger (1987)‟s two-
step procedure. Secondly, if the equilibrium relation can be identified, this study will 
examine the direction of causation, using Granger causality test. Thirdly, key variables of 
interest will be pooled together and re-analysed using the system-based cointegration 
approach by Johansen and Juselius (1990). Quarterly time-series data from Q1:1970 - 
Q4:2009 are used in this empirical analysis.  
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 6.2 presents a brief methodology 
of the two, adopted, co-integration approaches. They are the single-equation Engle and 
Granger two-step procedure and the Johansen VECM procedure. Section 6.3 is the analysis 
of data and variables. Section 6.4 presents the results derived from the single-equation 
Engle and Granger two-step procedure. Section 6.5 reports the results from the Johansen 
VECM procedure. Section 6.6 performs Granger causality test. Section 6.7 concludes and 
gives a summary of the key findings from the empirical analyses.         
 
6.2 Econometric Methods 
Like other macroeconomic theories, both FDI-related growth theories and dependency 
theory imply the long-term relationship between FDI and economic development. 
Accordingly, econometric tools adopted to analyse such impact should be able to capture 
the dynamic effects that not only include a long-run equilibrium but also a short-term 
impact. For this reason, cointegration analysis appears to be the most appropriate empirical 
framework.  
There are several methods to test for cointegration. The most commonly used cointegration 
tests are the Engle-Granger two-step procedure (Engle and Granger, 1987) and the system 
based cointegration of Johansen (Johansen and Juselius, 1990; Johansen, 1995). The first 
test is based on the residuals from a cointegration regression. The second test is based on 
the system of equation in the form of vector autoregressive models. Cointegration has 
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become a common econometric tool used to analyse macroeconomic data, such as, 
investment, national income, consumption, and unemployment, where long-run 
relationships affect currently observed values. Granger (2004) pointed out that 
macroeconomic data is rather smooth, moving with local trends, or with long swings, but 
the swings are not regular. These characteristics make the most of macroeconomic data 
unsuitable to be analysed with the standard statistical procedures due to the lack of the 
property called „stationarity‟. Conventionally, applied economists dealt with this problem 
by re-expressing these data in the form of changes or rates of returns, so that the data 
would be integrated. In other words, most of the macroeconomic data has been differenced 
before being used in the regression analysis.  
Engle and Granger (1987) proved that the difference between many pairs of non-stationary 
time-series, that is, the linear combination, could be stationary. Granger (2004) explained 
that once this property could be identified, it implies that these pairs of series may have the 
property and nature as suggested by economic theory. Statistically, it suggests that they 
must be co-integrated with the same common factor. In particular, it can be assumed that 
these pairs of series may be generated by the error correction model. This idea has later 
been extended to incorporate more than two variables in a model, see for example, 
Johansen and Juselius (1990), Inder, (1993), and MacKinnon, Haug, and Michelis, (1998). 
Cointegration analysis processes non-stationary, stochastic variables in such a way that it 
can produce the results which are both statistically sound and economically meaningful.    
In this study, the Engle-Granger two-step procedure will be used to analyse the relationship 
between several pairs of variables that have been discussed in FDI-related growth and 
dependency theories. They are: 
i) GNI and FDI/GDP; 
ii) GNI and trade openness;  
iii) deficit in income balance and FDI; and   
iv) total imports and FDI. 
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Next, the system based cointegration of Johansen (Johansen and Juselius, 1990; Johansen, 
1995) will be used to analyse the system of equations depicting the relationship among 
GNI, FDI, domestic investment, and labour as discussed in Chapter 4, where this study 
presented its theoretical model. The Johansen approach would provide a complementary 
insight into the relationships between FDI and economic development while taking into 
account the role of domestic investment, labour, and trade openness, while the empirical 
results from the Engle-Granger approach do not. The rest of this section will present a brief 
methodology of two cointegration analyses adopted in this study. However, when it comes 
to a model specification being used in this analysis, deterministic variables and seasonal 
dummy variables will be added into the system in order to capture a structural break or a 
seasonal effect in the time-series data.   
6.2.1 Engle-Granger Two-step Procedure 
The Engle-Granger residual based test is one of the commonly used cointegration tests 
(Chakraborty and Basu, 2002). In its original and most effective form, this single-equation 
error correction model is used to study the existence of a relationship of two variables in 
equilibrium. Basically, prior to conducting cointegration tests, the analysis of a single 
series must be carried out in order to identify the order of integration. Tests of the unit root 
hypothesis or stationarity were developed by, for instance, Fuller (1976), Dickey and 
Fuller (1979, 1981), Phillips and Perron (1988), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(1992). Once it is established that the variables of interest appear to be integrated at the 
same order, then they can be processed into the Engle-Granger cointegration analysis 
which involves the following two steps. 
First Step: Cointegration Regression 
This step involves an estimation of a cointegrating regression whereby variables in levels 
are estimated with the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique. In the simplest form, this 
regression may be written as: 
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ttt xy              and  ),0(~
2Nt     (6.1) 
where ty  is the dependent variable, and tx  is the single, exogenous, independent variable. 
The equation 6.1 is meaningful and consistent only if tx  can produce the major properties 
of the variable being explained, which is ty  (Granger, 1981). However, in many cases, as 
proved by Granger and Newbold (1974), a statistically significant relationship can be 
confirmed where, in fact, none exists. This case is known as a spurious regression. 
Spurious regression normally carries some characteristics, such as, a relatively high R-
square, and abnormal Durbin-Watson statistics. To distinguish whether or not such 
regression is spurious or meaningful, Engle and Granger (1987) proposed to examine the 
following criteria. If t  is proved to be stationary in levels, that is, I(0), and given that it is 
a product of two integrated series of higher order, then it can be concluded that equation 
6.1 does represent the relationship between the dependent and independent variable in the 
equilibrium. The requirement to analyse the series of innovation, t , implies the use of the 
unit root test.  
Second Step: Error Correction Model 
Once it can be proved that equation 6.1 represents the relationship between ty and tx in the 
long run, the Granger representation theorem shows that equation 6.1 can then be re-
represented in a dynamic fashion, the error correction form. The simplest form of such 
equation can be written as: 
tttttt eyxxyy 13121111 )(    (6.2)   
where Δ is a difference operator, 1 is a parameter depicting the strength of the 
disequilibrium correction, and 11 tt xy is the first lag of the degree of disequilibrium, 
known as an error correction term. 2 and 3 indicate the short-term impact of the first 
lagged values of x and y respectively. It must be noted that in practice, the number of lag 
values and the choices of lagged difference variables in the right-hand side of the equation 
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will be guided by the unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR), as shown in Engle and 
Granger (1987). Clearly, equation 6.2 captures the short-term impact and incorporates the 
built-in tendency to adjust itself towards equilibrium. In summary, an inference derived 
from equation 6.1 and 6.2 would suggest both the nature of the relationship and its 
dynamic impact between the two variables of interest.   
6.2.2 System Based Cointegration of Johansen 
The methodological discovery in Engle and Granger (1987) gave rise to various 
econometric applications and development. Most importantly, it highlighted the 
application of VAR, initially developed by Sims (1980). Sims advocated the use of 
unrestricted VAR models as a means of modelling economic relationships without 
unnecessary assumption. This is reasonable, particularly in the case where the theory is 
loose and quiet about the specificity of dynamic relationship. It is in this area that VAR 
could give tremendous insight into the rich dynamics using time-series data. In addition, 
VAR is also a framework that is suitable when researchers are not confident if the 
variables are exogenous or endogenous (Ender, 1995). This is because VAR offers a 
framework that allows for interdependence among these variables. Similar to the Engle-
Granger two-step procedure, a VAR model with cointegration is often based on the idea of 
a long-run or moving equilibrium.  
Among later development of the combination of these ideas, the method developed by 
Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) is most popular and thus adopted 
in this empirical analysis. The system based cointegration of Johansen can be said to be the 
second generation of the Engle and Granger approach because even though it uses non-
stationary, cointegrated time-series, it builds directly on maximum likelihood estimation 
instead of partly relying on OLS. Chakraborty and Basu (2002) pointed out that the 
Johansen approach is regarded as superior to the Engle-Granger because it provides a 
multivariate framework which allows for more than one cointegration vector in the 
estimated model. From a statistical point of view, this not only forecloses the loss of 
efficiency but, in terms of methodology, it represents better the real economic world in 
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which many cointegrating vectors, or long-term relationships among various variables are 
believed to co-exist. In brief, the Johansen approach helps to explain how multivariate 
cointegrated systems work, how to estimate them and how to test hypotheses. These are the 
means to understand the behaviour of time-series of interests in the context from where the 
observations are collected.  
The Johansen cointegration test requires an analysis of single time-series data in order to 
determine stationary property and identify the degree of integration. Generally, estimation 
of a vector error correction model (VECM), in the fashion of Johansen and Juselius (1990), 
also involves the two steps elaborated below. 
The First Step: Estimation of Cointegrating Vectors  
According to Johansen and Juselius (1990), the methods used to estimate a number of 
cointegrating vectors in the VAR system involve two tests which are the trace test and the 
maximum-eigenvalue test. To illustrate, the definition of a VAR of a set of variables Z can 
be defined as: 
eZZZ ktktt ...11        (6.3)          
If all series in a set of variables Z are non-stationary and integrated at the same degree, 
then, the system of equations 6.3 may be re-expressed in VECM form as: 
 tkttt ZZZ 1       (6.4) 
 where ],...,,[ 11 kttt ZZZZ  
 and ),0(~ 2NEt  
Thus, parameters and are formulated as; 
 )](),...,(),[( 21211 kIII    (6.5) 
 kI ...21  
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Non-stationary variables in Z imply that will have deficient rank. From the Granger 
representation theorem, it can be implied that the coefficient matrix has reduced rank r < p 
where p is a number of variables in the set.  Then, there exists n×r matrix such that  
  and tZ is I(0)      (6.6) 
The rows of may be defined as the r distinct cointegrating vectors, that is, the number of 
cointegration. The rows of represents how these cointegrating vectors are loaded into 
each equation in the system. The essence of the Johansen cointegration approach is to 
decompose  into two matrices, and , and to test whether the restrictions implied by 
the reduced rank of can be rejected. 
This is where the rank test and the maximum-eigenvalue test come into play. In the trace 
test, the null hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors is, at most, equal to r, 
where r = 0,1,2,…,p. In each case, the null hypothesis is tested against the relevant 
alternative, that is, the number of cointegrating vectors is greater than stated in the null 
hypothesis. The trace test can be computed as follows: 
 
p
ri
itr TLR
1
)1(        (6.7)  
where trLR is the test statistic of the trace log likelihood ratio and i is the i-th largest 
eigenvalue of the matrix. In the maximum-eigenvalue test, the null hypothesis is that the 
number of cointegrating vectors is equal to r. It is tested against the alternative of r + 1. 
The maximum-eigenvalue test is computed as: 
 )1log( 1max rTLR  for r =  0 … p-1    (6.8) 
In practice, it is possible that the trace statistic and the maximum eigenvalue statistic yield 
conflicting results. In this event, Johansen and Juselius (1990) recommended the 
examination of the estimated cointegrating vector and base the choice on the 
interpretability of the cointegrating relations. However, Banerjee, et al., (1986, 1993) 
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suggested that the priority should be given to the maximum eigenvalue statistic because its 
results are more reliable even with a small sample size, which is the common case of 
empirical analysis. The identification of the unique cointegrating vectors reflects the 
structural economic relationships underlying the long-run model (Chakraborty and Basu, 
2002). This step is equivalent to the Engle-Granger‟s cointegration regression.      
Second Step: Vector Error Correction Model 
Once a number of cointegrating relationships among a set of economic variables is 
identified, the next concern is how these variables adjust in response to a random shock in 
the system. Similar to the second step of the Engle and Granger procedure, the second step 
in the system based cointegration approach concerns the short-run disequilibrium dynamics. 
This step involves an estimation of the short-run VAR model with error correction form as 
denoted in equation 6.3. However, in this stage, it is possible to identify explicitly the 
number of cointegration relationships attached to the residual terms. The error correction 
terms in this system pick up the speed of adjustment of each variable in response to a 
deviation from the steady state equilibrium. Another inference that can be drawn from this 
stage is the direction of causation in the form of Granger causality. A variable with zero 
speed of adjustment is said to be Granger non-causal in determining short-run dynamics of 
other variables in the system.  
 6.2.3 Vector Error Correction Granger Causality 
According to Granger et al., (2000), once the statistical property of t from cointegration 
regression is established to be I(0), an error correction term is required in testing Granger 
causality as shown below: 
k
i
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In the above equations, 1  and 2 are speeds of adjustment. They are in fact the first 
lagged value of the residuals from the cointegration equation. From Engle and Granger 
(1987), the existence of cointegration implies causality among a set of variables as 
manifested by 021 .  This test looks to reject the 0...: 222210 kH and 
0... 112110 kH  which signify no Granger causality. However, it must be 
noted that statistical evidence may not be sufficient to provide a true understanding of the 
direction of causation. It also requires a good support from economic theories and 
institutional knowledge (Stock and Watson, 2001). The pair of equations shown above can 
be extended as a Vector Error Correction Granger causality test in which the number of 
endogenous or weakly exogenous variables in the system is greater than two.   
6.3 Data, Variables, and Analysis of Time-series 
Due to the nature and focus of the research question, this study adopts time-series analyses 
as the method of deriving empirical evidence. This is because, firstly, this research 
attempts to quantitatively study the growth process in Thailand in relation to an inward 
FDI, over time, and at aggregate level. Thus, time-series analysis is a natural choice as it 
can offer an in-depth investigation as well as dynamic changes over time. Indeed, it can be 
argued that, in ideal cases, this should be complemented with panel studies in which both 
time dimension and geographical dimensions, such as, industry or region, can be embraced 
into the same data set. However, quantitative research on developing countries can hardly 
enjoy such privileges due to an inadequate availability of data. To address this shortfall, 
this research provides a brief overview of empirical studies that used cross-sectional, firm-
level studies in Thailand, such as, Kohpaiboon (2003, 2006) and Tamboonlertchai (2009). 
Hence, time-series analyses, conducted in this study, can be viewed as complementary to 
the existing empirical findings which would shed more light into the reality of Thai 
economic development in relation to FDI.  
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Secondly, time-series analysis is no less common than panel studies in political and macro-
economic studies, for example, see De Mello (1999), Ramirez (2000), Zhang (2001), 
Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2005) and Ang (2009). Lastly, in empirical growth studies, due 
to the restriction of the availability of data, the choices between the robustness and the 
efficiency depend, most of the time, on the subjective decisions of researchers (Durlauf, 
Johnson and Temple, 2004).  
In addition, in recent years, it is observed that the availability of data has dramatically 
improved so much so that the application of an appropriate time-series analysis is possible. 
Even though the number of observations offered by time-series data is far less than that 
offered by firm or industrial panel studies, time-series data at high frequency do provide 
enough observations to produce valid statistical inferences (De Boef and Keele, 2008).   
 
6.3.1 Data and Variables 
Sources of Data  
Time-series data used in this study are mainly drawn from statistics‟ publications in 2010, 
by three main international organisations, namely, the IMF, the World Bank and the United 
Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Data are mostly observed on 
quarterly basis. It is noted that not all series provide full samples. Missing data are 
addressed by the interpolation method using related time-series as suggested by Friedman 
(1962) and Greenberg, Pollard and Alpert (1989).  
The whole sample covers from Q1:1970 to Q4:2009, making a total of 30 years and 120 
observations. This makes the number of sample size, used in this study, larger than that 
used in the previous papers. For example, Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2005) studied the 
direction of causal relationship between FDI and GDP in Thailand, Chile and Malaysia. 
Their results are drawn from annual time-series from 1969-2000, making 42 observations 
for each country. Ang (2009) analysed the impact of FDI through the financial deepening 
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in Thailand. His data set, covering years 1970-2004, has only 25 observations.  A summary 
of the sources of data and the preparation can be found in Appendix E, Table E1. 
 
Variables 
There are eight time-series variables and a dummy variable in the analysis. Time-series 
variables are, namely, gni, fdi/gdp, fdi, open, imp, def, dinv, and lb. The summary of 
variables and their construction are summarised in Table E1, Appendix E. 
Unlike most past empirical studies that use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a 
measurement of economic growth, this paper chooses GNI. GNI is more appropriate as a 
measurement of economic growth in relation to FDI because it is a growth indicator that 
has been addressed for the transfer of income generated from international investment. By 
conventional standard, GNI take a logarithmic form and is denoted as gni. 
Two variables approximate FDI in this analysis. One is fdi/gdp which is approximated by 
the value of FDI stock over GDP,
gdp
fdi
. According to Kentor and Boswell (2003), this 
measurement represents foreign penetration. As it can be interpreted as the size of foreign 
operations in relation to the whole economic activities, it is a suitable approximation of 
FDI under the context of growth analysis. Another is fdi which is value of FDI capital 
stock. From a theoretical point of view, using FDI stock is more desirable than using FDI 
inflow data. This is because FDI stock represents directly the value and foreign capital and 
reserved within the economy (Zhan, 2006). This variable is used in the analyses whose 
focus is made on FDI and its effect on the BOP. 
 
As trade and investment liberalisation can hardly be analysed separately, it is necessary to 
incorporate the degree of trade openness in the analysis of liberalisation of FDI and growth. 
In this study, the measurement of trade openness, denoted as open, is measured by the 
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summation of export and import over the GDP, 
gdp
impexp
. This is the simplest 
measurement of trade openness which has its root in Summer and Heston, (1993) and 
Balasubramanyam, et al., (1996). 
The impact of inward FDI on the BOP is also central in the analysis of this study. The 
emphasis is made on two entries in the current account. They are imports and a remittance 
of income and profits.  Imports are measured by the total import of goods and service and 
denoted as imp.  Dependency theory also claims that FDI brings to developing countries a 
capital intensive technology, which implies quite a heavy import of capital goods and 
intermediate products. It is interesting to see if imports in Thailand can also be explained 
by FDI. The nation‟s import is directly approximated by the total imports and represented 
in a logarithmic form, denoted as imp.  
 
On the remittance of income and profits, denoted as def, it is measured by the size of the 
deficits in the nation‟s income balance where the remittance and receipt of income and 
interest between the residents and the rest of the world is recorded. This variable is found 
to be essential in the analysis because a deficit in income balance is one of the main traits 
of dependency. It is therefore interesting to find out if this outflow of capital could be 
explained by FDI.  def and imp are both represented in logarithmic form. 
 
Domestic investment, denoted as dinv, is approximated by the difference between gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) and the flow of inward FDI. GFCF is, so far, a 
conventional approximation of domestic investment. This paper attempts to disaggregate 
domestic investment and foreign investment. Thus, a portion of foreign flow of investment 
should be taken away from GFCF. Labour force is denoted as lb. It is measured directly 
from the size of the labour force. dinv and lb are expressed in the logarithmic form. The 
last variable refers to a dummy variable capturing the effect of financial crisis in1997. In 
this variable, Q3:1997 to Q2:1998 takes a value of one while the rest is zero. 
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6.3.2 Analysis of Time-series 
As mentioned in Section 6.2, an examination of single time-series is a prerequisite for 
cointegration analysis as it is important to be able to prove that time-series are non-
stationary property and identify the degree of integration. It is expected that all series 
should behave in the same manner. They should be non-stationary and integrated in the 
similar degree. This is because, in terms of interpretation, it is unlikely that a stationary 
process can be explained by a non-stationary process (De Mello, 1999, p.136). Generally, 
the most common used unit root test for cointegration is the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) and Said and Dickey (1984). 
ADF test is the basic autoregressive unit root test that accommodates the general 
Autoregressive and Moving Average (ARMA(p,q)) model. It is therefore the test that 
constructs a parametric correction for higher order correlation.  
The ADF test normally tests the null hypothesis that a time series is I(1) against the 
alternative that it is I(0), assuming that the dynamics in the data have an ARMA structure. 
However, the ADF test based on Eview6 is formulated in another fashion and defined as 
below: 
t
k
i
ktittt yyDy
1
1      (6.10)  
where tD  is a vector of deterministic terms, for instance, intercept and trend. The k lagged 
difference terms, kty , are used to approximated the ARMA structure of the errors, and 
the value of k is set so that the error t is serially uncorrelated. In addition,  t  is assumed 
to be homoskedastic. With this form of presentation, the null hypothesis that ty is I(1) It 
implies that 0 . Thus, 01H . The ADF statistic is usually the t-statistic for 
testing 0 . The ADF normalised bias statistic is computed as 
 ))ˆ(/(ˆ set        (6.11) 
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where ˆ  is the estimate of , and )ˆ(se is the coefficient standard error. Dickey and Fuller 
(1979) showed that under the null hypothesis of unit root, this statistic does not follow the 
conventional Student-t distribution. Advanced methods for calculating approximate 
distribution functions of test statistics that can provide accurate results have been 
developed, for example, by MacKinnon (1991, 1996, and 2010), Ericsson and MacKinnon 
(2002). The critical values used in this study are calculated based on the methods 
developed by MacKinnon (2010). These critical values provide accurate results for both 
Dickey-Fuller and Engle-Granger tests.    
There are two important practical issues in performing the ADF test. Firstly, it is the 
specification of the deterministic terms. On this aspect, Hamilton (1994) suggests that this 
specification can be made based on the nature of the data and economic intuition. In 
general, if the series exhibit a clear trend, the test regression should incorporate both the 
constant and the trend. Nonetheless, if the series are relatively flat and the data revolve 
around the non-zero mean, the regression should then include only the constant term. 
These broad rules imply the use of theoretical knowledge and the graphical examination of 
each series. Graphical presentation of all the series are reported in Appendix E, Table E2. 
Another important practical issue for the implementation of ADF test is the specification of 
lag length, k. If k is too small then the remaining serial correlation in the errors will bias 
the test. On the other hand, if k is too large then the power of the test will suffer. The most 
common used method to determine the number of lag length is devised by Schwartz (1978). 
It is computed as: 
 ])
100
(12[ 4/1max
T
k         (6.11) 
where maxk  is the number of the maximum lag length and T is a sample size which is 120. 
It must be noted that the criteria of choosing the lag length is not limited to the Schwartz 
Criteria (SC), there are many other criteria such as the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
This paper considers two models while performing the tests on both levels and first 
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differences for all time-series variables. These two models are differently specified with 
regard to deterministic terms. The first model refers to the model that includes only an 
intercept. The second model incorporates both an intercept and trended variable.  In respect 
to the specification of lag length, this study allows the statistical software Eviews6 to 
calculate automatically the appropriate lag orders, using the Schwartz Bayesian 
information criterion. Table 6.1 reports results from the ADF test. 
TABLE 6.1: ADF UNIT ROOTS EXAMINATION ON VARIABLES 
Note: 1. critical values computed from Table 2 and3 in MacKinnon (2010) 
2. * indicates that the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. 
 
Table 6.1 reports the ADF test on all series to be used in the regressions. It can be seen that 
when the series are examined in levels, most of ADF statistics are greater than the critical 
values. However, when series are examined in the first differenced form, the ADF statistics 
become smaller than the critical values. Thus, it can be concluded that most of the time-
series are I(1.) It must be noted that, deficit in income account, def, gives an inconclusive 
  ADF statistic calculated from the 
model 
 
Variables Test for unit root in with intercept with intercept 
and trend 
Conclusion 
gni level -0.8012 -1.5396  
 first difference -10.2071
*
 -10.1628
*
 I(1) 
fdi/gdp level -0.2072 -2.1139  
 first difference -8.5781
*
 -8.5607
*
 I(1) 
fdi level -1.2735 -1.6587  
 first difference -3.1672
*
 -3.5443
*
 I(1) 
def level -0.5300 -3.7325
*
  
 first difference -5.6209
*
 -5.5346
*
 I(1) without trend 
open level -0.8049 -2.9001  
 first difference -12.6436
*
 -12.5880
*
 I(1) 
imp level -0.6177 -2.0842  
 first difference -8.3079
*
 -8.2694
*
 I(1) 
dinv level -2.3156 -2.7551  
 first difference -18.1020
*
 -18.0209
*
 I(1) 
lb Level -1.1658 -2.3483  
 first difference -3.5165
*
 -3.5347
*
 I(1) 
5% test 
critical values
1  t = -2.8859 t = -3.4476  
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result. It indicates that the series is I(1) only when examined with the model without a 
trended variable.  
In terms of interpretation, it can be said that all series exhibit persistent movements and 
appear to have long-term memory. They are also supportive to the linearity hypothesis 
which implies long-term relationship among these variables. In brief, the results reported in 
Table 6.1 confirm that all series are non-stationary and integrated in degree one, that is, 
they are I(1). They have the common traits of most macroeconomic time-series data. It 
follows that these series can be analysed by cointegration techniques and such analyses 
will be carried out in the following sections.  
6.4 Engle-Granger Two Procedure, Results, and Discussion 
This section attempts to identify the existence of a long-term relationship between four 
pairs of variables defined as follows:  
Regression 1: GNI vs. size of foreign operations; 
Regression 2:  GNI vs. trade openness;  
Regression 3:  size of income deficits vs. stock of FDI; and  
Regression 4: size of total import vs. stock of FDI. 
The first two regressions can be regarded as bi-variate income regressions that would 
explain the growth of income in relation to inward FDI and trade openness respectively. 
Regressions 3 and 4 seek to explain the impact of FDI on BOP, particularly, on the 
remittance of profits and imports.  
     
Following the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure, this study estimates a cointegration 
equation of the form specified below: 
,3210 rtrtrt etrendcrisisxy     (6.12) 
where r refers to a number of regression, t is time. Thus, 4,3,2,1 andr  and Tt ,...,2,1 . 
rty  and rtx  are dependent and independent variables of interest in each regression. crisis is 
an exogenous shock in the equation, depicting the financial crisis in 1997. trend is a trend 
variable.   
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TABLE 6.2: COINTEGRATION REGRESSIONS  
Regression 1 2 3
 
4 
                     
Dependent  
                      variable 
Independent 
 Variable 
gni 
 
gni 
 
def 
 
imp 
 
fdi/gdp 
-4.70
***
 
(-14.8) 
    
  
open  
-0.98
*** 
(-5.09) 
  
  
fdi    
0.68*** 
(31.0) 
0.83*** 
(9.62) 
crisis 
-0.29*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.28) 
0.48*** 
(2.73) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
DW 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.22 
S.E of regression 0.14 0.21 0.34 0.21 
R-square 0.95 0.88 0.89 0.95 
RESET
♦ 
0.15 0.00 0.10 0.89 
JB
♦
 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.39 
LM(4)
 ♦
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ARCH(4)
 ♦
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: 1. t-statistic is reported in the parentheses. 
2. ***,**,* indicate statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
3. Except from regression 3 which has only constant, all regressions include unreported constant and trend 
variables. 
4.
 ♦
indicates p-values 
5. RESET test has the null hypothesis of no specification errors. 
6. Jacque-Bera test has the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals  
7. Lagrange Multiplier test has the null hypothesis of no serial correlations  
in residuals up to the specified lag order. 
8. ARCH LM heteroskedasticity test has the null hypothesis of no autoregressive conditional 
 heteroskedasticity in the residuals up to the specified lag order.   
 
Equation 6.12 is estimated with OLS and the results are reported in Table 6.2. All 
regressions, reported in Table 6.2, at a first glance, show few traits of being spurious, such 
as, high R-square and low Durbin-Watson (DW) statistical values. These traits are 
common in regressions using data in level. However, as mentioned earlier, Engle and 
Granger (1987) showed that, only by examining the stationary property in the residuals, 
can one determine whether or not such a regression is meaningful. More specifically, if the 
residuals of a cointegration regression are stationary in level, it can be said that such a 
regression represents the relationship between dependent and independent variables in the 
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long run. The ADF unit root tests were performed on each series of residuals, rte . The 
results are reported in Table 6.3. 
 
TABLE 6.3: ADF STATISTICS OF THE RESIDUALS FROM CO-INTEGRATION 
REGRESSIONS 
Note: 1. critical values computed from Table 2 and3 in MacKinnon (2010) 
2. * indicates that the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. 
 
ec1, ec2, ec3, and ec4 are residuals from Regressions 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. It is seen 
that only ADF statistics from Regressions 3 and 4 are smaller than the 5% test critical 
values, signifying that the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. Hence, it can be 
concluded that there is a long-term relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables in Regressions 3 and 4. 
Results from Tables 6.2 and 6.3 suggest the following economic interpretation. As the 
residuals from regression 1 and 2 are not stationary, it points out that there is no 
relationship between inward FDI and economic growth in Thailand. The failure to 
establish an empirically long-run relationship between FDI and growth in Thailand, based 
on bi-variate VAR specifications, has already been recorded in the literature, for instance, 
Zhang, (2001), and Herzer, et al., (2008). This study also fails to establish a long-term 
relationship between trade openness and economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it appears that inward FDI has a long-term relationship with income deficits 
and total imports in Thailand. This suggests that inward FDI statistically causes changes in 
the balance of payments. Regression 3 indicates that FDI would increase income deficits in 
  ADF test statistic calculated from 
the model 
 
Variables Test for unit root in with intercept with intercept 
and trend 
Conclusion 
ec1 Level -2.7651 -2.7593 I(1) 
ec2 Level -1.8261 -1.8115 I(1) 
ec3 Level -3.8730* -3.8840* I(0) 
ec4 Level -3.8572* -3.8709* I(0) 
5% test  
critical value
1  t = -3.3875 t = - 3.8606  
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the long run and the crisis in 1997 also affected income deficits positively. Regression 4 
shows that inward FDI would increase total imports in the long run. The crisis in 1997 
appears not to have caused any change in imports in this regression.  The results from 
Table 6.2 support the arguments made by dependency theorists claiming that FDI triggers 
an outflow of capital in the form of profit and income remittance. The results also support 
the claims of other empirical studies, reviewed in Chapter 5, that TNCs in Thailand tend to 
import capital and intermediate goods from elsewhere rather than using locally produced 
goods. As ec3 and ec4 are stationary, this implies that it is possible to analyse empirically 
the short-term impact of inward FDI on income deficits and on imports under the 
specifications of the error correction model (ECM). Thus, regressions 3 and 4 are 
empirically estimated with the OLS estimation under the following specifications: 
,1543210 trtirtirtrt etrendcrisisyxy  (6.13) 
Δ is a difference operator, 1rte  is the first lagged value of the residuals from the 
cointegration regression. It must be noted that the residuals from cointegration regression 
capture the error correction relationship by depicting the degree to which x and y are out of 
equilibrium. Hence, 5 captures the rate at which the system y adjusts to the equilibrium 
state after a shock, in other words, a speed of error correction. i is 1, 2,...,T. According to 
Engle and Granger (1987), the choice of i is determined by estimating the unrestricted 
autoregression and selecting the lagged variables that appear significant to be included in 
the error correction model.  Table F1, Appendix F reports the results of Regressions 3 and 
4, estimated under the unrestrticted vector autoregression specifications.    
Table 6.4 reports the results of Regressions 3 and 4, using first-differenced data and 
incorporating the error correction term. Column 2 of table 6.4 shows that FDI has a short-
term impact on income deficits. However, it must be noted that only the coefficient of 
lagged value of FDI in the long past appears to be significant. This implies that FDI may 
take at least three years to cause an increase in income deficits. Thus, the positive long-run 
and short-run impacts of inward FDI on income deficits are empirically found. The 
coefficient of error correction term is significant. It also gives an appropriate sign, that is, 
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negative. This suggests that deviations from equilibrium are corrected at about 6% 
quarterly. 
TABLE 6.4: ENGLE AND GRANGER ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
Regression 3 4 
                             Dependent 
variable 
 
Independent 
 Variable 
def Δdef imp Δimp 
fdi 
0.68*** 
(31.0) 
 
0.83*** 
(9.62) 
 
Δifdi(-1) 
 
 
-0.07 
(-0.81) 
 
-0.05 
(-0.35) 
Δifdi(-12) 
 
 
0.58*** 
(5.98) 
  
Δdef(-1)  
0.49*** 
(7.83) 
  
Δdef(-2)  
0.13*** 
(2.22) 
  
Δdef(-4)  
-0.40*** 
(-6.58) 
  
Δdef(-5)  
0.34*** 
(5.43) 
  
ec3(-1)  
-0.06*** 
(-2.45) 
  
Δimp(-1)    
0.24*** 
(2.70) 
Δimp(-5)    
0.26** 
(2.23) 
ec4(-1)    
-0.16*** 
(-3.64) 
crisis 
0.48*** 
(2.73) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(-1.06) 
DW 0.22 0.71 0.22 1.92 
S.E of regression 0.34 0.05 0.21 0.05 
R
2 
0.89 1.61 0.95 0.48 
RESET
♦ 
0.10 0.33 0.89 0.08 
JB
♦
 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 
LM(4)
 ♦
 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.98 
ARCH(4)
 ♦
 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.01 
Note: 1. t-statistic is reported in the parentheses. 
 2. ***,**,* indicate statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 3. ec3 and ec4 are residuals from the cointegration regressions 3 and 4 respectively. 
4. Regression 4 include unreported constant and trend variables while regression contains only constant. 
5.
 ♦
indicates p-values 
6. RESET test has the null hypothesis of no specification errors. 
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7. Jacque-Bera test has the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals  
9. Lagrange Multiplier test has the null hypothesis of no serial correlations  
in residuals up to the specified lag order. 
10. ARCH LM test has the null hypothesis of no autoregressive conditional 
 heteroskedasticity in the residuals up to the specified lag order.   
 
Regression 4, presented in column 3, Table 6.4, suggests that FDI does not have a short-
term impact on imports. This is because the coefficient of the lagged value of FDI is not 
significant. Even though the short-term impact of FDI on imports is not found, it is seen 
that at each quarter, the deviations from equilibrium is corrected at the speed of 16%.  
In summary, this section adopts the Engle and Granger two-step procedure to analyse the 
data set. The results indicate that, under the specification of VAR assuming two 
endogenous variables, inward FDI and trade openness do not have a long-term relationship 
with economic growth in Thailand. However, it is found that inward FDI has positive long-
term and short-term relationships with income deficits. In addition, the long-term impact of 
FDI on imports is found but its short-term impact is not empirically confirmed by the data.  
6.5 Johansen Cointegration and VECM, Results, and Discussion 
Failure to establish a long-term relationship between inward FDI and the Thai economic 
growth, under the specification of the Engle and Granger cointegration approach, may be 
due to the mis-specification of the model. This is because the specification of equation 6.12 
may suffer from the problem of omitted variables. In addition, due to the possibility that 
there is more than one cointegrating relationship in an economy, the Engle and Granger 
approach may be inefficient in producing an accurate inference since the model assumes 
only one cointegrating relationship in the model. It is also noted that assessing the impact 
of FDI on economic growth is in fact a study of growth in relation to FDI. Thus, a more 
appropriate attempt to assess the empirical impact of FDI on growth may require the 
empirical growth framework in which all basic factors of production are taken into account. 
For this reason, it is reasonable to adopt the growth model that this study developed in 
Chapter 4.  
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The growth model of the form of equation 4.5 can be rewritten under the specification of 
Johansen approach, depicted by equation 6.3, as follows: 
t
kt
kt
kt
kt
kt
kt
kt
kt
t
t
t
t
t E
lb
dinv
fdi
gni
lb
dinv
fdi
gni
lb
dinv
fdi
gni
cisislb
dinv
fdi
gni
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
3210 ...           (6.14) 
 gni is an approximation of Y, national income. fdi and dinv represent capital, K, which is 
segregated into foreign capital and domestic capital. lb is labour L. Theoretically, there is 
no reason to assume that the labour force would have an endogenous relationship in the 
system. Thus, this study treats this variable as weakly exogenous. Basically, equation 6.14 
can be regarded as a Cobb-Doulas production function under the specification of the 
Johansen conditional model (Johansen, 1991). As the previous chapter showed that 
Thailand is in its second stage of economic development, according to the Investment 
Development Path (IDP), this is why an outward FDI is omitted from equation 6.14.  
With respect to the coefficients in equation 6.14, they can be explained as follows.  0 are 
deterministic terms that include an intercept, a trended variable, and seasonal dummy 
variables. It must be noted that, according to Johansen (1995), the standard 0/1 dummy 
variables, if applied, will affect the mean and the trend of a dependent variable in level. 
Therefore, he proposed the solution of using orthogonalised seasonal dummy variables, 
which shift the mean without causing changes in the trend. 1 is the coefficient of labour 
force in the lagged first-differenced. 2 is another deterministic term that captures the 
financial crisis in 1997.  43 , , and  are already defined as presented by equation 6.5.  
The objective of this section is to determine whether there is any long-term relationship in 
the system of equations 6.14. That is, with the Johansen approach, one would be able to 
identify the number of cointegration vectors. It is seen from Table 6.1 that all variables in 
the system of equations 6.14 are I(1) variables. Thus, it is in  where this study seeks to 
identify the r linearly independent vectors. As mentioned earlier, this procedure involves 
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the likelihood estimation based on the maximum eigenvalue test and trace test. At this 
stage, the system of equations 6.14 is estimated without restriction. The Johansen 
cointegration test requires two practical specifications as in the Engle and Granger 
cointegration that are, the deterministic terms of the model and the number of lag length. 
The deterministic terms have been identified earlier in the previous paragraph. With 
regards to the number of lag length, it is determined by the SC and the AIC. The lag length 
selection is reported in Table E.3, Appendix E.  
It is noted that the number of cointegrating vectors implies that long-term relationships are 
sensitive to the number of lag length, k. In the case of this study, the SC and AIC choose 
different numbers. The SC identifies k to be 1 while the AIC chooses 16. Accordingly, 
specifying different lag length in the model leads to different results. When the model is 
specified with lag length equal to one, it indicates one cointegration vector. However, 
when lag length in the model is specified to be 16, the Johansen cointegration estimation 
reports four cointegrating vectors. The results of the trace test and the maximum 
eigenvalue test, performed under different lag lengths, are reported in Table 6.5a, Table 
6.5b, Table 6.6a, and Table 6.6b. 
TABLE 6.5a: TEST OF THE NUMBER OF COINTEGRATING VECTORS BASED ON TRACE TEST 
WHERE k = 1 
Null Hypothesis Trace Statistic Critical Value at 5% Probability 
r = 0 82.6148 63.8761 0.000 
r ≥ 1 24.8459 42.9152 0.797 
r ≥ 2 11.9608 25.8721 0.814 
r ≥ 3 1.2131 12.5179 0.997 
Conclusion: Trace test indicates one cointegrating vector at 5% level 
Note: Critical value is computed based on the statistic reported in Mackinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999) 
TABLE 6.5b: TEST OF THE NUMBER OF COINTEGRATING VECTORS BASED ON 
MAXIMUN EIGENVALUE TEST WHERE k = 1 
Null Hypothesis 
Maximum Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
Critical Value at 5% Probability 
r = 0 57.7689 32.1183 0.000 
r = 1 12.8851 25.8232 0.812 
r = 2 10.7476 19.3870 0.539 
r = 3 1.2131 12.5179 0.997 
Conclusion: Maximum eigenvalue test indicates one cointegrating vector at 5% level 
Note: Critical value is computed based on the statistic reported in Mackinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999) 
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TABLE 6.6a: TEST OF THE NUMBER OF COINTEGRATING VECTORS BASED ON TRACE 
TEST WHERE k = 16 
Null Hypothesis Trace Statistic Critical Value at 5% Probability 
r = 0 189.7344 63.8761 0.000 
r = at most 1 101.5837 42.9152 0.000 
r = at most 2 37.9702 25.8721 0.001 
r = at most 3 13.2937 12.5179 0.037 
Conclusion: Trace test indicates four cointegrating vectors at 5% level 
Note: Critical value is computed based on the statistic reported in Mackinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999) 
 
 
TABLE 6.6b: TEST OF THE NUMBER OF COINTEGRATING VECTORS BASED ON 
MAXIMUN EIGENVALUE TEST WHERE k = 16 
Null Hypothesis 
Maximum Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
Critical Value at 5% Probability 
r = 0 88.1507 32.1183 0.000 
r = 1 63.6134 25.8232 0.000 
r = 2 24.6765 19.3870 0.001 
r = 3 13.2937 12.5179 0.037 
Conclusion: Maximum eigenvalue test indicates four cointegrating vectors at 5% 
level 
Note: Critical value is computed based on the statistic reported in Mackinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999) 
 
As is evident, under k equal to one, the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue tests 
produce similar results which show that there is one cointegrating vector in the system of 
equations 6.14. Nevertheless, when k is equal to 16, four cointegrating vectors are then 
identified. Thus, it is inferred that there is at least a long-run relationship among variables 
in the Thai income growth process as depicted by equation 6.14. It is then possible to 
examine further a nature of structural relationships underlying the long-run model.  This is 
done by interpreting β and α coefficients, located in  vectors, estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method.  
In the light of two different results of the number of cointegrating relationships, a 
judgement needs to be made before this study could proceed further to analyse the 
structural relationship. At this stage, it can be confirmed that there exists a long-term 
relationship between GNI, FDI, domestic investment and labour force in Thailand. 
However, in terms of making an economic interpretation, Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
noted that when at least two cointegrating vectors are identified the interpretation of β and 
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α is not straightforward. Thus, for practical purposes, this study will interpret the 
cointegrating vector which is estimated by the model where k = 1. The estimated 
coefficients β and α from the model, where k =1 and only one cointegrating vector is found, 
are reported in Table 6.7. 
TABLE 6.7: JOHANSEN TEST FOR COINTEGRATING VECTOR OF THE THAI GROWTH 
REGRESSION 
 gni fdi dinv lb constant 
      
 1.000 
 
3.698 
(0.842) 
-0.504 
(0.047) 
6.978 
(0.954) 
-75.665 
      
 0.067 
(0.029) 
-0.013 
(0.006) 
1.362 
(0.241) 
-0.019 
(0.005) 
 
Test for autocorrelation 
LM(1), p-value = 0.47 
LM(2), p-value = 0.43 
Test for normality 
JB, p-value = 0.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of LM test is no serial correlation 
          The null hypothesis of Jacque-Bera (JB) tests is residuals are multivariate normal  
 
Before discussing the structural relationship found in the cointegrating vector, it is worth 
commenting on the property of the model specification. Based on Chakraborty and Basu 
(2002), two multivariate diagnostic tests were performed to assess the properties of the 
residuals of equation 6.14. These are the multivariate Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and 
the multivariate extensions of the Jacque-Bera residual normality test. As seen from Table 
6.7, the residuals are free from serial correlation but they are not normally distributed. An 
initial attempt to explain this would be that the model does suffer from the omitted variable. 
However, this can be considered as a common and trivial problem for growth regression in 
general. This is because growth process is affected by a wide range of determinants. As a 
more serious problem of serial correlation is absent, this model can be regarded as a sound 
model and that the interpretation derived from this model is meaningful. 
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The interpretation of the cointegration vector in the equilibrium relation can be given by 
the following equation: 
lbdinvfdigni 978.6504.0698.3665.75    (6.15) 
The coefficients of α can be interpreted as the weights with which the deviations of GNI 
enters the four equations of the system of equation 6.14. Indeed, it is the average speed of 
adjustment towards the estimated equilibrium state. However, in the context of this study, 
they do not provide much economic sense. Therefore this study will focus only on the 
interpretation of the β coefficients. The estimated β coefficients, as re-represented in 
equation 6.15, show that FDI has a long-term negative impact on GNI. It is also found that 
domestic investment has a long-term, positive impact on GNI. However, counter-
intuitively, an increase in the size of the labour force appears to have a long-term negative 
impact on GNI.  
The negative impact on FDI and the positive impact of domestic investment on the Thai 
GNI in the steady state could be supported by dependency theory. It must be noted that the 
negative impact of FDI on the Thai GNI is not likely to be caused by the FDI per se. From 
Chapter 5, this study showed that as a result of an attempt to restore market mechanism, 
the Thai government has gradually lifted policy instruments devised to facilitate 
materialisation of FDI-positive spillovers. In addition, this study showed that TNCs are the 
main exporters in Thailand, and that their activities are positively correlated with the 
outflow of capital. Thus, it is not difficult to comprehend the negative impact from inward 
FDI on the Thai national income.  
In relation to domestic investment, as it gives a positive impact on growth, it can be 
classified as a more preferred type of investment. This notion has long been advocated in 
economic development literature and has been reviewed in detail in Chapter 3. It must be 
noted that the importance of domestic investment, presumably conducted by domestic 
entrepreneurs, is also the central point in the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4. 
The productive capability, acquired by the process of learning by investing and embodied 
in domestic firms, is the main impetus that would perpetually upgrade the nation‟s 
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comparative advantages along the path of development. Thus, it should help accelerate and 
sustain an increase in national income.  
With regard to the negative impact on GNI from an increase in the size of the labour force, 
it can also be explained within the context of dependency theory. From the historical 
review of economic development in Thailand in Chapter 5, this study pointed out that only 
a minority of Thai citizens is the main beneficiary of the FDI-led growth development 
model. The majority of citizens that makes up a vast pool of unskilled labour still earn the 
minimum wage which is extremely low compared to the average income of the upper-
middle class. In addition, it must be noted that the empirical evidence shows that the nature 
of technology that has been imported with FDI is capital-intensive. This implies less 
employment, particularly the employment of unskilled labour. Capital-intensive 
technology however benefits more the elites and upper-middle classes. In such situations, 
the unskilled labour may compete for the lower income while the minority upper-middle 
class would still enjoy a secured and increasing income share. In most cases, the benefits 
for the minority may not be able to compensate for the social loss from an uneven income 
distribution. Thus, an increased labour force in an economy where FDI is a key source of 
economic activities, like Thailand, could result in a decrease in the national income. 
Now, the analysis will shift to examine the dynamic or short-term relationships among 
variables in the system of equation 6.14. Within the Johansen VECM approach, short-run 
structural relationships are obtained by estimating the VECM that includes the long-run 
cointegrating relationship. This cointegrating vector acts as the error correction term to be 
included in the model. In the case of this study, the VECM is defined as follows: 
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    (6.16) 
where 1tZ  is the cointegrating vector as depicted by equation 6.15. The results from the 
estimation of equation 6.16 are reported in Table 6.8. The diagnostic tests show that the 
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model is sound and can be considered as a working one. It also produces the estimated 
coefficients which appear to be theoretically correct. In particular, the serial correlation 
tests suggest that, if a higher lag order is included, the serial correlation problem may well 
be addressed. The JB test shows that the joint residuals of four equations appear not to be 
normally distributed. This study accepts this breach of assumption but the interpretation of 
the results will continue as this violation is not considered to be serious.   
TABLE 6.8: ESTIMATION OF THE VECM 
 Δgni equation  Δfdi equation  Δdinv equation 
Variables      
Δgni(-1) 0.034 
(0.328) 
 0.032 
(1.488) 
 0.894 
(1.078) 
Δfdi(-1) 1.479 
(2.992) 
 0.210 
(2.089) 
 -1.658 
(-0.427) 
Δdinv(-1)  0.177 
(1.493) 
 -0.002 
(-1.197) 
 -0.097 
(-1.041) 
Δlb -0.457 
(-0.842) 
 -0.015 
(-0.136) 
 10.609 
(2.363) 
Δlb(-1) 1.198 
(2.328) 
 -0.280 
(-2.669) 
 2.010 
(0.497) 
crisis -0.183 
(-6.197) 
 0.035 
(5.935) 
 -0.147 
(-0.635) 
ce(-1) -0.048 
(-1.546) 
 -0.012 
(-2.001) 
 1.614 
(6.607) 
Test for autocorrelation 
LM(2), p-value = 0.02 
LM(5), p-value = 0.19 
Test for normality 
JB, p-value = 0.00 
Note: The null hypothesis of LM test is no serial correlation 
          The null hypothesis of Jacque-Bera (JB) tests is residuals are multivariate normal  
ce is cointegrating vector  
 
From Table 6.8, column 2, it is seen that inward FDI and labour force appear to have a 
short-run positive impact on the growth of the Thai GNI. The dummy variable that depicts 
the crisis in 1997 also produces a correct sign, suggesting that the crisis has a negative 
impact on the Thai national income. The coefficient of error correction terms is negative 
and nearly significant. This suggests an error correction mechanism, even though it may 
well be weakly exogenous. Column 3 from the same table depicts an equation that explains 
changes in inward FDI in Thailand. It shows that the past value of the stock of FDI helps to 
Chapter 6: Data Description, Empirical Analyses, and Results 
  
 
 
201 
explain an increase in the stock of FDI in the present time. However, it shows that an 
increase in the labour force has a short-term negative impact on FDI. The crisis variable 
also gives the coefficient that is in line with the observations made in the previous chapter. 
That is, the crisis is positively correlated to an increase in the stock of FDI. The error 
mechanism is also found in this equation because the coefficient of the cointegrating vector 
is negative and significant. The last column in Table 6.8 depicts the changes in domestic 
investment in relation to other variables in the system. The only independent variable that 
appears to have a positive short-run impact on domestic investment is the size of the labour 
force at the present time. Generally, this equation can be considered as weak because the 
error correction mechanism cannot be identified and most of independent variables appear 
not to be significant.  
In brief, the short-run structural relationships show that FDI appears to cause growth in the 
Thai GNI even though it leaves a negative long-term impact on the national income. 
Domestic investment, whilst giving a long-run positive impact on the Thai GNI, appears 
not to have a short-term impact on growth.  Labour force shows to have a positive short-
run impact on growth but a long-run negative impact. Thus, the empirical results again 
confirm that Thailand appears to have traits of being a capital-dependent state.    
So far, this study has focused mainly on establishing long-run and short-run relationships 
between and among variables of interest. Conventionally, most empirical studies that 
adopted VAR and VECM approaches for time-series analyses also went beyond estimating 
parameters to establishing the direction of causation between and among variables of 
interest. Thus, in the next section, this study will perform the bi-variate Granger causality 
tests, based on Granger et al. (2002) and Vector Error Correction (VEC) Granger causality.    
The aim of the following section is to identify the direction of causation between and 
among variables which are cointegrated.     
6.6 Bi-variate and VEC Granger Causality     
This section looks to identify the direction of causation between two endogenous variables 
in Regressions 3 and 4 specified and estimated by the Engle and Granger two-step 
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procedure. It also seeks to identify directions of causation among the variables in the 
system of equations 6.14, specified under the Johansen cointegration model. The bi-variate 
Granger causality test is performed on the following pairs of variables: FDI vs. income 
deficits and FDI vs. total imports. Clearly, they are pairs of variables from Regression3 and 
4, respectively. The specification of the bi-variate model is taken from Granger et al., 
(2000), as elaborated by equation 6.9. The results are reported in Table 6.9.   
TABLE 6.9: BI-VARIATE GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS 
Note:  1. −/→ implies the H0 of no Granger causality. 
 2. p-values reported in bold represent Granger cuausality significant at 5% level and lower. 
3. Assuming that these variables tend to affect one another in the long run so based on economic intuition, the 
past information to be taken into account should go back to period t-8 which implies two years. 
 
The numbers of lag length, used in the bi-variate Granger causality test, are chosen by the 
SC, the AIC, and the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria. Furthermore, this study 
also specified lagged value of the period t-8 in order to capture the impact over two years. 
As seen from Table 6.9, row 2, FDI does Granger cause changes in income deficits and the 
reversed direction of causality is not found. This, once again, supports the argument made 
by dependency theory which claims that FDI causes an outflow of capital. Table 6.9, row 3, 
indicates that FDI and total imports in Thailand appear to have a bi-directional causality. 
More specifically, it is seen that when consider a shorter lagged value, that is 2, the 
causation runs from FDI to import, suggesting that FDI Granger causes changes in imports. 
However, when a longer lagged period is considered, the bi-directional causality appears. 
This implies that FDI in Thailand could well be a quid pro quo FDI and import-
H0: y1−/→y2 
H0: y2−/→y1 
lag length chosen by 
intuition
3 
AIC SC HQ 
p-value 
 
p-value 
( lag length ) 
p-value 
( lag length ) 
p-value 
( lag length ) 
fdi−/→def 0.012 
(8) 
0.000 
(12) 
0.6763 
(6) 
0.000 
(12) 
def−/→fdi 0.960 
(8) 
0.903 
(12) 
0.8913 
(6) 
0.903 
(12) 
fdi−/→imp 0.000 
(8) 
0.000 
(10) 
0.000 
(2) 
0.000 
(10) 
imp−/→fdi 0.011 
(8) 
0.0399 
(10) 
0.239 
(2) 
0.0399 
(10) 
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substitution. Nonetheless, in the light of a liberal trade and investment regime, this could 
also be explained by the following situation. That is, foreign export firms find it is more 
profitable to produce the products, which they once exported, in Thailand in the form of 
FDI.  
The framework of Granger causality, depicted by equation 6.9, can be extended to examine 
the direction of causation among the variables of interest in the system. More specifically, 
it is possible to determine the causation relationship among the variables in the system of 
equations 6.14 while taking into account the error correction terms and a set of 
deterministic terms. The results of the VEC Granger causality are reported in Table 6.10. 
TABLE 6.10: VEC GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS 
 
Panel (a) 
Dependent variable: gni    
Lag order 1 16 
dinv 0.0486 0.0000 
fdi 0.0074 0.0000 
lb 0.0263 0.0065 
All 0.0006 0.0000 
 
Panel (b) 
Dependent variable: dinv    
Lag order 1 16 
gni 0.3487 0.0179 
fdi 0.6512 0.8216 
lb 0.4978 0.1720 
All 0.4153 0.4955 
 
Panel (c) 
Dependent variable: fdi    
Lag order 1 16 
gni 0.1040 0.0001 
dinv 0.2062 0.1307 
lb 0.0073 0.0310 
All 0.0920 0.0021 
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Panel (d) 
Dependent variable: lb   
Lag order 1 16 
gni 0.3163 0.2549 
dinv 0.0070 0.5422 
fdi 0.0670 0.2167 
All 0.0159 0.0878 
Note:  1. Numbers reported are p-values 
2. Numbers reported in bold indicate the presence of Granger causality from that variable to the related 
dependent variable.  
 
As mentioned earlier, from the given dataset, the SC and the AIC selected the numbers of 
lag length, 1 and 16, to be included in the model, respectively. Thus, this study performed 
two multivariate Granger causality tests on its cointegrated variables with k equal to 1 and 
16 accordingly. A succinct interpretation of the results reported in Table 6.10 is as follows. 
With the model where only one period lagged value is included, the uni-direction of 
causation runs from FDI, domestic investment, and labour force, to GNI. No reversed 
direction of causation was empirically found. This means that in a very short run, FDI, 
domestic investment, and labour force help to explain changes in GNI but GNI itself does 
not Granger cause changes in these variables.  
Furthermore, the VEC multivariate Granger causality, where k is equal to one, also shows 
that two causations exist, running from labour force to FDI and from domestic investment 
to labour force. An initial attempt to explain these relationships would be to suggest that 
FDI in Thailand is attracted by an increasing pool of cheap labour force. This argument is 
well supported by the literature review in Chapter 2 where this study showed that when 
production technology is matured, TNCs look to relocate their productive activities in the 
country where labour is abundant and cheap. This is also in line with the observations 
made in Chapter 5 where this study pointed out that most of TNCs activities in Thailand 
concentrate more on manufacturing rather than developing products. On the causation from 
domestic investment to labour force, it may well be that an increase in domestic investment 
may draw a labour force from an informal sector of the economy into the formal sector. 
However, as the effect is short-lived, that is, it does not take place in the model where more 
information is included. So, this causation may not be economically significant.  
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When more past information, higher lagged values, are fed into the model, bi-directional 
causalities between GNI and investment of both types are empirically found. This confirms 
that first of all, the treatment of FDI and domestic investment as endogenous variables are 
indeed statistically correct. It also implies that changes in market size, captured by the size 
of the national income also help to determine the decision to invest by both foreign and 
domestic investors. In addition, the causation from labour force to FDI remains significant. 
Overall, the VEC Granger causality tests confirm that FDI, GNI and domestic investment 
in Thailand are indeed interrelated. 
6.7 Summary  
This chapter empirically confirms that there exist equilibrium relationships between i) 
inward FDI and income deficits, and ii) inward FDI and total imports in Thailand. In 
addition, this study also found the equilibrium relationship among GNI, FDI, domestic 
investment, and labour force. The first two long-term relationships were empirically found 
from the bi-variate endogenous models. They point out that inward FDI helps to explain 
and increase in income deficits and imports in the long run. This study failed to establish 
the long-term relationship between GNI and inward FDI from the Engle and Granger two-
step procedure. However, such log-run relationship is found when the model is better 
specified with more variables. 
Under the multivariate growth model and estimated by the Johansen cointegration 
technique and the error correction modelling, the long-run relationship between FDI, 
domestic investment, labour force, and GNI in Thailand was identified. From this long-run 
relationship, it was seen that FDI and labour force have a long-term negative impact on 
GNI while domestic investment appears to have a positive long-run relationship on the 
Thai GNI. The existence of such a long-run relationship allows the analysis of short-run 
impact of these variables in a vector error correction model. The VECM then suggests that 
even though FDI has a long-term negative impact on the Thai GNI, in a short run, it does 
help increase growth. It is also observed that while domestic investment has a long-term 
positive impact on GNI, it does not have a short-run impact on growth.  
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Granger causality tests also confirm that inward FDI in Thailand does Granger cause 
changes in income deficits and total imports. This finding supports the arguments made by 
dependency theory, which asserts that inward FDI could trigger the outflow of capital and 
that it could cause balance of payments problems by inducing more imports. In the 
multivariate Granger causality tests, this study showed that when more past information is 
taken into account, the Thai GNI appears to have a bi-directional relationship with FDI and 
domestic investment. 
In summary, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter appears to support the 
hypothesis made in the previous chapter that the Thai developmental path is taking the 
form of a capital dependent state. This means that economic growth in Thailand is largely 
dependent on foreign capital and technology. Moreover, it can be deduced that this 
situation may well be the result of abolishing policy instruments that have been devised to 
facilitate the spillovers from FDI. On policy implications, this evidence strongly suggests 
the revision of the Thai investment promotion scheme that appears to favour and benefit 
foreign investment more than domestic investment.    
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the work presented in this study. Also found in this chapter are 
implications for public policies and propose areas for further study.  
 
7.2 Review of the Dissertation  
The assessment of the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on economic growth 
required theoretical understanding of at least three related disciplines, namely, international 
business, economic growth and political economy. From institutional perspectives, Chapter 
2 showed that firms, particularly, TNCs, exist due to imperfections in the market. FDI is an 
action of a national firm which decides to internalise transactions across two or more 
national markets. In other words, a pursuit to grow beyond what the national market can 
offer. The larger the productive operations of TNCs become in relation to the market, the 
less power the invisible hand has to deliver the optimal economic efficiency. In addition, 
this study points out that firms‟ ownership-specific advantages are their abilities to produce 
technological and organisational capability. These abilities are sources of survival and 
growth. They empower firms to be more efficient than the market.  
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The ownership-specific advantage is created by an interactive use of human and non-human 
capital which might be controlled by the management or entrepreneurs. It is also important 
to note that the direction of growth and the availability and quality of a firm‟s resources are 
very much dependent on external factors such as regulations, institutions, and the role of the 
state. At aggregate level, the ownership specific advantages of national firms can be 
regarded as the country‟s productive capability in the sense of Chang (2010). This capability 
is responsible for instigating and sustaining further economic development.  
 
From macro-economic perspectives, Chapter 3 explained that FDI is regarded as a long-
term capital flow which brings not only additional capital but also advanced technology to 
host countries (Borensztein, et al., 1998; De Mello, 1999; Ramirez, 2000; Saggi, 2002 and 
Kohpaiboon, 2006). In growth economics, capital and technology are sources of growth. 
Thus, when FDI is perceived as an inflow of capital and technology, it is presumed to be 
beneficial to the growth of host economies. The majority of FDI-growth models reviewed in 
section 3.2.1.1 have underplayed several qualitative aspects of FDI, such as, the rent-
seeking behaviour and foreign nationality of Transnational Corporations (TNCs). Besides, 
FDI-growth models fail to capture the dynamic impact of FDI such as transfers of resources 
and capital ex post. Therefore, given the complicated implications of FDI for the host 
economy, it is not sufficient to assess the benefits of FDI by merely adopting a pure growth 
economic approach.  
 
There are conceptual discrepancies between micro-perspectives and macro-perspective 
towards FDI. Given these, FDI is more likely to be perceived in accordance with macro-
economic perspectives and hence been presumed to be an important source for economic 
development. Accordingly, attracting FDI has been placed high in the agenda of many 
developing countries, including Thailand.  This agenda is also implemented with neo-liberal 
development policies which are likely to create an institutional structure that does not 
facilitate the materialisation of FDI-related spillovers.  
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This study also points out that the friendly perspectives towards FDI at the moment are 
contrary to the common perception of FDI in the 1960s and 1970s. Between these two 
decades, many developing countries were mostly hostile to the penetration of TNCs from 
more powerful nations. These critical arguments towards FDI were stem from the emblem 
of dependency theory. Though not unified and rigorous, dependency theorists agreed that 
FDI is likely to make a developing nation into a dependent capital state, or a peripheral 
economy, and impede a complete capitalist development.  
 
Dependency theorists perceived FDI more in line with how international business scholars 
considered it. More specifically, dependency theory is strongly aware the ability of FDI to 
drive out domestic firms and obstruct the formation of a strong, domestic, capitalist class. 
Dependency theory has been arguing that FDI, through the use of inappropriate technology 
and limited interaction with the greater scope of the economy, could cause an uneven 
development and give rise to social inequality and economic dualism. Most importantly, 
dependency theory suggested that economic development, led by FDI, could generate only a 
limited benefit from international trade, due to the deterioration of the terms of trade. It 
might also cause an outward transfer of resources in the form of outflow of income from 
investment, natural resources, or products that are produced using cheap domestic resources. 
All these aspects could have serious adverse impacts on the balance of payments of the 
nation. It must be noted, however, that dependency theory too carries many shortcomings. 
The theory assumes a passive role of the state and weak domestic firms. It also underplays 
the possibility of value creations, expansion of consumer choice and the opportunity of 
domestic firms to gain knowledge and technology at a lower cost.  
 
Chapter 3 also showed that a friendly attitude towards FDI was a recent phenomenon and a 
product of world history, namely, the fall of communism and the rise of neo-liberal ideology. 
These two events had a forceful consequence on economic policies including economic 
development policies in relation to FDI. Neo-liberalism believes in market efficiency and 
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supports an idea of free movements of goods, services, and capital, and the minimal role of 
the state. The case in point is that, theoretically, FDI and TNCs exist because of the 
inherited inefficiency of the market. Therefore, they may not be effectively managed by 
neo-liberal policies whose driving ideology lies in a different set of assumptions. Indeed, 
scholars from international business discipline, such as, Hymer (1979), Penrose (1995), 
Dunning and Narula (1996), and Dunning (1999) tend to support the state‟s intervention in 
the market through policies and regulations when dealing with larger and stronger firms vis-
à-vis smaller and weaker firms. In fairness, some FDI-growth models also acknowledge the 
nature of the highly concentrated market in which TNCs operate. However, they appear to 
underplay the rent-seeking nature of TNCs and overstate the possibility that TNCs will 
generate technological spillovers. Besides, these models seem to leave out the likelihood 
that FDI might trigger further transfer of resources across nations when engaged in 
operations. These transfers may not necessarily generate gains from international investment 
or even international trade for the host countries. This is partly because international 
transactions, caused by TNCs are in many cases, not arm‟s length transactions but likely to 
be intra-firm transactions that might adopt transfer pricing.   
 
The present study highlighted that the evidence in support of positive spillovers from FDI to 
growth is inconclusive. Most importantly, the results seem to be negative when using data 
from developing countries. In cases where positive spillovers are reported, they are 
conditional on other factors such as human capital, technological gap, liberal trade regime, 
and financial market development. It should be noted that as these conditions can only be 
materialised by implementing relevant policies. Thus, it points to the role of the state in 
regulating FDI and manipulating it to serve the national development objectives. However, 
in practice, particularly in Thailand, due to the influence of neo-liberalism which attempts to 
reduce the role of the state in intervening international investment. The country is not only 
discouraged from regulating FDI but also indirectly guided to prioritise foreign investment 
over domestic investment.  
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The conceptual frameworks are developed in Chapter 4. For the purpose of political 
economy analysis of FDI, this study adopts the concept of the Investment Development Path 
(IDP) to analyse the dynamic role of FDI in economic growth. The IDP is a concept that is 
developed within the international business discipline and which, later on, the author has 
extended to the field of political economy. This framework can be used to assess what type 
of development a country tends to follow, that is, a complete capitalist development or a 
dependent development, based on the Net Outward Investment (NOI). This indicator 
represents the ownership-specific advantages that are embodied in domestic firms in relation 
to that of TNCs. These ownership-specific advantages, at aggregate level, reflect the 
country‟s productive capability or the strength of domestic firms which later will help to 
increase the country‟s competitive advantage along its developmental path. As mentioned 
earlier, the IDP could also shed some light on the dynamic nature of FDI-related policies. 
The study showed that the modified IDP framework can be used to represent a capital-
dependent state which is advocated by dependency theorists.  
 
Nonetheless, as the IDP does not offer a theoretical framework where the impact of FDI can 
be empirically assessed, this study then resorts to growth economics and adapts the neo-
classical growth model as its empirical platform for the assessments of the impact of FDI in 
the economy of Thailand.  
 
Against the backdrop of the ongoing economic transformations in Thailand that has led to 
diminishing power of domestic capital, deregulations in the FDI-related area, and increasing 
dominance of TNCs in growth strategic sectors after the financial crisis in 1997, dependency 
theory appears to provide a more relevant conceptual framework to analyse the effect of FDI 
in the Thai economy. Firstly, this is especially important because the Thai state has been 
relatively weak due to the influence of neo-liberalism, particularly in the area of industrial 
planning. Secondly, the liberalisation and deregulation of FDI allow TNCs to exercise their 
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greater ownership-specific advantages with limited restrictions. Thirdly, domestic firms in 
Thailand appear to be passive and relatively weak, compared to TNCs.         
Observations made from the analysis of political economy 
In Chapter 5, the study has analysed the role of FDI in the political economy of Thailand in 
a conceptual framework that is based on the IDP and dependency theory. It has been shown 
that Thailand has a number of features of being a capital dependent state or a peripheral 
economy. These features are the following: 
1) Thailand has adopted FDI and export-led growth policies since 1970s. Its 
development was once claimed as a successful case of FDI and export-led growth 
strategy. Indeed, export and FDI appear to instigate economic growth in Thailand. 
2) Despite having been the main recipient of inward FDI in the region for over three 
decades, the country‟s NOI does not show any sign of surging. It implies that the 
technological gap between the domestic firms and TNCs may have increased over 
time.   
3) Thailand appears to have a high level of FDI concentration when measured in terms 
of the percentage share of total investment by the three largest foreign investors 
classified by country. Even though the concentration has been slightly decreased 
recently, the implication remains that a few countries, collectively, may have 
bargaining power over the Thai government in the international investment-related 
policies.    
4) From 1980, the ratio of the stock of FDI to GDP, which represents foreign capital 
penetration, has generally been increasing, particularly after the financial crisis of 
1997. This can be interpreted as an increasing dominance of TNCs in the economy. 
5) Domestic firms and TNCs in Thailand specialise in different sectors. TNCs appear to 
specialise in the medium and high technology intensive export sectors. TNCs are 
responsible for more than 60 percent of total exports from Thailand. This may 
suggest limited linkages between domestic firms and TNCs. This limited linkage 
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may be explained by the small productive capability of domestic firms, which in turn, 
can be captured by the persistent decline of the negative NOI. 
6)  The study of FDI and investment-related policies showed that the policies have been 
mainly influenced by neo-liberal ideology. Explanation of policies also helps to 
identify the underlying reasons for the limited linkage between TNCs and domestic 
firms. That is because 
 
i) Thailand has no specific and detailed industrial plan. 
ii) The promotion of investment in Thailand does not distinguish the 
nationality of the firm except in the case of sensitive industries such 
as agriculture, media, and communication. In many industries, 
domestic and foreign firms are treated equally, irrespective of their 
size and competitive ability. 
iii) After the financial crisis of 1997, many instrumental policies that are 
designed to increase the likelihood of technological spillovers from 
TNCs to local firms were lifted. For example, the requirement of 
local content, and the limitation of foreign equity were abolished. 
iv) More liberal FDI policies have been adopted as a result of the 
participation in international trade and investment agreements.  
 
7) The investment-related policies pursued were mostly aimed at attracting FDI by 
increasing the country‟s locational advantages. Little has been done to help increase 
the ownership-specific advantage of domestic firms. Over time, the country has been 
receiving more FDI with sophisticated technology. The ownership-specific 
advantages embodied in domestic firms, however, has remained constant or 
increased at a slower pace. Thus, the technological gap between TNCs and domestic 
firms has been widening. 
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8) The widening technological gap argument is supported by the NOI analysis where it 
is seen that the Thai NOI has been decreasing, especially from 1997 onwards. The 
fall of NOI represents the growing difference of the ownership-specific advantages 
between TNCs and domestic firms.   
9) Recently, due to the change in regulations that has been largely influenced by 
external political influence, the number of 100% foreign establishments has 
increased significantly while the number of joint-venture projects has decreased by a 
half.  
10)  It has also been observed that, since 2005, projects receiving fiscal investment 
incentives had over 70 percent of their capital coming from foreign investors. 
11) Even though FDI is highly concentrated in the manufacturing sector, Total Factor 
Productive (TFP) growth of that sector has remained modest.  
12)  Regarding resource transfers, the study showed that the ratio of GNI to GDP in 
Thailand, since the promotion of export and FDI-led growth policies, has always 
been less than 1.0 and gradually decreased with some fluctuations. This suggests that 
the country experiences deficits in the net transfer payments which are possibly 
caused by hosting international investment projects.  
13)  The study of the Thai balance of payments showed that the Thai income balance has 
been the largest source of deficits, followed by the balance of services. Even though 
the balance of goods appeared to generate some surplus, it is noticed that the surplus 
appears to be marginal. 
14)  Export of goods from Thailand seems to trigger an increase in import of goods and 
services. Indeed, data showed that between 1995 and 2008 imports of raw material, 
intermediate and capital goods on average accounted for almost three-quarters of 
total imports. 
15)  The country‟s terms of trade have also deteriorated significantly especially since the 
financial crisis of 1997. The deterioration can be partly explained by a heavy 
reliance on imports of technology and intermediate goods, devaluations, and transfer 
pricing practices.   
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16)  It is observed that the neoliberal development has affected the Thai economy 
structurally. The financial crisis of 1997, particularly its cyclical effects highlighted 
the structural deficiencies of the economy. Some of the key deficiencies are 
relatively weak domestic entrepreneurs, the dominance of foreign capital in export 
sectors, and the limited role of the state in engineering the industrial development.  
17) The pattern of ownership in a number of economic sectors has considerably changed. 
For example, there appears to be a growing foreign dominance in key industries such 
as banking, and medium to high technology intensive manufacturing industries. 
Moreover, the share of export to total GDP has significantly increased. It must be 
noted that most of exported products were produced by TNCs. This suggests that the 
country has also increased an economic reliance on their operations.  
18)  There has always been a relatively high level of income inequality throughout the 
history of the Thai development. It is highlighted that income inequality has co-
existed with „economic dualism‟ over the past fifty years. The inequality has 
persistently existed under the neo-liberal FDI-led growth model in Thailand. It 
appears that economic growth in Thailand in the past could not address the 
inequality and this inequality does underlie the recent political instability recently. 
 
Most of the above-mentioned features are similar to economic traits of a capital-dependent 
state, as described by dependency theorists, who also argue that these features are largely 
induced by FDI. It is acknowledged that an export and FDI-led growth strategy helps 
explain economic growth in Thailand. However, the type of growth it has induced, 
particularly the institutional transformation, has not been beneficial to Thai development in 
the long-term. Firstly, this type of growth impedes the formation of a strong entrepreneurial 
class. Secondly, international pressure has constrained the role of the state in industrial 
planning and intervention. Thirdly, this type of growth has increased the country‟s 
dependence on foreign capital and technology. As a result, the nation‟s productive capability, 
which is crucial for a fully capitalist development, cannot be effectively formed. 
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Observations made from empirical analyses 
In Chapter 6, the study carried out some empirical tests. The statistical techniques adopted 
for the analyses in this chapter were the Engle and Granger two-step procedure and the 
Johansen cointegration and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Empirical analyses are 
derived from the use of quarterly time-series data from Q1:1970 to Q4:2009. The empirical 
findings can be briefly outlined as follows: 
1) Inward FDI has induced economic growth, measured by GNI, in Thailand only in 
the short run. However, in the long run, the impact of FDI appears to have a negative 
impact on GNI. This empirical result supports the hypothesis that Thailand is a 
capital-dependent state.  
2) Domestic investment has had a positive impact on economic growth even though it 
does not have an impact in the short run.   
3) Labour force has a negative long-run effect on GNI but it is able to instigate growth 
of GNI in the short run. It must also noted that increase in labour force could attract 
inward FDI  
4) Inward FDI is empirically found to induce an increase in income deficits and imports 
in Thailand in the long run 
5) The financial crisis of 1997 was empirically found to have had a detrimental impact 
to the economy both in the short-term and the long-term. It is also found that the 
crisis has empirically explained an increase in inward FDI in Thailand.   
 
In addition to the insight gained from growth regressions, the study also provides an 
analysis of directions of causality.  It adopts the bi-variate and multivariate Granger 
Causality tests for cointegrated variables to identify directions of causality among key 
variables of interest. The study found that: 
 
6) The results from the bi-variate Granger Causality test shows that inward FDI does 
Granger cause deficits in income account and not vice versa.  
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7)  The bi-variate Granger causality confirms the bi-directional causality between 
inward FDI and total imports.  
8)  Finally, the multivariate Granger causality tests show that there are 
interrelationships between GNI and two types of investment namely FDI and 
domestic investment. 
The proposition claiming that Thailand might be a capital-dependent state due to its 
development policy which placed too much emphasis on inward FDI seems to be supported 
by the observations made by the political economy and empirical analyses. Nevertheless, 
regarding the empirical analyses, it must be noted that the results are based on past 
performances and specific to the model environment.  
 
7.3 Policy Implications 
 
1) Need for revisions of FDI policies  
Most of the scepticism on the impact of financial liberalisation in developing countries tends 
to focus on the liberalisation of short-term capital flow. This is because the adverse impact 
from the speculative nature attached to the short-term investments can be realised relatively 
shortly after the anomalies have taken place in the economic system. However, the long-
term capital flow, FDI, has arguably been less criticised since this type of capital inflow 
produces immediate benefits, such as, the creation of employment and filling the gap in 
domestic savings. These, in general, tend to increase economic growth, at least in the short 
term. Nonetheless, the financial and technological superiorities of foreign projects could 
possibly cause structural damages to domestic markets in the long term by out-competing 
domestic entrepreneurs.  This would happen unless the state sets a number of appropriate 
policies to guarantee fair competition between domestic and foreign firms. In Thailand, the 
tax incentive scheme, offered to TNCs, such as no corporate income tax for eight years, no 
import duty, and the absence of local content requirements, limits the channels through 
which Thailand could benefit from FDI. Some FDI-growth theories, their empirical 
evidence, and the IDP suggest that spillovers from FDI can accrue if and only if FDI is 
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regulated with appropriate policies. This, in practice, implies revisions of liberalisation of 
FDI and reconsiderations of FDI deregulations. 
 
2) Special support for Thai entrepreneurs, particularly in strategic industries 
Development theories and historical evidence from industrialised nations show that 
domestic entrepreneurs are important for economic development. Thailand may be 
interested in having a special incentives scheme that is exclusively available to domestic 
entrepreneurs in order to help them to withstand international competition and to develop 
their ownership-specific advantages.  
 
3) Need for a well-crafted industrial planning 
Similarly development theories and historical evidence of other developed countries show 
that development cannot be achieved without strategic planning and effective policy 
implementation. Therefore, Thailand might need to reduce its reliance on market mechanism 
and put more energy towards producing a well-crafted industrial planning which emphasise 
the strategic coordination between domestic firms and the state. Their coordination is a key 
to successful economic development.   
 
4) Importance of  independence in designing developmental policies  
The study shows that the change in the political economy of Thailand has been largely 
influenced by external factors. The choice of sub-optimal policies that each government in 
Thailand has implemented over the years not only was not internally driven but mostly 
externally dictated. In other words, policies were mainly formed as a consequence of 
collaborations between domestic political leaders and the Washington-based international 
organisations such as, the IMF and the World Bank with the support of the United States 
and Japan. These two countries have been the main foreign investors in Thailand. The study 
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advocates the need for independent control of policy by the Thai government and its 
technocrats under the assumption that the public interest is always prioritised.  
 
7.4 Limitations and Future Work 
Even though the study has made an analytical contribution to the study of FDI and 
economic development, providing more up-to-date empirical evidence in the case of 
Thailand, and offered policy implications, there remain some limitations. However, by 
outlining these limitations, future work can be suggested.  Firstly, at the analytical level, the 
exogenous FDI-growth model, developed in Chapter 4, is still constrained by the nature of 
neo-classical specifications. That is, the model has left out the institutional aspects of the 
economy and the role of policies outside the model. Moreover, output elasticities of 
international investment, δ and β, which are critical in identifying the type of developmental 
path that the function should exhibit, are left to be determined outside the model. Even 
though these aspects can be incorporated into an analysis as intuitive after-thoughts, their 
mechanisms are not identified within the model. Therefore, it is interesting to develop an 
endogenous FDI-growth model in which δ and β are identified, probably as a function of 
ownership-specific advantage of  the country, and linked to the level of technology, A.  
Secondly, on empirical aspects, despite several salient benefits of using macro-economic 
time-series data, there remain some limitations in terms of the relevance of the research 
question and its representation of a whole economy. Moreover as FDI in Thailand is 
clustered in only a number of industries, it would be interesting to assess the impact of FDI 
at an industrial level. Indeed, the study has acknowledged this shortcoming in Chapter 5 and 
already addressed the problem by providing a review of empirical works that assessed FDI 
in Thailand, using industrial level data.  
Thirdly, even though the study has paid attention to FDI-related policies and speculated how 
they might help to explain the impact of FDI in Thailand, a fuller policy analysis can be 
carried out by a more complete study of international law that governs international trade 
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and investment, and bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements between Thailand and other 
countries. Indeed, the future study of FDI and its impact on economic development should 
also take into account the study of law and analytical tools developed in the new 
institutional economics. This is because economic decisions and organisations may not be 
only determined by the neo-classical lens of choice but also by the lens of contract.  
Lastly, the study assessed the empirical impact of FDI on Thai economic development by 
focusing on FDI in relation to trade and TNCs in relation to domestic firms. Due to 
limitation of space and scope the study did not cover an important related aspect of TNCs, 
that is, their role in an international division of labour. It would be useful to investigate how 
FDI would affect changes in average and minimal wages and how their interactions might 
help to explain the economic development in relation to FDI. 
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF INWARD FDI ON GROWT 
Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
Cave (1974) Australia and 
Canada 
1965-
1967 
Cross-
Sectional/Industry 
level 
Value added per 
worker 
Average profit, sales, 
firm‟s assets, 
Change in number of 
firms with the majority 
foreign equity  
-OLS regression 
(level linear) 
-Positive spillovers are found  
-Foreign presence tends to 
increase efficiency through 
competition 
Globerman (1979) Canada 1972 Cross-
Sectional/industry 
level 
 
Labour Productivity 
in domestic owned 
plants 
Asset/labour, 
wages*/labour, 
Tariff rate, 
Concentration index, 
value added in plant* 
-OLS regression 
(level linear) 
-Positive spillovers are found  
Blomström (1986) Mexico 1970-
1975 
Cross-
Sectional/industry 
level 
Efficiency Index 
(constructed 
variable)  
Foreign share/industry, 
concentration index, 
market growth rate, rate 
of T progress   
-OLS regression 
(level and log linear) 
-Positive relationship is reported 
between foreign ownership and 
efficiency however this is 
pronounced only in the modern 
sectors. 
-Foreign presence tends to 
increase efficiency through 
competition  
Balasubramanyam, 
Salisu and Sapsford 
(1996) 
46 developing 
countries divided in 
to ES, IS according 
to the WB 
1970-
1985 
Cross-
Sectional/country 
level 
GDP growth rate Labour, domestic capital 
stock/GDP, FDI 
stock/GDP, export, time 
trend 
-OLS regression, 
-Generalised 
Instrumental 
Variable Estimation 
(log linear) 
-Confirm Bhagwati‟s Hypothesis: 
country tends to benefit FDI more 
when they adopt Export Promotion 
(EP) policies  
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Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
De Mello (1999) -OECD vs non 
OECD not 
including Thailand 
 
1970-
1990 
Panel 
Time Series/country 
level 
-Capital 
Accumulation 
-Output Growth 
-TFP 
FDI -Bivariate VAR  
(use growth rate and 
prove that I(0)) 
-Non OECD countries exhibit more 
of 
the heterogeneity in  
the positive relationship  
between FDI and capital  
accumulation and output growth. 
Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) 
Venezuela 1976-
1989 
Panel Data /Plant 
level 
Log of real output at 
plant level 
Foreign ownership in 
plant, foreign ownership 
in sector 
-OLS regression, 
-WLS regression 
(log linear) 
-Foreign investment negatively 
affects domestically owned firms. 
-Plants with foreign ownership are 
more productive. 
-The benefit from FDI appear to be 
captured only by JV 
Ramirez (2000) Mexico 1960-
1995 
Time series analysis GDP growth rate Domestic capital stock, 
FDI, labour, 
Government 
consumption, dummies, 
time trend 
-Co-integration 
analysis 
-ECM model 
(1st dif form) 
-Positive impacts of FDI on the 
labour productivity is reported. 
 
 
Xu (2000) US MNEs 1966-
1994 
Panel Data/Country 
level 
TFP growth rate Technological gap, 
human capital, Foreign 
activity in host country 
-2SLS IVs are the 
predicted value of 
endogenous 
variables 
(level linear) 
 
-U.S. MNEs contribute to the 
productivity growth in DCs but not 
LDCs. 
- a minimum threshold of human 
capital is required in order to reap 
the benefit from FDI 
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Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
Konings (2001) Bulgaria, Romania 
and Poland 
 Panel Data/ plant level Log of real output at 
plant level 
Time trend, capital, 
material capital, FDI, 
foreign output/sector 
output 
-OLS regression 
(fixed effect) 
(log linear) 
-GMM IVs are 
endogenous 
variables in level  
-No evidence of positive spillovers 
but rather the negative effects in 
Romania and Bulgaria. 
-In Poland, foreign firms do better 
than the domestic firms.  
Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold (2001) 
Developing 
countries 
including Thailand 
1971-
1995 
Panel Data 
24 developing 
countries/country 
level  
GDP growth rate Domestic investment, 
inflation, FDI, export 
(all in growth e=rate) 
-Granger Causality 
-OLS fixed effect 
panel regression 
-Holtz-Eakin et al. 
Causality test 
(level linear) 
-The relationship between growth  
and FDI is heterogeneous across  
countries.  
-No report on country basis.  
-reject Bhagwati‟s hypothesis 
Zhang (2001) East Asia and Latin 
America 
Including Thailand 
1957-
1997 
Annual Time-series GDP FDI Granger Causality 
and ECM 
The result of FDI-led growth is 
specific to different country. In 
Thailand, no long run relationship 
can be established. In short run, 
causality runs from GDP to FDI and 
not vice versa.  
Carkovic and Levine 
(2002)  
Not identified 1960-
1995 
Panel Data of 72 
Countries/Country 
level 
GDP growth rate Initial per capita income, 
avg years of schooling, 
inflation, trade openness, 
government  size, FDI, 
FDI*schooling 
-OLS regression, 
-Dynamic panel 
regression 
-IV (GMM) 
(1st dif form) 
IVs are lagged 
value of 
endogenous 
variables.  
-FDI does not exert a reliable 
positive impact on economic growth  
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Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
Alfaro (2003) 47 countries 1981-
1999 
Panel Data/Country 
level 
GDP growth rate Initial GDP, FDI, 
inflation, government 
consumption, private 
credit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
-OLS panel 
regression 
-Instrumental
variables, IVs are 
one-period lagged 
of FDI 
(log linear) 
-FDI in primary sector tends to give 
negative impact on growth. 
-FDI in manufacturing sector
appears to give positive impact. 
-FDI in service sectors is ambiguous. 
 
Basu, Chakraborty and 
Reagle (2003) 
23 developing 
countries including 
Thailand 
 
1978-
1996 
Panel Data/Country 
level 
GDP, FDI FDI, GDP -Granger causality 
test 
-Co- integration 
(level and 1st dif 
form) 
-FDI and growth have bi-directional 
relationship in open economy. 
-GDP causes FDI in close economy. 
Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemni-Ozcan and 
Sayek (2004) 
Mixed of 
developing and 
developed countries 
including Thailand 
1980-
1995 
Panel Data of 
proximately 50 
Countries/Country 
level 
GDP growth rate Initial GDP, FDI, 
FDI*finance, , finance, 
pop growth, human 
capital government 
consumption, black 
market premium, and 
regional dummy 
-OLS regression, 
-Instrumental 
Variables, IVs are 
one-period lagged 
of FDI and a 
measure of 
creditors rights  
(log and ration 
variables) 
-FDI alone plays ambiguous 
contribution to economic growth. 
-FDI tends to beneficial when the 
host country has a well-developed 
financial market. 
Jarvorcik (2004) Lithuania 1996-
2000 
Panel Data/Plant level Real output of firm Value of fixed assets, 
labour, material, foreign 
share/total equity, 
horizontal and vertical 
integration 
-OLS regression 
-Olley-Pakes 
Regression 
(allow for dynamics 
in production  
functions) 
-Positive effect of FDI is capture by 
JV and not by wholly subsidiaries 
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Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
Chowdhury and 
Mavrotas (2005) 
Chile, Malaysia and 
Thailand 
1969-
2000 
Time series analysis GDP FDI -Toda-Yamamoto 
test 
(level) 
-A bi-directional causality between 
FDI and GDP in Thailand and 
Malaysia. 
-Only GDP to FDI in the case of 
Chile.  
   
Yao and Wei (2007) China 1979-
2003 
Panel Data of 19 
provinces/Micro 
Level 
Log of GDP  Labour, capital, 
exchange rate, human 
capital, FDI/total 
investment, time trend, 
export/GDP 
-Random effect 
Model, Fixed effect 
model (OLS) 
-GMM. No IV 
identified 
(level) 
 
-Positive impact of FDI on the 
growth of output is found. 
-The asymmetric economic 
performance is found between 
different regions. 
 
 
Busse and Groizard 
(2006) 
Not identified 1994-
2003 
Panel Data/ Country 
level 
Log of per capita 
GDP 
-initial GDP per capita, 
FDI inflows/GDP, black 
market premium for 
foreign currency, 
changes in CPI, pop 
growth, Gove con/GDP, 
openness to trade 
-OLS regression 
-2SLS, IVs are log 
level of GDP per 
capita, FDI in level 
and the interaction 
between FDI in 
level and 
regulation dummy 
variables  
(log linear) 
 
-Heavily regulated countries are 
unlikely to benefit from FDI.  
-Any attempt to offer tax incentive 
for FDI is unlikely to realise the 
positive externalities if the quality of 
regulatory is low.  
-Advocate for sound institutional 
framework, trade liberalisation and 
economic integration 
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Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
Ran, Voon and Li 
(2007) 
China 2001-
2003 
19 industries in 30 
provinces (excluding 
Taiwan and Tibet) 
Gross output Total labour 
productivity, number of 
high school and college 
graduate, FDI 
-GLS regression 
-Instrumental 
Variables, IVs are 
one period lagged 
of FDI and rate 
exchange rate in 
level  
(log and level linear) 
-The positive impact of FDI fades 
over time and heterogeneous across 
regions.  
-China as a whole does not appear to 
benefit from inflow of FDI 
Goss, Wingender and 
Torau (2007) 
U.S. 1988-
1999 
Cross-
sectional/Industry 
level 
Industry‟s output Labour‟s hours by 
industry, FDI by 
industry, domestic 
capital by industry, age, 
education and timer 
variables 
 
-Fixed effect panel 
regression 
(log linear) 
-The positive impact of foreign 
capital on the U.S, productivity is 
reported. 
Basu and Guariglia 
(2007) 
Not identified 1970-
1999 
Panel Data of 119 
developing countries/ 
Country level 
Gini index, 
GDP per capita 
growth rate, Share 
of agriculture/GDP 
FDI, black market 
premium, openness, pop 
growth rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Instrumental 
Variables, IVs are 2 
to 5 lag of FDI, 
M2/GDP, black 
market premium, 
openness, pop 
growth rate 
(growth level) 
-FDI positively relates to the 
educational inequality 
-FDI positive relates to the growth 
rate 
-FDI relates to the decline of the 
agriculture share in GDP. 
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Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
Yang (2008) Not identified 1973-
2002 
Panel Data of 110 
countries/ Country 
level 
GDP growth rate Domestic investment, 
initial GDP, FDI 
inflows, Government 
size, Inflation, trade 
openness, availability of 
credit  
-Fixed effect panel 
regression 
-The effect of FDI on growth is 
heterogeneous across time and 
region. 
-Positive effect of FDI on growth ion 
OECD countries. 
FDI positively affect Latin America 
and negatively affect Middle East.  
-No significant effect of FDI found 
in East Asia 
Bang Vu (2008) Vietnam 1990-
2002 
Cross-
Sectional/Industry 
Level 
Log of output per 
sector 
Capital, Human Capital, 
FDI*Human Capital, 
interest rate, interest 
rate*capital 
-OLS regression, 
-Feasible GLS 
-Least square 
Dummy Variable 
-Granger Causality 
(log linear) 
-FDI has a positive effect on 
economic growth through labour 
productivity.  
-The effect is not equally distributed. 
Herzer, Klasen and 
Lehmann (2008) 
28 developing 
countries including 
Thailand  
1970-
2003 
Time series analysis Log GDP in real 
terms  
FDI/GDP -Bivariate ECM 
model 
-Granger Causality 
 
-No robust evidence to support the 
positive impact of FDI on growth. 
-Thailand exhibits short-run bi-
directional between FDI and GDP 
but not in a long run. 
Only   
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Foreign Investment and Positive Externalities 
Authors Country Year Data How Positive 
Externalities are 
measured (DV) 
Independent Variables 
(IV) 
Identification 
Strategy 
Findings 
Batten and Vinh Vo 
(2009) 
Not identified 1980-
2003 
Panel Data of 79 
countries/ country 
level 
GDP growth rate FDI, FDI/GDP, 
Education, Government 
consumption, Trade 
openness, Inflation, size 
of stock market, 
domestic credit 
-Fixed effect panel 
data 
-GMM 
No IV is identified  
(level) 
-Positive impacts are conditional on 
the level of education, trade 
openness. Note that the results are 
sensitive to the sensitivity analysis. 
Ang (2009) Thailand 1970-
2004 
Time series analysis GDP per capita in 
real terms 
Gross fixed capital 
formation/GDP, FD-
M2/GDP and credit to 
private sector/GDP, FDI 
and FDI*FD  
-ECM  
(level) 
 
-FDI has a negative impact on output 
-FDI through FD give positive 
impact but the magnitude is modest.   
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APPENDIX B:  SOME LIKELY BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OF FDI TO HOST COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Dunning (1994 
Type of FDI Some Likely benefit to host countries Some Likely costs to host countries 
Natural Resources-Seeking 1) Upgrading existing technology and knowledge 
2) Providing access to foreign market 
3) Creating the local spin-off for example, help 
creating secondary processing industries 
4) Increasing the standard of product qualities 
5) Fostering clusters of resource-based related 
activities 
 
1) Creating an outflow of natural resources 
2) Depleting natural resources and casing 
environmental problems  
Market-Seeking 1) Upgrading the existing technology and knowledge 
2) Enhancing vertical linkages spillovers through an 
establishment of suppliers and consumers network 
3) Stimulating local entrepreneurship and domestic 
rivalry 
1) Distorting the competition by inducing  too strong 
firms into the domestic markets 
2) Impeding the formation of domestic entrepreneurs 
3) Substitute for international trade when domestic 
market is protected  
Efficiency-Seeking 1) Improving international division of labour and cross 
border networking 
2) Facilitating the structural adjustment 
3) Increasing the comparative advantages of host 
countries 
4) Similar to the effects induced by market seeking 
1) Impeding the formation of high skill workers in case 
where the host countries are located in the low 
level of production process 
Strategic-Seeking 1) Providing new financial capital and complementary 
assets 
2) Providing access to foreign market 
3) Stimulating local entrepreneurship and domestic 
rivalry 
4)Improving international division of labour and cross 
border networking 
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APPENDIX C: REPORT OF TFP STUDIES IN THAILAND 
 
This appendix reports Total Factor Productivity studies from Tinakorn and Sussangkarn 
(1996, 1998), Sitthikul (2001), Chandrachai, Bangorn, and Kamjara (2004), and Bosworth 
(2005) respectively. All studies adopted the parametric approach assuming the Cobb-
Douglas or the Translog production function. The weight attached to capital and labour 
varies from one study to another but the classification of economic sector is consistent in all 
studies. The classification is made as follows. The economy is classified into three different 
sectors, namely, agriculture, industry, and service. Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
construction and utilities are categorised as industry. Service sector includes transport, 
communication, wholesale and retail trades, banking, insurance, real estates, ownership 
dwelling, public administration and other services.   
TABLE C1: SOURCE OF GROWTH BY SECTOR, TDRI STUDY, 1977-1990 
Component 
Total 
Economy 
Agriculture Industry 
Services and 
Others 
Real Output Growth 
7.6 
(100.0) 
4.0 
(100.0) 
9.0 
(100.0) 
8.0 
(100.0) 
     
Contribution of:      
     
- Labor 
3.5 
(45.7) 
1.9 
(47.6) 
3.8 
(42.0) 
5.0 
(62.4) 
     
 Employment  
2.0 
(26.0) 
1.3 
(31.2) 
3.2 
(35.7) 
2.9 
(35.5) 
     
 Quality Changes 
1.5 
(19.8) 
0.7 
(16.4) 
0.6 
(6.3) 
2.2 
(26.9) 
     
- Capital 
2.8 
(37.2) 
0.7 
(17.9) 
5.8 
(64.8) 
3.3 
(40.9) 
     
- Land 
0.1 
(1.2) 
0.1 
(2.2) 
- - 
     
- TFP 
1.2 
(10.2) 
1.3 
(32.2) 
-0.6 
(-6.8) 
-0.3 
(-3.2) 
Source: Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1996), Tables 4.12 and 5.21. 
Note: Percentage distribution in parentheses 
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TABLE C2: SOURCE OF GROWTH BY SECTOR, TDRI STUDY, 1980-1995 
Component 
Total 
Economy 
Agriculture Industry 
Services and 
Others 
Real Output Growth 
8.1 
(100.0) 
3.7 
(100.0) 
10.5 
(100.0) 
7.8 
(100.0) 
     
Contribution of:      
     
- Labor 
1.8 
(22.2) 
0.5 
(13.5) 
4.0 
(37.8) 
2.9 
(37.4) 
     
 Employment  
1.0 
(11.8) 
0.1 
(3.8) 
2.9 
(27.4) 
2.1 
(26.7) 
     
 Quality Changes 
0.8 
(10.3) 
0.4 
(9.7) 
1.1 
(10.4) 
0.8 
(10.7) 
     
- Capital 
5.0 
(61.7) 
2.2 
(60.4) 
7.2 
(68.6) 
5.3 
(67.7) 
     
- Land 
0.0 
(0.4) 
0.0 
(1.1) 
- - 
     
- TFP 
1.3 
(15.6) 
0.9 
(25.1) 
-0.7 
(-6.4) 
-0.4 
(-5.1) 
Source: Tinakorn and Sussangkarn (1998). 
Note: Percentage distribution in parentheses 
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TABLE C3: SOURCE OF GROWTH BY SECTOR, SITTHIKUL STUDY, 1980-1996 
Component 
Sector 
Total Agriculture 
Non-
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Real Output Growth 8.0 3.8 8.8 10.1 
     
Contribution of:      
     
- Labor 
2.7 
(33.8) 
1.2 
(31.6) 
3.7 
(42.0) 
3.9 
(38.5) 
     
 Employment  
0.9 
(11.3) 
-0.1 
(-2.6) 
2.5 
(28.4) 
2.3 
(22.7) 
     
 Quality Changes 
1.8 
(22.5) 
1.3 
(34.2) 
1.2 
(13.6) 
1.6 
(15.8) 
     
- Capital 
4.9 
(61.3) 
2.3 
(60.5) 
5.5 
(62.5) 
6.8 
(67.2) 
     
- TFP 
0.5 
(6.3) 
0.2 
(5.3) 
-0.4 
(-4.5) 
-0.5 
(-4.9) 
Source: Sitthikul (2001). 
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TABLE C4: SOURCE OF GROWTH BY SECTOR, ACHARA ET AL. STUDY, 1977-1999 
  Aggregate Economy  Sectors, 1977-96 
Component 1977-1999 1977-1996 1977-1990  Agriculture Industry Services 
        
Real Output Growth 6.0 7.5 7.3  3.5 7.8 7.5 
 (100) (100) (100)  (100) (100) (100) 
Contribution of:         
          
  - Labor 1.9 2.0 2.5  n/a  n/a n/a 
 (31.7) (26.9) (34.7)     
        
     - Employment 1.2 1.4 1.8  0.4 1.4 1.9 
 (19.4) (18.4) (25.4)  (10.5) (18.3) (25.7) 
        
     - Quality Changes 0.7 0.6 0.7  n/a  n/a  n/a  
 (12.3) (8.5) (9.3)     
        
  - Capital  3.6 3.9 3.0  1.3 6.4 5.0 
 (59.7) (52.3) (40.9)  (37.4) (81.1) (67.1) 
        
  - Land n/a  n/a  n/a   n/a  n/a  n/a  
        
  - TFP  0.5 1.6 1.8  1.8 0.0 0.5 
  (100) (100) (100)   (100) (100) (100) 
Source: Achara and others (2004). 
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TABLE C5: SOURCE OF GROWTH BY SECTOR, BOSWORTH STUDY, 1977-2004 
 Total Economy  Agriculture  Industry 
 1977- 1977- 1999-  1977- 1977- 1999-  1977- 1977- 1999- 
Component 2004 1996 2004   2004 1996 2004   2004 1996 2004 
Real Output 
Growth 6.0 7.7 5.0  2.9 3.3 3.2  8.0 10.2 6.3 
Contribution of:             
  - Labor 1.8 2.0 1.9  0.4 0.5 0.1  2.7 3.5 2.9 
 (30) (25) (30)  (14) (16) (14)  (34) (34) (34) 
            
     - Employment 1.4 1.6 1.4  0.2 0.4 -0.1  2.3 3.2 2.7 
 (23) (21) (23)  (8) (12) (8)  (29) (31) (29) 
            
     - Quality 0.4 0.3 0.4  0.2 0.1 0.2  0.4 0.3 0.4 
 (7) (4) (7)  (6) (4) (6)  (5) (3) (5) 
            
  - Capital  3.1 4.0 0.9  1.9 1.9 1.6  4.7 6.1 1.2 
 (52) (51) (52)  (68) (59) (68)  (59) (59) (59) 
            
  - Land 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.1 0.0  n/a n/a n/a 
            
  - TFP  1.0 1.6 2.1  0.5 0.7 1.4  0.4 0.4 2.0 
 (16) (21) (16)  (17) (23) (17)  (5) (4) (5) 
                        
 Manufacturing  Services     
 1977- 1977- 1999-  1977- 1977- 1999-     
 2004 1996 2004   2004 1996 2004     
Real Output 
Growth 8.4 10.2 6.6  5.4 7.3 4.2     
Contribution of:             
  - Labor 2.8 3.2 2.9  3.4 3.5 3.6     
 (34) (31) (34)  (63) (47) (63)     
            
     - Employment 2.4 2.8 2.6  2.9 3.1 2.7     
 (29) (27) (29)  (53) (42) (53)     
            
     - Quality 0.4 0.4 0.4  0.5 0.4 0.5     
 (5) (4) (5)  (10) (5) (10)     
            
  - Capital  4.1 5.4 0.8  2.5 3.2 0.6     
 (49) (53) (49)  (46) (44) (46)     
            
  - Land n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a     
            
  - TFP  1.2 1.3 2.7  -0.5 0.5 0.0     
  (15) (13) (15)   (-9) (7) (-9)         
Source: Bosworth (2005)
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APPENDIX D: NET FLOW OF FDI BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 
 
 
Net flow of FDI by economic sector in percentage 
 
 
            2008  2007 2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  
Industry  56.45 50.26 39.09 62.99 97.32 67.38 73.47 78.77 70.92 29.93 
Manufacturing 45.17 35.80 38.83 52.74 76.39 46.63 54.08 58.64 64.36 35.62 
Agriculture 0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.19 0.12 0.55 0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.05 
Service 43.46 49.71 60.93 36.81 2.57 32.08 26.44 21.32 29.05 70.02 
Total (Industry + Service + Agriculture) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
           
           
             1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  1991  1990  1989  
Industry  50.18 56.49 35.02 32.92 23.31 42.54 51.94 60.03 55.58 58.53 
Manufacturing 42.91 50.12 31.22 28.30 38.72 26.09 17.20 46.21 47.87 47.84 
Agriculture 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.47 -0.47 0.75 -0.27 1.16 1.18 1.32 
Service 49.81 43.48 64.89 66.61 77.16 56.70 48.33 38.80 43.24 40.15 
Total (Industry + Service + Agriculture) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Bank of Thailand, (2009) 
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Net flow of FDI by economic sector in percentage (continued) 
 
 
  1988  1987  1986  1985  1984  1983  1982  1981  1980  1979  
Industry  66.73 69.41 52.08 79.15 72.51 58.02 84.38 71.40 61.75 103.94 
Manufacturing 57.79 52.42 30.74 30.86 32.74 31.33 28.41 39.45 26.13 64.22 
Agriculture 1.13 3.15 2.92 1.77 0.70 0.58 0.36 0.11 5.42 0.40 
Service 32.14 27.43 44.98 19.06 26.78 41.38 15.25 28.48 32.82 -4.38 
Total (Industry + Service + Agriculture) 100.00 99.99 99.98 99.98 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.96 
           
           
             1978  1977  1976  1975  1974  1973  1972  1971  1970  
 Industry  63.71 45.18 43.23 46.58 60.13 48.84 55.69 47.65 62.78 
 Manufacturing 41.01 30.46 28.42 33.36 26.87 37.91 21.61 13.64 50.18 
 Agriculture -1.59 -0.01 0.07 0.11 0.40 0.31 0.34 0.00 0.00 
 Service 37.84 54.81 56.65 53.26 39.46 50.77 43.95 52.25 37.20 
 Total (Industry + Service + Agriculture) 99.96 99.98 99.95 99.95 99.98 99.93 99.97 99.90 99.98 
 Source: Bank of Thailand, (2009) 
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APPENDIX E: DATA PREPARATION 
 
This appendix presents source of data by series, its completion and the extrapolation of 
times series data in the case where there are missing observations. 
TABLE E1: SUMMARY OF SOURCE OF DATA AND VARIABLES CONSTRUCTIONS 
Series Description/Source
 
Preparation
 
gni
1 
Gross National Income 
(US$ million, current)/ Quarterly 
International Financial Statistics, IMF, 
(2010) 
See below 
gdp
1 
Gross Domestic Product (US$ million, 
current)/ Quarterly International Financial 
Statistics, IMF, (2010) 
See below 
stock_fdi
3 
Inward FDI, approximated by the stock of 
inward FDI (US$ millions)/ UNCTADstat 
(2010) 
Data comes in annual time-series. It is then 
transformed into a higher frequency using a 
method, quadratic-average, by Eviews 6. 
This method is selected in accordance to how 
quarterly data of GDP and GNI is distributed. 
flow_fdi 
Inflow of inward FDI (US$ million, 
current)/ Quarterly International Financial 
Statistics, IMF, (2010) 
- 
import 
Import values including cost, insurance, 
and freight. (US$ million)/ Quarterly 
International Financial Statistics, IMF, 
(2010) 
- 
export 
Export values Free on Board 
(US$ million)/ Quarterly International 
Financial Statistics, IMF, (2010) 
- 
deficits
3 
Income deficits calculated from the 
summation of income debit and income 
credit then multiply with (-1) to get 
positive number. (US$ million)/Balance of 
Payment, IMF, (2010) 
Data comes in annual time-series. It is then 
transformed into a higher frequency using a 
method, quadratic-average, by Eviews 6. 
This method is selected in accordance to how 
quarterly data of GDP and GNI is distributed. 
gross fixed 
capital 
formation
1 
Gross fixed capital formation 
(US$ million, current)/ Quarterly 
International Financial Statistics, IMF, 
(2010) 
- 
labour
2 
Labour force (thousand)/ Quarterly 
International Financial Statistics, IMF, 
(2010) 
See below 
dinv
1 
Gross fixed capital formation minus inflow 
FDI/ Quarterly and annual International 
Financial Statistics, IMF, (2010) 
See below 
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Table E1 reports the source of data. The superscript found in the first column is associated 
to the method of data preparation. Series without superscript is taken from the source 
without making adjustment.  It must be noted that this study aimed to intervene the data set 
the least possible. Those with superscript are involved in data preparation process to the 
different degree. The details can be found below. 
 
1) Under this category, the quarterly data is available from Q1: 1993 onwards. This 
means that observations prior to Q1: 1993 are derived by the frequency 
transformation from annual time-series in accordance with the data distribution in 
the original series.  
 
2) Labour force time-series data in quarterly basis is also available from Q1: 1993. 
However, its annual time series is only available from 1980. Thus, this study 
conducted the extrapolation of this series, during 1977-1979, by assuming its 
changes in accordance with the changes in population of the same year.  
 
3)  Under this category, time series data is not taken from the International Financial 
Statistics, IMF. Thus, quarterly time series data under this category have been 
derived from the frequency transformation.  
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TABLE E2: GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION OF EACH VARIABLE 
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TABLE E3: THE RESULTS OF LAG LENGTH SELECTION 
 
Note: The above results are computed from the unrestricted VAR with 20 lag.
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: LGNI LDINV FDI_GDP LOG(LB)     
Exogenous variables: C CRISIS D_1 D_2 D_3     
Date: 06/07/11   Time: 16:10     
Sample: 1980Q1 2009Q4     
Included observations: 104     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  227.8204 NA   2.16e-07 -3.996545 -3.488009 -3.790522 
1  783.6485  1015.455  6.71e-12 -14.37786  -13.46249* -14.00701 
2  818.8262  61.56099  4.66e-12 -14.74666 -13.42446 -14.21100 
3  854.0048  58.85651  3.24e-12 -15.11548 -13.38645  -14.41500* 
4  875.4812  34.27970  2.95e-12 -15.22079 -13.08494 -14.35550 
5  891.7197  24.66998  2.98e-12 -15.22538 -12.68270 -14.19526 
6  906.7268  21.64490  3.11e-12 -15.20628 -12.25677 -14.01135 
7  919.1910  17.01837  3.43e-12 -15.13829 -11.78195 -13.77854 
8  929.4151  13.17336  3.98e-12 -15.02721 -11.26404 -13.50264 
9  949.2833  24.07111  3.89e-12 -15.10160 -10.93160 -13.41221 
10  965.7563  18.69053  4.11e-12 -15.11070 -10.53387 -13.25649 
11  988.2419  23.78284  3.92e-12 -15.23542 -10.25176 -13.21639 
12  1005.647  17.07056  4.21e-12 -15.26245 -9.871957 -13.07860 
13  1043.797  34.48180  3.10e-12 -15.68841 -9.891090 -13.33974 
14  1087.516   36.15226*   2.11e-12* -16.22147 -10.01732 -13.70798 
15  1112.200  18.51257  2.13e-12 -16.38846 -9.777478 -13.71015 
16  1138.090  17.42591  2.19e-12  -16.57865* -9.560840 -13.73553 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
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APPENDIX F. THE ESTIMATION OF UNRESTRICTED VECTOR 
AUTOREGRESSIONS 
This appendix presents the results of unrestricted vector autoregressions from Regressions 
3 and 4 whose residuals are found to be stationary in levels. The results are reported in 
Table F1, found below.  
TABLE F1: THE ESTIMATION OF UNRESTRICTED VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS 
Regression 3  
Regression 4 
 
independent 
variables 
coefficient 
 independent 
variables 
coefficient 
lg_def(-1) -0.124 
(-3.828) 
 lg_imp(-1) -0.151 
(-2.503) 
lg_fdi(-1) 0.063 
(2.859) 
 lg_fdi(-1) 0.128 
(2.003) 
Δdef(-1)* 0.570 
(6.404) 
 Δimp(-1)* 0.029 
(2.648) 
Δdef(-2)* 0.205 
(2.258) 
 Δimp(-2) -0.064 
(0.548) 
Δdef(-3) 0.049 
(0.531) 
 Δimp(-3) 0.117 
(0.996) 
Δdef(-4)* -0.493 
(-5.502) 
 Δimp(-4) 0.140 
(1.042) 
Δdef(-5)* 0.489 
(4.932) 
 Δimp(-5)* 0.367 
(2.708) 
Δdef(-6) 0.080 
(0.775) 
 Δimp(-6) -0.116 
(-0.825) 
Δdef(-7) -0.031 
(-0.304) 
 Δimp(-7) -0.075 
(-0.565) 
Δdef(-8) -0.065 
(-0.698) 
 Δimp(-8) 0.005 
(0.037) 
Δdef(-9) 0.186 
(2.200) 
 Δimp(-9) 0.200 
(1.502) 
Δdef(-10) -0.024 
(-0.283) 
 Δimp(-10) -0.098 
(-0.745) 
Δdef(-11) -0.009 
(-0.108) 
 Δimp(-11) 0.198 
(1.522) 
Δdef(-12) -0.010 
(-0.166) 
 Δimp(-12) -0.111 
(-0.848) 
Δfdi(-1)* -0.000 
(-0.111) 
 Δfdi(-1)* -0.000 
(-1.168) 
Δfdi(-2) 0.000 
(0.567) 
 Δfdi(-2) -0.000 
(-0.694) 
Δfdi(-3) 0.000 
(0.148) 
 Δfdi(-3) 0.000 
(1.394) 
Δfdi(-4) -0.000 
(-0.785) 
 Δfdi(-4) 0.000 
(1.600) 
Δfdi(-5) 0.000 
(1.113) 
 Δfdi(-5) -0.000 
(-0.934) 
Δfdi(-6) 0.000 
(0.478) 
 Δfdi(-6) -0.000 
(-0.179) 
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Regression 3  
Regression 4 
 
independent 
variables 
coefficient 
 independent 
variables 
coefficient 
Δfdi(-7) 0.000 
(0.204) 
 Δfdi(-7) 0.000 
(0.039) 
Δfdi(-8) -0.000 
(0.000) 
 Δfdi(-8) -0.000 
(-0.962) 
Δfdi(-9) 0.000 
(1.161) 
 Δfdi(-9) 0.000 
(0.213) 
Δfdi(-10) 0.000 
(0.602) 
 Δfdi(-10) 0.000 
(0.567) 
Δfdi(-11) 0.000 
(0.053) 
 Δfdi(-11) 0.000 
(0.149) 
Δfdi(-12)* 0.000 
(2.115) 
 Δfdi(-12) -0.000 
(-0.766) 
crisis 0.074 
(1.614) 
 crisis 0.007 
(0.110) 
constant 0.231 
(3.398) 
 constant 0.429 
(1.755) 
R
2 
0.756  R
2 
0.446 
F-statistic 9.103  F-statistic 2.249 
S.E. equation 0.058  S.E. equation 0.072 
Note: Numbers reported in parentheses are t-staistic 
              *
indicates that the variable is included in the error correction model reported in   
Table 6.4, p. 192. 
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APPENDIX G: THAI IMPORT AND EXPORT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR 
 
 
I. Imports 
 
 
Import by economic group 
 
  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  
Consumer Goods 12,849.75 13,817.77 10,985.87 9,656.25 8,377.41 7,454.43 6,326.29 5,737.16 
Raw Materials and Intermediate 
Goods 
51,550.42 73,484.02 60,028.38 52,183.12 49,390.69 41,822.07 32,972.15 28,622.46 
Capital Goods 35,726.95 42,957.08 35,811.97 34,560.45 32,003.34 25,716.66 21,932.01 18,750.88 
Other Imports 33,541.02 48,965.86 33,139.46 32,373.34 28,406.14 19,040.85 13,807.88 11,131.51 
Total 133,668.14 179,224.73 139,965.68 128,773.16 118,177.58 94,034.01 75,038.33 64,242.01 
 
Import by economic group as a percentage of total import 
 
  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  
Consumer Goods 9.61 7.71 7.85 7.50 7.09 7.93 8.43 8.93 
Raw Materials and Intermediate Goods 38.57 41.00 42.89 40.52 41.79 44.48 43.94 44.55 
Capital Goods 26.73 23.97 25.59 26.84 27.08 27.35 29.23 29.19 
Other Imports 25.09 27.32 23.68 25.14 24.04 20.25 18.40 17.33 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Bank of Thailand, (2009) 
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I.  Imports (continued) 
 
 
Import by economic group 
       
         2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  
Consumer Goods 5,307.00 5,130.45 4,119.99 3,485.52 4,957.00 5,382.01 5,344.87 
Raw Materials and Intermediate Goods 26,910.30 29,545.99 24,407.24 20,845.61 26,816.29 30,090.58 30,771.44 
Capital Goods 18,779.40 16,914.03 14,131.74 13,046.42 21,647.15 23,719.06 23,393.75 
Other Imports 10,755.13 10,589.68 7,260.61 5,024.57 9,865.68 13,056.05 11,207.90 
Total 61,751.83 62,180.15 49,919.58 42,402.12 63,286.12 72,247.70 70,717.96 
        Import by economic group as a percentage of total 
import 
      
         2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  
Consumer Goods 8.59 8.25 8.25 8.22 7.83 7.45 7.56 
Raw Materials and Intermediate Goods 43.58 47.52 48.89 49.16 42.37 41.65 43.51 
Capital Goods 30.41 27.20 28.31 30.77 34.21 32.83 33.08 
Other Imports 17.42 17.03 14.54 11.85 15.59 18.07 15.85 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Bank of Thailand, (2009) 
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II. Exports 
 
Export by sector 
        
          2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  
Primary 16,859.78 21,297.33 16,531.04 14,886.66 11,857.34 11,163.74 9,432.82 7,613.39 
Manufacturing 135,542.66 156,436.07 136,148.27 113,121.75 97,420.48 83,736.07 68,770.68 58,424.80 
   High-tech products 92,332.06 111,444.20 99,857.36 83,446.77 70,843.76 60,160.33 47,514.65 40,125.11 
Samples & other unclassified 
goods 
15.32 26.10 1,026.27 1,525.13 1,466.87 1,441.84 1,704.21 1,973.02 
Re-exports 4.44 18.09 161.88 188.15 191.70 160.61 131.68 145.09 
Total exports 152,422.24 177,777.61 153,867.49 129,721.71 110,936.42 96,502.29 80,039.42 68,156.32 
         
         Percentage share of total export 
        
          2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  
Primary 11.06 11.98 10.74 11.48 10.69 11.57 11.79 11.17 
Manufacturing 88.93 88.00 88.48 87.20 87.82 86.77 85.92 85.72 
   High-tech products 60.58 62.69 64.90 64.33 63.86 62.34 59.36 58.87 
Samples & other unclassified 
goods 
0.01 0.01 0.67 1.18 1.32 1.49 2.13 2.89 
Re-exports 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.21 
Total exports 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Bank of Thailand, (2009) 
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II. Exports (continued) 
 
 
Export by sector 
       
         2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  
Primary 7,452.14 7,979.40 7,278.83 7,609.45 8,797.67 9,496.28 9,593.02 
Manufacturing 55,482.62 59,831.37 49,428.31 44,973.59 48,286.87 45,746.36 46,527.65 
   High-tech products 37,939.20 42,122.44 33,151.24 29,708.72 30,455.22 27,456.65 26,350.83 
Samples & other unclassified 
goods 2,156.14 1,871.01 1,668.00 1,749.74 1,151.18 638.67 509.41 
Re-exports 95.69 93.71 126.09 148.50 195.60 102.66 95.19 
Total exports 65,186.62 69,775.51 58,501.26 54,481.31 58,431.34 55,983.99 56,725.30 
        
        Percentage share of total export 
       
         2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  
Primary 11.43 11.44 12.44 13.97 15.06 16.96 16.91 
Manufacturing 85.11 85.75 84.49 82.55 82.64 81.71 82.02 
   High-tech products 58.20 60.37 56.67 54.53 52.12 49.04 46.45 
Samples & other unclassified 
goods 3.31 2.68 2.85 3.21 1.97 1.14 0.90 
Re-exports 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.18 0.17 
Total exports 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Bank of Thailand, (2009) 
 
